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Abstract 
In recent years, researchers have begun to identify cross-cultural and 
within-cultural variation with respect to several domains of human cognition. 
These include the effects of language background on executive control, 
differences in the attentional patterns of individuals in the United States and 
East Asia, and the relationship between personality and the use of language. 
The underlying mechanisms for how cognitive variation arises is likely due to 
interactions within a complex system that spans the cognition of individuals 
and the dissemination of information at a cultural level. This culture-cognition 
system can be seen as dynamic system of cognitive tools, instruments – 
biological or technological – through which people interact with and 
understand the world. Each individual acquires a unique bias for using 
particular cognitive tools – or a cognitive style. Differences in cognitive style 
arise for two reasons. First, individuals who are exposed to different cognitive 
tools will acquire different cognitive styles. Second, individuals may need to 
strengthen certain preexisting cognitive tools if they cannot optimally support 
the acquisition of a new cognitive tool. In this dissertation, I argue that the 
understanding of cognitive tools and styles is critical for research on cognitive 
variation. I illustrate this point with three case studies that examine the 
effects of language learning on executive control, US-Japan differences in 
attentional style, and the relation between personality and vocabulary size.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.” 
 -English Proverb 
 
"A culture, like an individual, is a more or less consistent pattern 
of thought and action"  
 -Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture, pg. 46  
 
Cognitive science can be defined as the interdisciplinary study of 
the mind. As an interdisciplinary field, cognitive science has recruited 
the theories and methodologies of disciplines such as philosophy, 
psychology, neuroscience, anthropology, linguistics, and computer 
science. The scope of cognitive phenomena studied by the field is quite 
broad, taking into account human behavior and the brain, artificial 
intelligence, animals, and even systems of individual agents, such as ant 
colonies or human societies. Despite this broader scope, much of the 
discipline is guided specifically to understand the universal properties 
of the human mind. This is especially true of cognitive science studies 
that are closely tied to cognitive psychology, which specializes in 
inferring such universals from controlled laboratory experiments.  
For various reasons – to be detailed below – cognitive science’s 
focus on the mind has shifted attention away from understanding how 
the mind varies (D’Andrade, 2000). Such shift has led the field to act as 
if many of the discoveries made in the field generalize to all human 
minds. For example, most human behavioral experiments are performed 
at western universities where undergraduates between the ages of 18 
and 22 are used as research participants (see Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010 for detailed argument). In order to show that these 
generalize to all human minds, these same experiments must be 
performed on other age groups, individuals outside of academic contexts, 
and those in non-western cultures. Indeed, many experimental studies 
do not generalize when they are performed on individuals of different 
backgrounds (e.g. Ellen Bialystok, 1999; Henrich et al., 2010; Senzaki, 
Masuda, & Ishii, 2014b; Takao, Yamani, & Ariga, 2018; Ueda et al., 
2018).  
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Recent attention has highlighted that cognition does indeed vary 
from person to person, and from culture to culture (e.g. Bialystok, 1999; 
Henrich et al., 2010; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; Yu, Abrego-Collier, & 
Sonderegger, 2013). Such attention has coincided with an increased 
interest in documenting the mental processes of individuals across and 
within language and cultural divides. This research has covered 
variation with respect to differences in language (Bialystok & Craik, 
2010; Lucy, 2016; Senzaki, Masuda, & Ishii, 2014a), culture (Miyamoto, 
Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005), personality 
(Deyoung, Quilty, Peterson, & Gray, 2014; Jackson, 2018; Yu et al., 
2013), genetics (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), 
and various environmental factors (Ueda et al., 2018; Ueda & Komiya, 
2012).   
The importance of examining cognitive variation appears first 
and foremost to be the ability to understand which aspects of cognition 
are truly universal and the degree to which cognition is shaped by the 
environment. However, the fact that cognition varies with respect to the 
environment is integral to the understanding of cognition itself. Not only 
do such studies reveal information about the role of the environment but 
they also help in the understanding of how all aspects of cognition (e.g. 
language, vision, action, perception) come together to form cognition as 
a whole.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to introduce a new framework 
for understanding cognitive variation. I suggest that cognition and 
culture, together, form a complex dynamic system. As parts of a single 
system, culture will affect cognition and cognition will affect culture 
because they share the same information that constitutes this larger 
system. In particular, culture-cognition systems are comprised of 
cognitive tools – ways of interacting with and understanding the world. 
Each individual has a unique cognitive style – collection of biases for 
using particular cognitive tools. Individuals will have different cognitive 
styles if they have different cultural backgrounds, as they will have been 
exposed to different cognitive tools. Investigating these differences 
requires (1) detailed understanding of culture-cognition systems and (2) 
appropriate measures of individual differences.  
1.1 The Historical Imbalance 
The current state of studies on cognitive variation can be 
understood by examining the history of cognitive science. A lack of 
attention towards cognitive variation can ultimately be traced to early 
theoretical frameworks in cognitive science that split behavioral 
research into the study of mental processes (e.g. perception, decision 
  
 
3 
making, sentence processing) and mental content (e.g. the concept of 
‘dog’, color terms, cultural beliefs). As the field tended towards the study 
of processes over content, it shifted away from understanding cognitive 
variation (D’Andrade, 2000). However, newer theoretical advances 
suggest that the mind is a complex dynamic system in which there is no 
distinction between process and content (see Spivey, 2005 for review). 
Counter to this shift, methodologies that focus on content – especially 
those of cognitive anthropologists – may be particularly useful in the 
study of cognition as a complex dynamic system.  
Stemming from the early ideas of Noam Chomsky (1957) and 
later Jerry Fodor (1983), the human mind was believed to consist of 
innate modules that carry out specific tasks. While each module existed 
to process specific kinds of information (e.g. sentential word order or 
low-level visual perception), the organization and purpose of each 
module were said to be invariant with respect to the information that an 
individual processed. Such thinking allows one to use a computer as a 
metaphor for the mind. The modules of the mind act like the hardware 
of the computer, while the contents of the mind act like the software of 
the computer. The physical body of the computer can be seen as 
independent from software and a single hardware architecture is able to 
take on a myriad of various software programs without needing to 
restructure the hardware1.  
This view also suggests that the mind, like the computer, takes 
advantage of symbolic processing. Such processing – akin to algebraic 
manipulation – can manipulate symbols that stand in for some sort of 
mental object that is being processed. For example, syntactic theories 
often suggest that a few specific rules govern how all the words in a 
single language are ordered in sentences (Chomsky, 1957). These rules 
are able to be applied to every word because the rules act on symbols 
that can stand in for any word belonging to a particular category. In 
English, for example, the phrase ‘the cat’ is grammatical because ‘the’ 
belongs to a class of words (i.e. determiners) that are typically followed 
by words belonging to another class, nouns (e.g. ‘cat’). Such symbolic 
views of the mind allowed for cognitive science to treat the content that 
the mind operates on as separate from the processes that perform such 
operations. This divide was so great that contents and processes were 
studied by researchers in separate disciplines (Boster, 2011).  
Originally, cognitive science was conceived of as an 
interdisciplinary endeavor that pulled equally from its parent fields of 
sociocultural anthropology, experimental psychology, linguistics, 
neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy. While each field offered 
                                                      
1 This statement is actually false. Technically, any processing that a computer does 
requires minute changes in the physical structure of the computer.  
  
 
4 
a unique set of methodological techniques and theoretical backgrounds, 
both anthropology and psychology aimed to understand humans 
through behavioral evidence. This was also true of linguistics, albeit in 
regard to the more limited scope of language. Traditionally, cognitive 
anthropology has been housed within sociocultural anthropology, which 
focuses on understanding humanity by studying human behavior in situ 
(Blount, 2011). By studying particular peoples and individuals in depth, 
sociocultural anthropologists gain a broad, yet rich description of the 
people that they study. In contrast to sociocultural anthropology, 
experimental psychology emphasizes quick and controlled methods 
geared towards testing specific falsifiable hypotheses. Due to these 
different empirical approaches, a natural division was proposed between 
the anthropologists and psychologists of cognitive science. Cognitive 
psychologists studied the processes through which the mind performs 
cognition, while cognitive anthropologists studied the contents of the 
mind.  
The contents of the mind, as studied by sociocultural 
anthropologists, primarily concerned the categories through which 
different cultures divided the world (Boster, 2011; D’Andrade, 1981, 
1995). These studies originally followed methodologies resembling that 
of language documentation. Early studies focused on describing the folk 
concepts embedded within cultures. For example, ethnobotanists 
studied how particular cultures classified and used plants for medicinal 
purposes (Nolan, 2014). Others studied kinship terms (D’Andrade, 1995) 
or cross-cultural color terminology (Berlin & Kay, 1969). Eventually, the 
field sought to understand complex – or schematic – mental models 
through which humans described and understood the world (Blount, 
2011; D’Andrade, 1995). These included, for example, the temporal 
ordering for the prototypical stages of dating (Munck, 2011) or the 
average American’s folk model of the mind itself (D’Andrade, 1987).  
Despite the fact that cognitive science deemed anthropological 
efforts as geared towards content, cognitive anthropology (as well as its 
parent field, sociocultural anthropology) itself grew increasingly 
interested in the relation between culture and behavior. When studying 
mental models, cognitive anthropologists often asked how the models 
influenced the individual desires, beliefs, and actions of individuals 
(D’Andrade, 1995). As such, cognitive anthropologists developed 
theories for describing how culture influenced the thoughts and 
behaviors of individuals. These studies closely attended to the 
relationship between the mind, body, and environment. For example, 
Edwin Hutchins investigated how the navigation of a ship is computed 
by the actions of many individuals behaving in culturally defined ways 
(1995).  These earlier approaches to cognition beyond the brain were 
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instrumental in the foundation of distributed and embodied cognition, 
which are fundamental parts of contemporary cognitive science. 
In contrast to examining the contents of the mind, cognitive 
psychology focused on how humans came to understand and act upon 
the information they perceived.  Much of this focused on defining the 
modular mechanisms though which information is processed. This 
information processing paradigm has remained a dominant perspective 
within cognitive psychology. The experimental process itself is quite a 
fundamental aspect of cognitive science. It allows for specific conditions 
under which processes may be examined with precision. However, 
relying solely on laboratory experiments for empirical data is 
problematic in two major ways. First, experimental controls create 
artificially constrained conditions that fail to capture aspects of the 
mind associated with most real-world conditions. In contrast, more 
ecologically valid experiments may be performed outside of the 
laboratory at the cost of precise control. Second, psychological 
experiments tend to involve participants from select subsets of the 
human population, making it difficult to suggest that the results 
generalize to all human populations.  
The defining methodological differences between cognitive 
psychology and cognitive anthropology are in the scope of the data they 
examine and the degree to which their theories are data driven and vice 
versa. Psychologists will begin with theory. Their theories will dictate 
the specific kinds of data that they are interested in. For example, Buss 
et al. (1989; 1990; as presented by Boster 2011) argued that men and 
women would select mates of the opposite sex based on different 
characteristic traits. He theorized that this was because in the human 
ancestral past, traits that defined reproductively fit men were different 
from the traits that defined reproductively fit women; men were selected 
based on their abilities to provide for sustenance from their families, 
while women would be selected for based on their fertility. Based on this 
theory, Buss and collogues measured the degree to which men and 
women found the traits of physical attractiveness and wealth as 
important for selecting a mate of the opposite sex. Aligning with their 
theory, men ranked physical attractiveness higher than women, and 
women ranked wealth higher than men. Thus, Buss and collogues found 
empirical evidence that supported their initial hypothesis.  
In contrast to psychologists, anthropologists are more likely to 
begin with data exploration. Rather than selecting a theoretically 
specified scope, cognitive anthropologists attempt to examine an entire 
domain. For example, they may document a culture’s entire 
knowledgebase of disease. Then, they would examine patterns in this 
data, showing the culturally specific dimensions through which 
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individuals categorize different disease. In the case of mate selection, 
there are numerous traits upon which individuals can choose a mate. 
Boster (2011) examined how these traits were ranked in importance by 
men and women. He found that there was a strong linear relationship 
between the ratings of women and men. While men and women did differ 
slightly on their ratings of a few traits (as found by Buss et al 1989), 
these differences were found only among traits that men and women 
ranked with neither high or low importance. While there were 
significant differences in how men and women ranked physical 
attractiveness and wealth, these differences were minor in comparison 
to the overall pattern of trait preferences. Moreover, this analysis offers 
an alternative explanation for the data: Only traits that are perceived 
as neither important nor unimportant may vary in how they are 
perceived by men and women. This could be because the importance of 
other traits has gone through historical pressures – cultural or 
evolutionary – while mid-rated traits are less culturally salient and are 
therefore allowed to vary. As illustrated here, anthropology is geared 
towards examining data systems. While theory driven experiments will 
always be necessary for cognitive science, the data-driven approaches of 
cognitive anthropology are equally necessary as they help to 
contextualize experimental results and offer tools for studying culture 
and cognition as complex systems of information.  
Unfortunately, cognitive anthropology is no longer a thriving field 
and the presence of its methodologies are rare in contemporary cognitive 
science. This is primarily due to changes within the field of anthropology 
itself. Sociocultural anthropology (i.e. the field in which cognitive 
anthropology is housed) – as a whole – moved away from quantitative 
methodologies, mainly due to its embrace of postmodernism and a 
rejection of the ability to measure the non-subjective world (i.e. what is 
not experienced by the people they study) in the 1980s and 90s (Roy G. 
D’Andrade, 2000). This is not to say that anthropology produces data 
that are irrelevant to cognitive science. On the contrary, for example, 
theoretical advances in biological anthropology have significantly added 
towards the current understanding of brain evolution  (Deacon, 1990). 
Moreover, archaeological exploration has illuminated a vast history of 
human tool-use (Dockall, 2006; Richards, 2003). However, these sub-
fields of anthropology do not offer the tools necessary for examining 
culture as a complex system. Such behavioral methods have primarily 
been used by cognitive anthropologists housed within sociocultural 
anthropology. Sociocultural anthropology’s rejection of these 
quantitative methodologies weakened the potential for anthropology to 
contribute fully to cognitive science. As a consequence, cognitive 
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psychology became the dominant contributor of human behavioral 
research within cognitive science. 
Even in the absence of cognitive anthropology, an overwhelming 
body of empirical evidence within cognitive science now suggests that 
(1) cognition cannot separated into modules and (2) the processes of the 
mind are indeed shaped by – or perhaps physically indistinguishable 
from – the content of the mind (see Spivey 2005 for review). Seemingly 
unrelated processes – such as language and vision – are highly 
interactive. For example, as an individual hears a word, they continually 
update their perception of that word on a millisecond by millisecond 
basis (Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005). Moreover, this incremental 
processing of language is permeated by visual cues, which change how 
a word or sentence is perceived even before processing is complete 
(Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard, & Sedivy, 1995). The brain 
itself consists of highly interconnected areas that coincide with 
particular cognitive processes. For example, dense bidirectional 
synaptic connectivity link various cortical and subcortical brain regions 
(e.g. Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992; Felleman & Van Essen, 1991). The 
brain areas that underlie most cognitive processes tend to be distributed 
within brain networks rather than specific localized areas (Abutalebi & 
Green, 2007; Bullmore & Sporns, 2009). Even processes related to 
seemingly opposite aspects of cognitive, such as perception and action, 
are integrated so much that they cannot exist independently (Driver & 
Spence, 1998; Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010; Shimojo & Shams, 2001; 
Spivey, 2005).  
Along with a highly interconnected system, it is also clear that 
cognitive processes are sensitive to minute differences in the content of 
what is being processed. For example, the time that is takes to 
understand a word is a function of that particular word’s distribution in 
everyday language (Dahan, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 2001), the 
number of words that are phonologically related to it (Grainger, 
Muneaux, Farioli, & Ziegler, 2005), and the number of words that are 
semantically related to it (Buchanan, Westbury, & Burgess, 2001). This 
runs contrary to a symbolic account, which would suggest that any two 
words are processed the same as long as they belong to the same 
symbolic word class (e.g. noun, verb). These contextual effects can be 
seen even at the smallest scales of cognition. For example, neurons that 
spike when detecting a particular visual arrangement (e.g. a vertical 
bar) will spike when detecting different visual arrangements, depending 
on the environmental context of the viewer (Wörgötter & Eysel, 2000). 
This is because the neuron will receive contextual signals that change 
the neuron’s bias to spike give certain other inputs. Again, this runs 
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contrary to symbolic accounts, as specific neural response would be the 
same, regardless of the input, under a symbolic account.  
The high interconnectivity and context dependence of cognition 
completely undermines the original methodological split between 
cognitive anthropology and cognitive psychology, as process and content 
cannot be studied separately. Moreover, the field of cognitive science has 
begun to share theoretical stances that mirror cognitive anthropology’s 
study of the mind as embodied and distributed. Many studies show that 
the flow of information that defines cognition is not constrained to 
particular brain regions or even the brain itself. For example, even a 
simple task to pick up a cup requires information to be transmitted 
continuously as neural activation, muscle contractions, skin pressure, 
light, and eye-movements (Ballard & Hayhoe, 2009). Even two 
individuals sharing a conversation will show neural coupling, despite 
the fact that the connections between them lack any neural mechanisms 
(see Spevack, Falandays, Batzloff, & Spivey, 2018 for review). Taking 
this even further, cognitive information is transmitted and evolved 
though the interactions of individuals within entire societies over 
thousands of years (Anthony, 2010). 
The evidence touched on here suggests that cognition constitutes 
what is known as a complex dynamic system. These are systems are 
characterized by high interconnectivity that results in self-organization 
and chaotic changes that may result from small perturbations. A school 
of fish, for example, can be seen as a complex dynamic system. The 
behaviors of each fish are affected by all of the other fish in such a way 
that they will move together in synchrony. However, any small 
fluctuations in the movement of one fish may cascade to the whole 
system, causing the entire school to change direction. The content – or 
information – of cognition itself is connected in these ways. Take for 
example, language as it is within the cognitive system. Each word is 
influenced by the other words with similar meanings, sounds, and 
syntactic distributions (Buchanan et al., 2001; Dijkstra, Grainger, & van 
Heuven, 1999). These so-called ‘word neighbors’ are integral to how 
individual words are processed, affecting both the time it takes to 
understand each word and the potential meanings that can be ascribed 
to a word given the current context. Thus, understanding how words are 
processed requires knowledge of the structure of the entire system of 
words that an individual possesses.  
With such interactivity, cognition and culture form a single 
complex dynamic system that may be known as the culture-cognition 
system. It consists of a network of interconnections at various spatial 
and temporal scales. This system connects a variety of content, which 
includes language, concepts of the everyday world, narratives, 
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behaviors, beliefs, low-level perceptual units (e.g. receptive fields, 
phonemes), human agents, material artifacts, and even the physical 
environment. Many of the properties of the culture-cognition system are 
emergent and cannot be understood without studying the whole of 
cognition, including one’s cultural environment. It is important to 
complement cognitive science’s rich tradition of psychological 
experimentation with data-driven approaches that are sensitive to the 
complexities of the culture-cognition system. Moreover, the study of 
complex dynamic systems require methodologies that are suited to find 
patterns within complexity. Some of those necessary methods are skin 
to those of cognitive anthropologists. Many changes to the field of 
cognitive science, such as the shift towards a complex dynamic systems 
approach to cognition and an increased interest in embodiment and 
distributed cognition, make now an opportune and necessary time to 
reintroduce these methods. Indeed, as I discuss in the following section, 
the field has included many recent studies of cognitive variation. These 
studies make important contributions to the field of cognitive science. 
However, I argue that further research must take particular caution in 
understanding culture as a complex system.  
1.3 Contemporary Studies 
As outlined above, the study of human variation within cognitive 
science has been limited with respect to its full potential. This primarily 
is due to the historical divide between process and content and 
methodological shifts within anthropology. By re-incorporating research 
on cognitive variation, the field can better understand cognition as a 
complex dynamic system. Indeed, a growing number of researchers have 
highlighted and exemplified the need and utility in examining variation. 
These researchers have addressed topics such as the limited subject pool 
of experimental psychology (Henrich et al., 2010), the role of 
anthropology in cognitive science (Bender, Hutchins, & Medin, 2010), 
and the effects of language background on other aspects of cognition 
(Bialystok & Craik, 2010; Ellen Bialystok, 1999; Lucy, 2016). 
One paper by Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) draws 
attention to the fact that experimental psychology relies heavily on 
participants from a limited range of cultures. These participants often 
come from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic 
populations. These populations have been cleverly named WEIRD. The 
paper has been met with positive response, and there is now widespread 
acknowledgement of the necessity of cross-cultural research in cognitive 
science. Indeed, it has spurred several efforts to document cross-cultural 
differences in domains such as economic reasoning (Henrich, 2015; 
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Jackson & Xing, 2014),  motor movement (Bril, 2018), attention (Kardan 
et al., 2017), and even human-computer interaction (Rehm, 2013).  
While this sudden attention to the problems of WEIRD 
participants is much needed, there is still an aspect of anthropological 
methodology that is missing from the field. This is cognitive 
anthropology’s data-driven approach that captures the complexities of 
culture before constraining research to specific hypothesis. Without 
examining such cultural complexities, these hypotheses may rely on 
theoretical assumptions that run counter to the majority of data. Two 
cases of cognitive variation – cognitive differences between individuals 
in the United States and East-Asia and cognitive differences between 
bilinguals and monolinguals – help to illustrate the necessity of 
examining the complexities of culture.  
Cross-cultural cognitive differences have been found between 
individuals in the United States and East Asia. Individuals in the 
United States appear to rely less on certain kinds of contextual 
information than those in East Asia. For example, people in Japan will 
look more at background elements of a visual scene than those in the 
United States (Senzaki et al., 2014a). These attentional differences also 
extend to other aspects of cognition, such as categorization (Ji & Nisbett, 
2001), reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002), and 
memory (Schwartz, Boduroglu, & Gutchess, 2014). Many researchers 
believe that these differences correspond to a cultural variable known 
as self-construal, which captures the degree to which a culture values 
social harmony (i.e. collectivism) over self-independence (i.e. 
individualism). However, the exact means through which self-construal 
affects attention are yet to be well defined and there may be many other 
aspects of East Asia and the United States that explain these 
differences. For example, the sentence order of East Asian languages 
(e.g. Japanese, Korean) differ substantially from English. Japanese and 
Korean put contextual information first (e.g. house-POS front-LOC 
bicycle-SUB is), while focal information is put first in English (e.g. There 
is a bicycle is in front of the house; Tajima & Duffield, 2012). The 
habitual attention to contextual information first may lead East Asians 
to attend more towards contextual information in their visual 
environment.  
In another case, monolinguals and bilinguals have been shown to 
have different cognitive advantages with respect to each other. 
Monolinguals appear to have advantages for language perception and 
production. For example, in constrained laboratory contexts, 
monolinguals are faster to process certain words than bilinguals 
(Runnqvist, Strijkers, Sadat, & Costa, 2011). In contrast, bilinguals 
appear to possess certain advantages related to executive control 
  
 
11 
(Bialystok & Craik, 2010), a set of related cognitive processes which are 
responsible for organizing, controlling, and executing the various sub-
processes involved in a specific task. These processes include 
maintaining the current task demands in memory, executing the 
behaviors necessary to complete the task, attending to information 
relevant to the task, and suppressing information that is irrelevant to 
the current task goals (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). For example, 
bilinguals are better at the Stroop task (Zied et al., 2004), which requires 
participants to recite the colors that color words are written in while 
ignoring the word itself (e.g. saying ‘red’ for the word ‘blue’ written in 
red ink). These bilingual advantages are believed to stem from the 
bilingual’s constant practice at suppressing one language while using 
the other. However, the exact differences between monolingualism and 
bilingualism are both complex and not straightforwardly apparent. A 
bilingual’s two languages may not be represented separately. 
Intertangled languages imply that a bilingual must utilize complex 
control in order to suppress one language over another. The degree and 
complexity of this control depend on exact overlap of a bilingual’s 
languages. This, in return, would depend on the specific languages that 
they know and the level to which they know each language.  
With the numerous studies spawned by the two above examples 
(as well as many others), there is clear renewed interest in studying the 
mind as a flexible entity.  Given that cognition (and the cultures within 
which it is situated) is a complex dynamic system (as opposed to a 
modular system of process and content), these renewed interests place 
the field in a position to better understand not only the complex 
dynamics through which cognitive variations arise but also fundamental 
aspects of the mind in general. However, each individual case that 
relates culture to cognition comes with its own set of theoretical 
assumptions. These are appropriate, given that each case addresses 
specific cultural areas and specific domains of cognition. What is needed, 
however, is a general framework through which all studies of cognitive 
variation tie together.    
1.3 The Culture-Cognition System 
In order to understand the culture-cognition system, it is 
necessary to use a framework that provides useful methods for 
identifying ways in which differences at a cultural level will entail 
differences in the cognition of individuals. As culture and cognition form 
a single culture-cognition system, parallels may be easily identified 
because differences on a cognitive level will directly mirror differences 
at a cultural level. However, as the culture-cognition system is a 
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complex dynamic system, the acquisition of culture will sometimes 
necessitate specific changes to pre-existing cognitive content. I suggest 
that identifying the parallels between culture and cognition becomes 
easier when the content of this system is unified under the term 
‘cognitive tools,’ ways in which individuals are able to interact with and 
understand their environment. In addition, I define ‘cognitive style’ to 
mean the unique biases of an individual to use a particular set of 
cognitive tools in specific ways. The cognitive styles of individuals will 
mirror the cognitive tools shared through their culture. The acquisition 
and use of cognitive tools will depend on each individual’s entire 
cognitive style. As such, understanding individual differences is 
important because differences in the cognitive styles of individuals 
illuminate the mechanisms through which individual’s acquire and 
adapt to culture. 
1.2.1 Culture-Cognition Parallels 
In order to see how parallels may be drawn between culture and 
cognition, I utilize an example of linguistic relativity, as these studies 
pay close attention to the intricate patterns of cultural contexts. 
According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (Whorf, 1941), the habitual use 
of a particular language will lead to biases in the ways through which 
an individual will attend to and categorize the world. For example, in 
English, malleable entities (e.g. water, air) typically follow different 
grammatical patterns compared to entities with shape (e.g. dog, hat, 
airplane). In order to quantify such malleable entities, the nouns must 
be paired with a unitizer – a word that breaks the entity into units (e.g. 
the word cups in ‘two cups of water’). In contrast, most other English 
nouns may be paired with a number without such unitizers (e.g. ‘there 
are two pens’). Thus, a unit of quantification (i.e. shape, size) is 
embedded into the meaning of most English nouns. This is not the case 
for mass nouns such as the word ‘water.’ In languages such as Japanese 
and Yucatec-Maya, all nouns must be paired with a unitizer in order to 
be quantified (Imai, 2002; Lucy, 2016). There is an interesting 
attentional consequence of this difference. English speakers must 
consistently attend to the shapes of discrete objects, as their shape is 
encoded in the meaning of the words that refer to those objects. This is 
not true for Japanese and Yucatec-Maya. When speakers of these 
languages are given non-verbal tasks in which they must classify novel 
objects or identify similarities and differences between line drawings, 
English speakers are more likely to identify differences based on shape, 
while speakers of Japanese and Yucatec-Maya are more likely to 
identify differences based on material (Imai, 2002; Lucy, 2016). For 
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example, English speakers and Yucatec-Maya speakers were asked to 
sort depictions of everyday scenes based on similarity.  Many of these 
scenes were identical except for the number of certain items. Neither 
group was sensitive to differences in the number of malleable entities 
(e.g. number of clouds of smoke rising from a fire). However, English 
speakers were sensitive to difference in numbers of inanimate objects 
(e.g. plates of food, trees), while the Yucatec-Maya speakers were not 
sensitive to these differences (Lucy, 2016).  
In this example, a very specific structural aspect of language (i.e. 
the use of unitizers) was selected as the linguistic variable through 
which cognition varies. The identification of this variable required 
detailed knowledge of English, Japanese, and Yucatec-Maya (or other 
languages), with specific attention to the syntactic structures, semantic 
meanings, and systematic use of words in these languages. 
Furthermore, there is a direct parallel between the linguistic variable 
and the cognitive consequence; the absence of a unitizer for most words 
in English requires speakers to consistently attend to shape when using 
those words. The cognitive consequence of this directly parallels the 
linguistic variable, suggesting that habitual attention towards shape 
during language use leads to a bias in attention towards shape when not 
using language. Moreover, unitizers are simultaneously cultural content 
and cognitive content, as they are shared among groups of individuals 
who each use these as part of their mental processes. Each individual 
gains specific cognitive consequences (i.e. attention towards shape) as a 
result of incorporating the use of this cultural content into their 
cognition.  
Making such detailed claims about the relation between culture 
and cognition needs a detailed understanding of the contents of the mind 
and the contents of culture. As culture and cognition form a single 
culture-cognition system, both sets of content are essentially the same 
phenomena at different scales of single system. Understanding this 
content may employ methods that are akin to the rich descriptions of 
cognitive anthropologists. However, it is also necessary to specify more 
on the nature of the content being studied. As I discuss in the following 
section, the content of the culture-cognitive system is usefully described 
as ‘cognitive tools,’ as they share much in common with material tools.   
1.3.2 Cognitive Tools  
Culture is often described as the collection of knowledge systems, 
beliefs, behaviors, goals, and languages that are shared by a group of 
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people2. In addition, another fundamental property of culture is the 
dissemination of tool use. Tools are a ubiquitous part of human life. 
While tool use has been documented among a growing number of non-
human animals (see Seed & Byrne, 2010 for review), it is the variety and 
complexity of human tools that represents a defining feature of our 
species. To give an initial definition that will later be expanded upon, 
tools are objects external to the body that are used in order to perform 
an action. While in use, tools extend the physical capabilities of the body. 
Take for example, the hammer. For its canonical usage, it temporarily 
converts the human arm into a hardened surface that may be swung in 
order to apply blunt force to another object, typically a nail. Without a 
hammer, the human arm is soft and would likely be damaged itself when 
striking a hard object.  
Tools have been innovated to serve various purposes throughout 
human history. These have ranged in complexity from Oldowan stone 
tools3 to CRISPR gene editing4. In many of these cases, these tools serve 
to change the tool-user’s environment in a manner that is either directly 
useful to the tool-user or to others. This environmental change is 
physical and is conducted via actions of the tool-user. For example, a 
carpenter might use a set of saws and hammers to turn pieces of wood 
into a chair. As extensions of the body, tools may also be described as 
extended actions. In using tools, humans must exert much of the same 
control and attention as when performing an action with just the body. 
The concept of a tool can also be applied to something like glasses. 
The lenses of the glasses bend light in a specific way tailored to the 
wearer. With glasses, an otherwise blurry pattern of light becomes a 
clear pattern of relevant visual information for the wearer. In this case, 
the change into the environment is technically physical of sorts, as light 
has been bent. However, the ultimate utility of the glasses appears to be 
slightly different in that the critical change is in the information status 
of the light. 
Despite its importance in the study of cognition and other fields, 
the concept of information appears rather difficult to define (Cao, 2012). 
However, what can be stated is that information is information only 
insofar as it has utility to a user. Take for example, a book written in an 
unknown foreign script. While the individual looking at the book could 
                                                      
2 Culture can be distinguished from society, which refers to groupings of people who 
interact and share culture.   
3 These are the earliest known stone tools in human history, dating at the earliest to 
2.6 million years ago. They are associated with Australopithecus garhi as well as 
some later hominids.  
4 CRISPR stands for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats. It is a 
recent bioengineering advancement that allows DNA to be separated at specific 
locations.  
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be able to ascertain certain visual characteristics of the book and its 
writing, the book would possess less utility to them than to person who 
has (culturally shared) knowledge of the book’s language. Thus, there is 
something about the book’s informational content that is dependent on 
the user of the book. Similarly, in the case of glasses, there was 
something about the wearer (eyeball shape) that gave a certain 
informational status to the light refracted a certain way by the glasses. 
An individual with a different eyeball shape would find the glasses-bent 
light to be less informative.   
The utilization and manipulation of information spans many of 
the various cognitive processes, including perception, attention, 
categorization, and memory. For example, attention ultimately 
constrains the information one can gather from their environment. Any 
given environment has an abundance of potential information. Without 
focusing on specific details, individuals would become overwhelmed by 
the information, which would give no practical utility. Some aspects of 
the environment are more relevant than others. For example, when 
driving on a road, the lines on the road indicating different lanes are 
more important to attend to than trees on the side of the road. There is 
utility (and safety in the case of driving) in attending to particular 
features of the environment over others. Particular informational 
features also aid in categorization. For example, the roundness of a coin 
is irrelevant in distinguishing a dime from a quarter. Rather, the size 
and embossing of the coin provide the critical dimensions through which 
dimes are distinguished from quarters.  
Processes such as attention and categorization are ubiquitous 
throughout cognition. Attention is essential to all perceptual modalities 
and can be seen as critical in guiding goal-directed tasks and actions. 
Low-level visual features are categorized into shapes such as horizontal 
and vertical lines. Speech sounds are categorized into phonemes of an 
individual’s language. Higher level visual features are used to categorize 
objects using linguistic labels. Both attention and categorization play 
critical roles in performing complex tasks and decision making. The 
ubiquity of these and similar processes suggests that cognition as a 
whole is a system almost entirely defined by the manipulation and 
utilization of information.   
While all such cognitive processes might appear to be rather 
internal to the brain, a number of studies have found evidence 
suggesting cognitive processes extend throughout the body and even 
into one’s environment (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Hutchins, 1995). Much 
of the ways in which cognition is “offloaded” into the environment is 
through the use of tools. For example, long division may be performed 
with a pencil and paper. Not only are material tools used (i.e. the pencil 
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and the paper), but long division also utilizes particular mathematical 
procedures learned though one’s culture. These tools and procedures are 
integrated together in order to carry out manipulations of information 
and environment. Such manipulations can be seen throughout cognition 
in the form of complex loops between perception and action. For 
example, when grabbing an object such as a cup, individuals will 
constantly update the movement of their arm based on visual feedback 
and they constantly alter how they allocate attention based on the 
location of their arm (Smeets, Hayhoe, & Ballard, 1996).  
Of note, many of ways in which cognition is extended beyond the 
body can be described as tool use. Computers, cell phones, long division, 
books, and hammers all extend functions of the brain and body. They 
are also tools. As they are used to extend human cognition, these tools 
are indistinguishable from cognition. Moreover, cognition itself carries 
out the same process as tools; cognition and tools manipulate and utilize 
the environment and information. As such, the processes of cognition 
are tools. Hereafter, I denote all such tools of cognition with the term 
cognitive tools. These cognitive tools are the instruments – biological or 
technological – through which people interact with and understand the 
world.  
With the concept of cognitive tools, cognition and culture can be 
defined more parsimoniously. Cognition is a collection of cognitive tools 
utilized together for specific purposes. Culture is a collection of cognitive 
tools shared among a group of people. In many ways, one’s cognition – 
their personal collection of cognitive tools – stems from their culture. By 
defining cognition and culture in these terms, there is a direct parallel 
between them. Moreover, they can be seen as aspects of the same 
culture-cognition system as seen from different spatial or temporal 
scales.  
1.3.2 Cognitive Styles 
Cognitive tools inherit many of the properties of tools themselves. 
Two of these properties are particularly important for this dissertation. 
First, cognitive tools may be combined in order to make new cognitive 
tools. For example, the cognitive tool of long division utilizes other 
cognitive tools such as writing, subtraction, specific eye-movement 
patterns, and language. These component tools may be restructured to 
form other tools, such as multiplication, or combined with even more 
tools to make sophisticated cognitive tools such as calculus. The second 
property – which is closely related to the first – is that cognitive tools 
that serve almost the same functionality can be made with different 
constituent tools. This can be seen easily in the cases of language, where 
  
 
17 
completely different sets of words, grammars, and sounds can serve the 
purpose of communication. As a result of these two properties, the 
organization of cognitive tools can be quite fluid, with the organization 
of cognitive cools varying between and within cultural groups.  
Because the organization of cognitive tools is fluid, there is room 
for variation in the ways that individuals understand and interact with 
their environment. Cognitive style describes a person’s biases for using 
particular cognitive tools. While the term cognitive style has been used 
inconsistently in the literature, it generally refers to preferences for how 
individuals carry out a given task. Such preferences do not necessarily 
coincide with advantages or disadvantages. Rather, they represent 
alternative means for interacting and understanding the world. Some 
styles may be more suited for particular task environments than others. 
As cognitive tools provide ways for the utilization and manipulation of 
information, cognitive style can also be defined in terms of information; 
different cognitive style have different biases in attention to, 
categorizing, memorizing, or acting upon information.  
Cognitive style is easily exemplified for tasks that have an 
ambiguous end-goal. For example, an individual can be given a task in 
which they are given three words and instructed to group two of them 
together. The end-goal is ambiguous because there are many possible 
dimensions by which the words can be grouped. For example, if given 
the set of words cow, milk, and juice, an individual could group together 
cow and milk because there is a real-world relation between cows and 
milk (e.g. cows produce milk). However, the individual could also group 
together milk and juice, because both are beverages. Given the 
instructions of the task, neither grouping is better than the other. 
However, the individual’s choice usually shows a bias for grouping based 
on one of these two differing strategies.  
Cognitive style can also be seen in one’s overall performance in a 
task with a non-ambiguous goal. For example, in the rod-and-frame task 
(Wenderoth & Beh, 1977), individuals are given a tilted line and asked 
to rotate the line until it is perfectly vertical. The line is embedded 
within a square frame, which itself is tilted at an unrelated angle. 
Participants are instructed to ignore the orientation of the square frame 
and rotate the line with respect to absolute vertical. Participants range 
in performance, and those with lower performance are affected more by 
the orientation of the square frame. Thus, performance captures a 
participant’s ability to ignore the irrelevant context.  
At first glance, the rod-and-frame task appears to capture a 
capacity, rather than a cognitive style; given the task demands, it is 
clearly better to be able to ignore the frame. However, the task goals can 
be compared to an alternative in which participants are asked to ignore 
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absolute verticality and reorient the line until it matches the orientation 
of the square frame. Participants also range in performance on such 
tasks, with performance inversely correlated with performance on the 
canonical rod-and-frame task (Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005)  
Differences in cognitive style permeate all of cognition. 
Individuals may have subtly different conceptions of what constitutes 
the color blue, or they may have completely different languages through 
which they communicate about the world with. They may also have 
differing dispositions for using technology or socializing with others. All 
these cases can be described as differences in the cognitive tools through 
which people interact with and understand the world.  
In order to understand how culture influences cognitive style, we 
must understand the cognitive tools provided by a culture and the task 
demands that are shared by members of a culture. For example, culture 
explicitly provides certain cognitive tools. Members of a society may be 
exposed to education through which they learn certain mathematical or 
scientific ways of thinking, or they may learn certain familial crafts (e.g. 
cooking recipes). Much learning will involve the practice of specific 
actions, attention to particular details, and expert labels for categorizing 
the world. Moreover, societies will differ in the task demands that they 
require of individuals. For example, those in Japan must constantly 
attend closely to social proximity (e.g. friend, acquaintance, boss), as 
specific language forms must be used based on the social relatedness of 
two interlocutors.  
Importantly, the cognitive styles required of individuals of a 
culture are not arbitrary. Rather, they are a direct consequence of 
cultural learning. Thus, cognitive differences that relate to cultural 
differences should follow directly from the cognitive tools explicitly given 
by a culture and the cognitive tools required by the task demands of a 
culture. As argued for in above sections, this requires detailed 
knowledge of the cultures being studied. However, while cognitive style 
differences will indeed result from differences in culture, differences in 
cultural exposure and predetermined cognitive differences will affect 
cognitive style at an individual level. These differences are critical to 
understanding the culture-cognition system, as they show the specific 
conditions under which cognitive variation occurs.  
1.3.3 Individual Variation 
Culture is non-monolithic. Thus, people within a culture have 
slightly different exposures to the cognitive tools shared by a culture. 
Some culturally given cognitive tools may require a high level of shared-
ness (i.e. ubiquity, similarity, and precision of the cognitive tool used), 
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such as the basic vocabulary and grammar of a language5. For other 
cognitive tools, a high degree of shared-ness is not required. For 
example, a person might find their own idiosyncratic words and phrases 
that they use on a daily basis. These phrases may serve functional 
equivalents to other words and phrases in their community. This is not 
to say that people would not pick up their idiosyncratic language from 
others. Rather there is less necessity to do so, relative to more 
fundamental aspects of their language.   
Another reason that cognitive style may differ between 
individuals stems from the fact that cognitive tools serving similar 
functions may be constituted from differing component tools. Two 
individuals who face the same social pressures to acquired a cognitive 
tool may implement their versions in slightly different ways because of 
differences in their currently available cognitive tools. These currently 
available cognitive tools may have been the result of different previous 
cultural exposure, but they may also have resulted from different 
biological dispositions. For example, individuals with dyslexia exhibit 
neural differences before the onset of reading. Their exposure to 
language is may be inconsequentially different from others within their 
language group. Yet, they employ a slightly different cognitive style 
when reading. Thus, there is going to be individual variation within 
cultural groups of individuals.  
As individuals may use slightly different sets of cognitive tools as 
scaffolding for acquiring a new cognitive tool, the ultimate utility of the 
acquired cognitive tool may be different. Moreover, the use of certain 
cognitive tools may be more optimal for this scaffolding than others. 
Individuals who must rely on suboptimal tools as scaffolding will still 
need to acquire the new cognitive tool in a way that meets social 
expectations. In such cases, the individual may need to strengthen the 
utility of the new tool’s component tools. This strengthening is a 
cognitive consequence of acquiring the new cognitive tool.  
Figure 1.1 is a network representation of a community of 
individuals with varying cognitive tools. Nodes in the network represent 
individual agents while edges represent the likelihood of interacting 
with another agent. Each agent begins with a specific set of cognitive 
tools (depicted as colored squares). Some of these tools have been co-
opted together to form larger cognitive tools (colored squares 
surrounding smaller squares). Agents are likely to gain new cognitive 
tools as a function of the agents that they interact with. The network on 
the right shows the cognitive tools of the agents after interacting with 
                                                      
5 I am assuming here that this is the case, as all individuals in a culture must learn 
particular linguistic forms. However, it is possible that differing cognitive styles may 
meet the same ubiquitously shared task demands.  
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others as depicted by the network on the left. Two types of individual 
differences may be seen within the figure. First, agent 4 and agent 6 
have both interacted with agents who previously had the magenta 
cognitive tool. However, agent 4’s magenta cognitive tool is stronger 
than that of agent 6 because agent 6 only interacted weakly with one 
other agent (agent 2) that previously had the cognitive tool, while agent 
4 interacted with two others (agent 1 and 2). In contrast, agent 8 did not 
gain the magenta cognitive tool at all because it did not interact with 
any agents with the magenta cognitive tool. The second type of 
individual difference may be seen for agent 5. While agent 5 interacted 
heavily with 3 agents (1, 3, and 7) who use the magenta cognitive tool, 
it did not have the red cognitive tool, a component of the magenta 
cognitive tool. As such, agent 5 co-opted the green cognitive tool instead. 
It’s green cognitive tool was strengthened as a result of being used in a 
non-canonical way. In contrast, the green cognitive tool of agent 4 
remained un-strengthened, as agent 4 was able to use the optimal red 
cognitive tool.  
Figure 1.1 An example of a system of agents learning cognitive tools. 
Nodes represent agents, edges represent the degree to which agents 
communicate, and colored squares represent cognitive tools. (A) The 
network at some time. (B) The network after time has passed since A.  
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The above reasoning follows a similar line of logic as theories 
underlying a previously mentioned cognitive variation. Bilinguals are 
believed to have better inhibitory control, relative to monolinguals, 
because they must habitually utilized inhibitory control to suppress one 
language in order to utilize the other (e.g. Kroll, 2015). In this way, 
inhibitory control may be seen as cognitive tool that is utilized as 
scaffolding for a bilingual language system. As inhibitory control – as it 
is used by monolinguals – is not optimized for use with a bilingual 
language system, it becomes strengthened as it is used within the 
context of a bilingual language system.  
With the above, it clearly follows that there is individual variation 
within cultural groups. Thus, there will be variation in how individuals 
are affected by their culture. This is because (1) individuals will be 
exposed to different parts of their culture and (2) individuals will have 
different preexisting cognitive styles through which they will learn and 
adapt to their culture. A full account of cross-cultural variation must be 
able to account for this individual variation. If a theory cannot account 
for this variation, then the theory does not truly explain cultural 
variation as culture itself varies among individuals within a culture.    
Studies that measure cognitive differences between cultural 
groups are quasi-experimental, meaning that the variable that differed 
between groups (e.g. culture) pre-existed before any measure. Thus, it is 
difficult to suggest that any given aspect of a culture was responsible for 
the cognitive differences. These cannot be overcome without 
experimental manipulations. Measuring individual differences, 
however, allows one to narrow the possible cultural variables that affect 
cognition. This can be achieved by eliminating cultural variables for 
which individual scores do not correlate with performance on specific 
cognitive tasks.   
While differences in performance on cognitive tasks are naturally 
assessed by the tasks themselves, capturing individual cultural 
differences can be difficult. In many cases, survey instruments are used 
in order to capture an individual’s background. For example, the LEAP-
Q is a survey instrument used to measure the degree to which a 
multilingual knows each of their respective languages (Marian, 
Blumenfeld, & Kaushanskaya, 2007). The measure asks the participant 
to rate various aspects of their linguistic knowledge, including the 
relative level of reading or spoken proficiency for each language.  
All measures that ask participants to self-report rely on the 
introspective processes of participants. When participants introspect, 
they are often wrong, not having true privy into their own behaviors and 
knowledge. Moreover, even if an individual is quite good at 
introspection, it is difficult to compare that person’s rating of themself 
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with another individual’s rating. Often, the way in which an individual 
introspects about themself is cultural. For example, in the case of 
language experience, native Japanese speakers are more likely to report 
lower second language proficiency, relative to matched proficiency of 
Americans due to cultural values of modesty.   
Yet, aside from intensively testing cultural knowledge and 
proficiency, self-report measures provide some of the only means to 
measure an individual’s cultural experience. Additionally, there are 
means to ensure that self-report measures maintain some form of 
validity. Such measures can be subjected to statistical tests – such as 
factor analyses – to ensure that certain questions consistently correlate 
from participant to participant.  
One particular set of survey instruments that have been used 
within the field of psychology to measure individual differences is 
personality. Personality measures often rank individuals on a limited 
set of dimensions that describe differences that are socially relevant (e.g. 
how talkative or social an individual is, or how likely are they to display 
a friendly disposition). As they describe socially relevant dimensions, 
the dimensions outlined in each personality instrument are relative to a 
particular cultural context (i.e. Japan and the US will have different 
concepts of what behaviors or lack of are social relevant). However, 
personality does appear to be linked to differences in cognitive style. 
Personality has been linked to differences in attention (Poy, Eixarch, & 
Ávila, 2004), memory (Amin, Constable, & Canli, 2004), language 
(Jackson, 2018; Pennebaker & King, 1999; Yu et al., 2013), and 
measures of cognitive control (Murdock, Oddi, & Bridgett, 2013). 
Differences in the personalities of individuals appear to be driven by 
both environmental and biological factors (e.g. Jang, Livesley, & Vemon, 
1996; Loehlin, McCrae, Costa, & John, 1998). Thus, personality captures 
aspects of both types of individual differences outlined earlier in this 
section. As such, a comprehensive measure of personality should 
correlate with inter-cultural differences in cognitive style.  
The relatively few dimensions of personality may be seen as a 
reduction of a high-dimension space of behavioral variation. Reductions 
are ubiquitous and essential within cognitive science. As cognition is a 
complex dynamic system, it is often necessary to infer about the larger 
system from a single measurement. For example, language processing 
has been studied using button presses, eye-movements, and mouse-
movements. None of these measures capture the full dynamics of 
cognition. Yet, given careful theoretical grounding, these measures can 
help reconstruct many properties of the system as a whole. Such can be 
illustrated with a popular mathematical system known as the Lorenz 
attractor. The system itself describes a trajectory within 3-dimensional 
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space that loops around two foci indefinitely, such that it creates a shape 
similar to a bent figure eight or butterfly wings. While the system is 3-
dimensional, the dynamics of the entire system can be reconstructed 
from one single dimension. This can be done simply by plotting the 
dimension against itself but shifted in time.  
Overall, theories explaining cross-cultural variation in cognition 
must also account for differences in individual variation. If they cannot 
account for such variation, then different cultural variables are likely 
responsible for the cross-cultural variation. In this dissertation, I 
present three case studies that exemplify the study of cognitive 
variation. these studies place the existence of cognitive variation within 
the culture-cognition system. Each of these studies account, 
theoretically and methodologically, for individual differences. These 
studies are described in the following section.  
1.4 The Present Work 
Throughout the above sections, I have argued that capturing the 
effects of culture on cognition require detailed attention to the complex 
dissemination and use of cognitive tools. Each culture holds a unique set 
of cognitive tools. These tools are learned by individuals who develop 
their own cognitive styles, unique cognitive toolsets through which 
individuals understand and interact with the world. Many of the 
cognitive tools possessed by individuals are either directly learned from 
their culture or were necessary to develop in order to meet the task 
demands of habitual behavior demanded of by their cultures.  Thus, 
differences in cognitive style can be traced to specific cultural 
differences. It is important to recognize that individuals will 
differentially be exposed to culture and that they will have unique 
predispositions for learning and utilizing cognitive tools in specific ways.  
Furthermore, many domains of cross-cultural cognitive variation 
research have yet to truly investigate the mechanisms under which 
cognitive variation arises. Two of these, as mentioned earlier, are the 
studies examining the cognitive styles of individuals in East-Asia and 
the US, and those examining the cognitive styles of monolinguals and 
bilinguals. In the case of both domains, it is important to understand 
both (1) the complexities of culture in detail and (2) the role that 
individuals play in cognitive variation. In this dissertation, I examine 
these issues in more detail and investigate the role that various cultural 
variables, individual differences, and personality play in defining 
cognitive style.  
Chapter 2 addresses the recent claims suggesting that bilinguals 
and monolinguals possess different cognitive styles. Bilinguals tend to 
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have better inhibitory control, the ability to suppress irrelevant 
information in order to meet the demands of a specific task. Researchers 
claim that these differences arise because bilinguals must consistently 
suppress one language while using the other. However, this assumes a 
monolithic difference between monolinguals and bilinguals. Moreover, 
language experience, like other domains of culture, are complex 
amalgams of multiple variables. Thus, isolating the exact mechanisms 
through which language experience affects cognitive style requires an 
in-depth understanding of bilingual culture and cognition. The linguistic 
knowledge of bilinguals – and monolinguals – can be seen as cognitive 
tools or networks of interconnected component tools such as words, 
sounds, and syntactic patterns. The organization of these networks 
depend on the specific linguistic experiences of each individual. 
Moreover, the connections in these networks can vary in degree (i.e. how 
dense or sparse the connections are) and in type (i.e. semantic overlap 
between words or phonological overlap between words). Bilingual 
networks may generally display particular properties that are different 
than monolingual networks, but the exact ways in which these networks 
vary are individual specific. I re-examine bilingualism and its cognitive 
style consequences and suggest specific variables (overall phonological 
or semantic density) which might affect cognitive style. I then test how 
these specific variables relate to cognitive style with a controlled 
laboratory study. In the experiment, I give participants a task 
measuring inhibitory control (the attentional network task) before and 
after they engage in a tasks where they learn to associate pairs of words 
and objects.  Individuals who learned to associate familiar English labels 
(e.g. ‘dog’) with novel objects showed improved inhibitory control 
abilities. The results of the study hint that individuals with densely 
overlapping phonological networks but sparsely overlapping semantic 
networks will require greater enhancement of cognitive control. 
Moreover, individuals who struggled more with the object-word 
association task showed a bigger increase in inhibitory control. This 
result suggests that certain individuals possessed pre-existing cognitive 
tools (inhibitory control) already suited for the task. It was the 
individuals who possessed slightly different pre-existing cognitive tool-
sets that showed improvement in inhibitory control.  
In Chapter 3, I address recent studies showing cognitive 
differences between those in East-Asia and the US. As mentioned above, 
these studies have shown the individuals in East-Asia tend to possess 
cognitive styles in which they attend more towards context (i.e. the 
background of a visual scene) than those in the US. While the exact 
cultural variables underlying these differences are unknown, many 
believe that they stem from differences in self-construal (i.e. the degree 
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to which the individual is valued over the group). In order to pinpoint 
the responsible cultural variable, I take advantage of individual cultural 
differences and give the participants self-report measures that gauge 
their cultural experience in several cultural domains. I compare these 
measures with performance on two tasks that measure attention. The 
first of these tasks follows many of the cross-cultural studies and 
measures eye-fixations towards the foreground and background 
elements of visual scenes. The second task is a mouse-tracking 
experiment that measures each individual’s ability to attend to the local 
(fine-grain details) and global (overall shape) of objects. The results of 
the study are quite surprising. Interdependence – a measure of self-
construal – correlated with task performance in both studies. However, 
the direction of the correlation was opposite for the American and 
Japanese participants. For American’s interdependence was associated 
with context-free attention, while for Japanese, it was associated with 
context-dependent attention. I argue that individuals who possess self-
construal that are deviant from cultural norms must habitually 
suppress their personal dispositions in order perform in socially 
competent ways. This habitual suppression, in parallel with 
bilingualism, leads to cognitive consequences.  
The studies in Chapter 2 and 3 both illustrate cases in which the 
acquisition of particular cognitive tools (language and self-construal 
patterns) likely result in the strengthening of particular component 
tools for particular individuals. As such, these studies align with the 
framework outlined here in Chapter 1; individual variation is 
particularly relevant to the study of cognitive variation. However, these 
two studies examine individual differences in a limited manner. As the 
culture-cognition system is particularly complex, the ways that 
individuals may vary within the system are quite extensive. While these 
two studies did find correlations between cognitive variation and 
individual differences, it is still difficult to ascertain exactly what 
aspects of individual differences mechanistically drive differences in the 
cognitive consequences of culture acquisition. What is needed is a better 
understanding of how individual variation in cognition is situated 
within the larger space of individual differences. As with any high 
dimensional space, this is difficult. However, particular measures, such 
as personality, specialize in capturing individual differences with a high 
dimensional space with a minimal number of higher-order dimensions.  
In the final case study, which I present in Chapter 4, I examine 
cognitive variation within one such measure of personality. I present a 
project that examines how one model of personality – the Myers-Briggs 
Model of Personality – is able to capture differences in real-world 
behavior. The project utilizes an online forum where users have self-
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identified their Myers-Briggs types. Overall, these results suggest that 
individuals who are more open to experience (intuitive Myers-Briggs 
types) have higher vocabularies. This aligns with previous studies 
showing a link between several of the Myers-Briggs dimensions and 
language learning/accommodation. These dimensions align with 
openness to experience and possibly the ability to emphasize with 
others. Additionally, using a word2vec model (a machine learning 
algorithm that infers semantic relationships between terms from word 
distributions), I explore how users on the forum conceptualize the 
Myers-Briggs types. I use new personality dimensions derived from this 
analysis to further explain differences in the vocabulary sizes of users 
and the degree to which they accommodate their language to other users 
on the forum. The analysis shows the social construction of personality 
in action, with the online language community ascribing a greater range 
of behavioral diversity than the original model. Overall, the study 
demonstrates that similar cognitive differences may stem from different 
sources of individual variation (different personality dimensions), as 
multiple dimensions of Myers-Briggs and the word2vec model jointly 
predicted individual variation.  
The three studies of this dissertation together demonstrate that 
individual differences can arise from the complex interaction of culture 
and cognition. Each study exemplifies cases in which the dispositions of 
individuals influence the ways in they acquire or sharpen cognitive tools 
form their cultural environments. Moreover, the three studies – while 
examining three seemingly independent examples of cognitive variation 
– share many similarities, suggesting that the mechanisms through 
which these cases of variation arise overlap. In the case of bilingualism, 
individuals will strengthen their inhibitory control abilities because 
they must be able to suppress competition that arises from the 
interaction of various aspects of their linguistic knowledge. More 
complexities in linguistic knowledge will result in more competition. A 
very similar process appears to take place for the attentional differences 
in Japan and the USA. Individuals who have dispositions for culturally 
dis-preferred self-construal patterns show a greater ability to ignore 
context when exercising visual attention. As with bilingualism, this 
likely occurs because these individuals must utilize attentional 
mechanisms to negotiate between multiple cultural/linguistic patterns.  
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Chapter 2 
The Effects of Lexical Learning on 
Executive Control 
Language, like many other aspects of the mind, is inseparable 
from the rest of cognition. This idea runs contrary to modular 
conceptualizations of language, which assert that human language 
faculties carry out their processes independently, without interference 
from other modules. Such would suggest, for example, that sentences 
may be processed by a syntax module without it even being privy to the 
meanings of those sentences. However, it is rather clear that such 
modular views of the mind ignore the recent decades of behavioral and 
neuroimaging research on language. Language processing, for example, 
is incrementally constrained by visual cues and affordances in our 
environment (C. G. Chambers, Tanenhaus, & Magnuson, 2004; 
Tanenhaus et al., 1995). Moreover, not only is language privy to and 
affected by other aspects of cognition, language processing itself recruits 
brain areas involved in seemingly non-linguistic aspects of cognition, 
such as the sensorimotor cortical regions (e.g., Pulvermüller & Fadiga 
2010, Knoeferle, Habets, Crocker & Münte 2007, see Spevack, 
Falandays, Batzloff, & Spivey 2018 for review). 
One particular interaction between language and cognition that 
has been at the center of much debate is the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis. While various degrees and types of linguistic relativity have 
been tested (e.g. Boroditsky, 2001; Bowerman, conceptual, & 2001, n.d.; 
Lucy, 2016; Lupyan & Spivey, 2010; Matlock, 2004; Whorf, 1941), the 
general claim of the hypothesis is that an individual’s language 
background will bias how they reason, perceive, categorize, or interact 
with their environment. Generally, linguistic experience does impact 
seemingly non-linguistic behaviors. However, while the exact nature of 
linguistic relativity is debated (see Wolff & Holmes, 2011 for review), 
there does exist a connection between language and other aspects of 
cognition. 
Among studies examining the relationship between language and 
cognition, there has been recent attention with respect to language and 
executive control, a set of related cognitive processes which are 
responsible for organizing, controlling, and executing the various sub-
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processes involved in a specific task. These processes include 
maintaining the current task demands in memory, executing the 
behaviors necessary to complete the task, attending to information 
relevant to the task, and suppressing information that may be relevant 
to the current task goals (Miyake et al., 2000). Recent literature has 
suggested that bilinguals possess improved inhibitory control, the 
ability to suppress information that is irrelevant to an individual’s 
current goals or task demands (Ellen Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & 
Viswanathan, 2004; Albert Costa, Hernández, Costa-Faidella, & 
Sebastián-Gallés, 2009). Such improvements are suggested to arise 
because of an increase in the need to regulate two interacting languages.  
One implication of these bilingual advantages is that language 
processing relies on executive control in specific ways. It is clear that 
something about bilingualism increases the degree to which language 
processing relies on executive control. However, the mechanisms 
through which this advantage occurs are rather unexplored. Thus, there 
is a need to perform precise experimentally controlled studies that 
examine the relation between language and executive control.   
1.1 Review 
1.1.1 Bilingualism and Executive Control   
Bilingual advantages related to inhibitory control have been 
shown in various tasks such as the flanker task (Albert Costa et al., 
2009) and the Simon task (Bialystok et al., 2004). In all of these tasks, 
participants must attend towards and respond to the particular features 
of a target stimuli, while ignoring non-essential features of the target 
stimuli and non-target stimuli. For example, in the flanker task 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), participants are asked to report the direction 
(i.e. left or right) of a centrally fixated target arrow. This rather trivial 
task is rendered more difficult by the presence of four additional ‘flanker’ 
arrows presented simultaneously with the target. Two of the flanker 
arrows are presented on either side of the target arrow, such that all 
arrows together form a line of five arrows. In the congruent condition, 
all five arrows face the same direction (←←←←←). In the incongruent 
condition, the flanker arrows face in the opposite direction of the target 
arrow (←←→←←). On average, participants are slower and less 
accurate when reporting the direction of the target arrow during 
incongruent trials. This difference is consistently interpreted to mean 
that participants must inhibit irrelevant information coming from the 
flanker arrows during incongruent trials. Thus, the difference — or 
inhibitory cost — in the average response times (RTs) between 
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congruent and incongruent trials can be taken as a measure of the cost 
of inhibiting the irrelevant flanker information, as participants can 
accurately complete incongruent trials with less cost to their RTs. 
Participants with a lower inhibitory cost are presumed to be more 
efficient at inhibiting this information.  
While the bilingual advantage literature has primarily focused on 
inhibitory control, as revealed through the flanker and similar tasks, the 
bilingual advantage appears to extend more generally to various tasks 
involving executive function. Executive function is recruited for all tasks 
in order to maintain and carry out task goals, attend to relevant 
information, and inhibit irrelevant information. While executive 
function is rather ubiquitous, its exact nature is vague, with a consensus 
that it is made up of several interrelated processes. Much of the 
bilingual advantage literature points to Miyake et al. (2000), who 
identified three separable processes that make up executive function: 
switching, updating, and inhibitory control.  Miyake and colleagues 
derived these from a factor analysis on individual performances on a 
battery of several behavioral tasks related to executive function. 
Switching involves engaging, maintaining, and disengaging the 
goals of the current task at hand (Miyake et al. 2000). Behavioral tasks 
that exemplify this process often require participants to switch from 
carrying out one set of rules to another. For example, in the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Task (Grant & Berg, 1948) — children are given cards, 
each with a varying number of objects with the same shape and color. 
Participants are asked to sort the cards into piles based on one feature 
(e.g. color) and then are asked to sort the cards based on another feature 
(e.g. shape). Children with less developed switching abilities have 
difficulty sorting cards based on the second category.  
Updating involves the maintenance and manipulation of 
information that is relevant to the task at hand (Miyake et al., 2000). It 
is critically related to the notion of working memory. One task that 
exemplifies monitoring is the N-back task (Kirchner, 1958). In this task, 
participants are presented with a series of stimuli (e.g. numbers) and 
asked to report if the current stimuli is the same as the Nth stimuli 
before it. The task requires participants to hold N-number of stimuli in 
working memory. The ability to accurately perform the task when being 
required to hold a larger number of stimuli in working memory indicates 
better updating abilities.   
The existence of a complex set of interrelated processes suggests 
that the effects of language on executive control may in return be 
complex. Indeed, early research on the bilingual advantage showed that 
bilingual children displayed several metalinguistic abilities that 
surpassed that of their monolingual peers (Bialystok, 1988) as well as 
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other problem solving abilities related to general increases in executive 
control ability (Bialystok & Majumder, 1998).  
Inhibitory cost has been reported on several studies to be 
significantly less for bilinguals than for monolinguals (Bialystok et al., 
2004; Yang, Yang, & Lust, 2011). These effects extend to children (Ellen 
Bialystok, 2001), adults (Ellen Bialystok, Craik, & Luk, 2008) and even 
those who learn their second language as an adult (Luk, de Sa, & 
Bialystok, 2011). The advantages also appear to hold when confounding 
factors, such as socioeconomic status, are controlled (Calvo & Bialystok, 
2014).  
Perhaps even more compelling than these behavioral differences, 
bilingualism has also been shown to affect the onset of Alzheimer’s 
Disease symptoms. When bilinguals and monolinguals are matched by 
degree of neural atrophy in the brain, bilingual patients will show a 
delay of behavioral symptoms by up to five years (Craik, Bialystok, & 
Freedman, 2010). As much of the symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease are 
related to — but not limited to — executive control, it appears that 
bilingualism allows individuals more efficient use of physiologically 
degraded brain areas related to executive function (and other various 
aspects of cognition).  
1.1.2 Bilingual Language Competition   
According to the predominant explanation (e.g. Kroll et al. 2015), 
bilinguals are able to seamlessly produce or understand utterances in a 
target language, despite the fact that they have an alternative set of 
sounds, words, and grammatical forms. This entails that bilinguals 
must be good at inhibiting one language while using the other. Thus, 
over time, the bilingual must utilize inhibitory control to a larger degree 
than the monolingual. Because inhibitory control and other aspects of 
executive control are domain general, with the same brain networks 
responsible for all processes that require similar control, bilinguals will 
show increased inhibitory control abilities even for tasks that do not 
invoke language, such as the flanker and Simon tasks. Evidence for the 
predominant view can be seen both in behavioral tasks and 
neuroimaging. The behavioral evidence primarily exemplifies that the 
language production and perception of one language are affected by and 
require the suppression of a second language. The neuroimaging 
evidence in contrast, demonstrates that the control processes network 
utilized during bilingual language use indeed overlaps – or is perhaps 
identical – with the general executive control network.  
On average, bilinguals tend to be slower when naming images 
compared to their monolingual peers. However, these same participants 
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will not differ from their monolingual peers when sorting these same 
images into natural or hand-made objects, subjecting that bilingual 
latency differences are purely linguistic (Gollan, Montoya, Fennema-
Notestine, & Morris, 2005). Such suggests that these latencies are 
limited to linguistic processing. Similar latencies have been shown in 
word reading times. When reading cognates — words with similar 
meaning and phonology/orthography in two languages — bilinguals are 
faster than their monolingual peers (Costa, Caramazza, & Sebastian-
Galles, 2000). These effects hold even when these cognates are 
embedded in a sentence, suggesting that the effects of bilingualism on 
cognate recognition still holds even when there is a strong context which 
would prime for one language over another (Schwartz & Kroll, 2006). 
Moreover, bilinguals have slower recognition times when reading 
homographs or ‘false cognates’ — words with similar orthographies but 
different meanings (Lemhöfer & Dijkstra, 2004). And, their spoken word 
recognition exhibits interference from similar-sounding words in the 
other language (Marian & Spivey, 2003; Spivey & Marian, 1999). These 
latencies are usually taken as evidence that a bilingual’s two languages 
consistently compete, even when the bilingual is within a monolingual 
context.  
Evidence for the active inhibition of one language in order to 
utilize the other can be seen in the language switching task. In this 
paradigm, bilingual participants are asked to name objects (often these 
are digits, but in some cases other images are used) in one of their two 
languages. The target language is indicated by color of the image or 
other cue. Interestingly, bilinguals that are dominant in one language 
show greater naming latencies when switching from their L2 to their L1 
than from their L1 to their L2. This asymmetrical switching cost is often 
presented as unintuitive, as L2 words should be harder to produce, 
because the L2 is less automatic and individuals have been exposed to 
words in their L2 less on average than words in their L1. Green (1986, 
1998) suggests that when naming an object in one language, the other 
language is inhibited. When switching form one language to the other, 
an individual must overcome the inhibition of the previous target 
language. Because the L1 is dominant, the L1 must be suppressed more 
when an individual is speaking the L2 than vice versa. Thus, there is a 
larger latency when switching from the L2 to the L1 because the L1 was 
inhibited to a higher degree. These results suggest that the presence of 
a second language does indeed require control in order to utilize or 
switch between languages, those providing a general mechanism 
through which bilingualism leads towards greater executive control 
abilities.  
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Green and Abutalebi (2018) argue that Bilingual Language 
Control utilizes a cooperative network that recruits several regions of 
the brain, including the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, the 
parietal cortex, basal ganglia, and the cerebellum. The roles of these 
areas tend towards conflict resolution (PFC), conflict detection (ACC), 
bottom-up language selection (PC), maintaining the target language 
(Basal Ganglia), and temporal control (Cerebellum). This network itself, 
as well as the roles of its component areas, overlaps considerably with 
the executive control network. Together, these studies suggest that 
language processing for bilinguals does involve executive control. 
However, this does not necessarily indicate that only or all bilinguals 
will utilize a strong degree of control when processing language. 
1.1.3 Degrees of Competition 
The abovementioned findings show a clear indication that 
language competition occurs for certain bilingual individuals. However, 
these findings also suggest that a bilingual’s degree of competition is a 
function of language dominance (i.e. the relative degree to which each 
language is used). If switching costs are incurred for transiting from a 
non-dominant language to a dominant language, then it would follow 
that the degree to which the L1 is dominant – relative to the L2 – affects 
the switching cost. Moreover, Green and Abutalebi’s (2013) adaptive 
control hypothesis suggests that the degree to which cognitive control is 
affected by bilingualism is a consequent of the degree to which language-
switching occurs within community settings. For example, there should 
be a greater effect for individuals within a dense code-switching 
community, while there should be a smaller effect for individuals living 
in a community where each language is spoken in a separate context 
(e.g. school versus home). It follows that studies examining the bilingual 
advantages should pay close attention to the language dominance of 
research participants. Moreover, any studies examining the connections 
between language and executive control should closely attend to the 
linguistic knowledge the participants.  
One example of different degrees of the bilingual advantage can 
bee seen in age of acquisition (AOA, i.e. the age at which the second 
language was learned). While much debate has centered around how the 
AOA affects ultimate attainment of proficiency in the L2, it is now 
generally understood that rough fluency is attainable regardless of the 
AOA, even if less common (Abrahamsson and Hyltenstam 2008). 
Regardless, differences in the AOA will affect an individual’s linguistic 
system. These extend to the executive control advantages. Luk, De Sa, 
& Bialystok (2011) looked at the performance of bilinguals with early 
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and late AOAs with a flanker task. Only early bilinguals showed more 
efficient inhibitory controls over monolinguals. However, Tao et al. 
(2011) showed a slight advantage over monolinguals in a lateralized 
attentional network task (ANT). This advantage may have been 
revealed in this study due to the more difficult nature of the lateralized 
ANT. Additionally, Tao and colleagues found that the late bilinguals 
showed improved monitoring, compared to early bilinguals. 
There is also an implicit assumption within the bilingual 
advantage literature that a bilingual’s two languages are separable. If 
an individual must suppress one language in order to speak the other, 
it follows that each language is suppressible, separately form the other 
language. In contrast, there is evidence to suspect that a bilingual’s 
languages are likely intertwined, with cognate and other forms of 
linguistic competition occurring because of shared neural substrates. 
One example of language overlap can be seen in interlanguage cognates. 
Most competition effects for cognates can be seen between two words, 
with similar sounds, but different meanings. However, in some cases, 
similar sounding words share meanings between language. Facilitation 
effects caused by true cognates suggest cases in which a similar level of 
competition is absent, as true cognates may produce very overlapping or 
perhaps identical activations; they are treated as one word despite 
patterning in two languages. Such homograph effects on word reading 
are not limited to interlanguage homographs processed by bilinguals. 
When monolinguals read within-language homographs (e.g. “lead” as in 
the metal and “lead” as in the act of leading) they are slower to read 
them than non-homograph words of similar frequencies (Kawamoto and 
Zemblidge 1992; Gottlob et. al 1999). The parallels of interlanguage and 
intralanguage homographs offer two implications: (1) interlanguage 
homographs behave as if bilinguals possess a single interconnected 
network of linguistic knowledge and (2) the same linguistic competition 
that is necessary for bilinguals is present – perhaps to a lesser degree – 
for monolinguals.  
Connectionist models of language learning demonstrate that the 
L1 and L2 interconnectivity naturally occurs within biologically inspired 
neural networks (Elman, 1990.; French & Jacquet, 2004). Such neural 
networks are able to successfully learn two languages without explicitly 
separating them into non-interacting partitions.  In fact, when the 
learning of one language after the other has been learned to some 
degree, the second language becomes distributed among the first 
language. Thus, any operation performed that would suppress one 
language would be rather complex. Complex patterns of language 
suppression are mirrored by studies showing that switching may 
constrain subsets within languages, rather than full language 
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suppression. For example, Finkbeiner, Almeida, Janssen and 
Caramazza (2006) employed a language switching task in which 
bilingual participants named both digits and line drawings. Line 
drawings were always named in L1, but digits were named in either the 
L1 or L2. When naming line drawings in L1, participants were equally 
fast, regardless of the language of the previous item. Moreover, the 
phonological and semantic overlap of two languages can vary between 
language pairs and individual learners (Arbesman, Strogatz, & 
Vitevitch, 2010; Malt, Li, Pavlenko, Zhu, & Ameel, 2015).  
As with homographs, parallels can be drawn with intralanguage 
competition. Abutelebi and Green (2008) gave bilinguals a language 
switching task, a switching task in which participants were cued to 
identify an image with a noun or verb, and an image naming task with 
no switching. Naming latencies for the noun/verb switching task were 
comparable to those of the language switching task. Furthermore, 
Abutelebi and Green acquired fMRI activations during each trial. The 
noun/verb switching task and the language switching task shared 
common areas of activation, including the middle and inferior frontal 
gyrus. As these areas are critical in conflict resolution, it would appear 
that executive control is needed for within and across language 
competition alike.  
These qualifiers of the overlap between any given bilingual’s two 
language suggest that the bilingual advantage depends on the specific 
language background of the bilingual. Furthermore, even if bilingualism 
generally led to improved executive control, it should not be the case 
that bilingualism reliably leads such advantages. Indeed, despite a large 
number of studies reporting executive function advantages among 
bilinguals and many others showing the need to suppress one language 
in order to speak another, some studies have reported mixed results  and 
failures to replicate (Paap & Greenberg 2013, Paap, Johnson & Sawi 
2015). Together, studies on bilingualism indicate that the relation 
between executive control and language use is complex, needing further 
exploration. 
1.1.3 Testing the Link between Language and 
Executive Control 
Up until this point, the exact relation between language and 
improved executive control is speculative. It is unclear as to the specific 
kinds of language competition and interactions that require the use of 
certain kinds of executive control. As the field gradually is able to 
pinpoint the exact situations under which the bilingual advantages 
arise, it is also necessary to build a stronger framework through which 
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to understand the relationship between language and executive control 
more generally. By understanding the kinds of linguistic processes that 
that recruit executive control, better hypotheses may be made 
concerning the specific instances in which bilingual advantages arise, as 
well as general correlates between language use and executive control.  
Two potential sources of competition are the presence of 
phonological and semantic density within an individual’s linguistic 
network. Within this network, words are connected based on the degree 
to which they are phonologically or semantically similar.  As described 
above, bilinguals and monolinguals alike are influenced by such 
similarities between words, as seen in the effects of cognates and false 
cognates. In cases where density leads to inhibition, processing will 
require greater inhibitory control. However, the exact effects of 
phonological or semantic density – the number of connections to a 
particular word – are debated in the literature, with there being 
evidence that density facilitates or inhibits the processing of a word 
(Abdel Rahman & Melinger, 2019; Siew & Vitevitch, 2019). As such, it 
is yet unclear how the organization of a linguistic network requires the 
use of inhibitory control.   
As with other aspects of linguistic relativity, controlled laboratory 
settings are necessary in order to examine such mechanisms in 
precision.  Otherwise, it is difficult to ascertain how very specific aspects 
of language may lead to cognitive differences. One behavioral approach 
that can assist in this understanding is task transfer. In task transfer, 
one task is performed in-between two identical tasks (i.e. Task-A, Task-
B, Task-A). In most cases, there is improvement in the second 
performance of task-A, due to practice effects from the first performance 
of task-A. For some task combinations, however, there is improvement 
from the first task to the third task that is beyond improvement seen 
when a control task is used (ie. Task-A, Control, Task-A).   If such occurs, 
then it can be inferred that practice during the intervening task (in 
addition to practice form the first performance of task-A) transferred to 
the other task because both tasks require similar processes.  
Performance on executive function tasks have been shown to 
improve after training. Facilitated performance has been shown with 
training tasks that test similar aspects of executive control (near 
transfer) and tasks that are dissimilar (far transfer). Following such 
labels, near transfer may be described as akin to practice affects, while 
far transfer demonstrates the processes that underlie specific tasks are 
domain general and are utilized in the execution of a large array of 
differing tasks. Far transfer has been shown for many executive function 
related processes, including working memory (Au et al., 2015; Jaeggi, 
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Buschkuehl, Shah, & Jonides, 2014) and switching tasks (Karbach & 
Verhaeghen, 2014).   
There is limited evidence suggesting the effects of transfer from 
inhibitory control tasks. Indeed, several studies show an absence of 
transfer (Enge et al., 2014). However, several studies do show transfer 
from various tasks to inhibitory control. For example, Karbach and Kray 
(2009) showed that performance on the Stroop task was improved if 
participants are trained on a task that involves switching. This 
improvement was less if the training task did not involve a switching 
cost. Many similar studies have shown inhibitory control improvements 
from working memory tasks (e.g. Thorell, Lindqvist, Nutley, Bohlin, & 
Klingberg, 2009)  
Prior and Gollan (2013) had participants undergo four blocks of 
switching tasks. The second two blocks were separate from the first two 
blocks by a week. Half of the participants performed a language 
switching task for the first, second, and fourth block, with a color-shape 
switching task for their third block. The other half of participants 
performed the color-shape task for their first, second, and fourth blocks, 
with the language task for their third. They found that the third 
language block of the second group performed more quickly than the 
first block of the first group. In other words, performance on the 
language switching task was significantly greater if participants had 
performed a color-shape switching task the week before. However, the 
reverse effect of language switching transferring to the color-shape task 
was not observed. While the Prior and Gollan (2013) study did not show 
transfer from a language task to an executive control, the task transfer 
paradigm none-the-less offers a way to study individual mechanisms 
through which language processing shares processing with executive 
control tasks.  
Task transfer appears to be a promising paradigm that can be 
used in order to test how the relation between specific aspects of 
language relate to specific aspects of executive control. As the 
bilingualism literature suggests that the learning of a second language 
strengthens executive control, this study presents an experiment in 
which individuals learn novel word-object pairings. As homographs have 
been shown to be particularly competitive, the vocabulary items varied 
in the degree to which they matched the sound structures of English 
words. In addition, conditions varied in if the object being learned was a 
familiar or novel object.  
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2.3 Experiment 
2.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
 
A total of 300 undergraduates at the University of California, 
Merced participated in this experiment. All participants received extra 
credit in one of their university courses as compensation for their 
participation. A total of 60 individuals participated in each of the five 
conditions. All participants were above the age of 18 and provided 
written consent for participation in the experiment.  
 
Stimuli  
 
All parts of the experiment were presented on a 27-inch monitor 
using MatLab Psychophysics Tool Box 3 Psychophysics Toolbox Version 
3 (Brainard, 1997). For each trial, a central fixation cross appeared alone 
in the center of the screen for 1300 ms. The fixation cross remained in 
the center of the screen for the duration of the trial. After 1300 ms, 
either an asterisk-shaped cue would be displayed above or below the cue 
for 100 ms or the central fixation cross would remain alone on the screen 
for 100 ms.  
For the language-learning task, twenty word-object pairs were 
constructed for participants to learn. A set of twenty everyday objects 
were gathered with a Google image search. I selected a set of twenty 
novel objects from images in the novel object and unusual name 
database (Horst & Hout 2016). All images were selected such that they 
showed a single object set to a white background. For each of the twenty 
everyday objects, audio files of their English labels were generated using 
Apple text-to-speech. In addition, twenty novel words were generated 
such that each word matched one of the twenty English labels by 
syllable (e.g. the English label ‘dog’ with the novel word ‘hin’). These 
were also made into audio files with Apple text to speech. The images 
and words were paired together as follows: everyday objects with their 
English labels (the control condition), everyday objects with non-
matching English labels (familiar-object/familiar-label), everyday 
objects with novel words (familiar object novel label), novel objects with 
everyday words (novel-object/familiar-label), and novel objects with 
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novel words (novel-object/novel-label). Example object-label pairs for 
each condition are shown in Figure 1.  
We decided to present object-label pairs to participants in a way 
that did not test their knowledge of the object-label pairs as they were 
learning them. In case where participants give feedback that is 
incorrect, incorrect labels will be learned (McCandliss, Fiez, Protopapas, 
& Conway, McClelland, 2002). Thus, we presented participants with a 
continuous loop of on the computer screen for 3 seconds. After the first 
second, the audio label was played, and the orthographic representation 
was displayed below the image. Each object-label pair was presented a 
total of 20 times and in a randomized order. The entire presentation 
lasted 20 minutes.  
 
Procedure  
 
After giving informed consent, participants were first asked to 
carry out the ANT. Instructions were given both on the screen and 
verbally. Participants were instructed to press the button ‘P’ or ‘Q’ on 
the keyboard to indicate the direction of the target arrow. Participants 
Figure 2.1 Examples of object-word pairings for all conditions. (A) a familiar 
object paired with a familiar word, (B) a familiar object with a novel word, 
(C) a novel object with a familiar word, (D) a novel object with a novel word, 
and (E) the control, a familiar object with its English label. 
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were given five practice trials, and then completed two blocks with 96 
trials each. In between the two blocks, participants were given a short 
break to rest.  
After the ANT task, participants were given one of 5 object-label 
association tasks. Regardless of the condition, participants were given 
the following set of verbal instructions: “You are learning a ‘secret code.’ 
You may already know parts or all of the code, but you will be tested on 
your knowledge of the code when you are done.” Participants were then 
instructed to repeat the label while looking at the object after each time 
the label was played by the computer. Participants were monitored 
during the language learning task to verify that they were verbally 
repeating the label throughout the task. After the association task, 
participants were given another ANT task.  
2.3.2 Results 
Data Preparation 
 
Trials were included only if participants gave the correct 
response. In addition, individual trials were removed if they were from 
incorrect trials or if they exceeded 2.5 times the standard deviation from 
the mean RT of each participant. In total, 9.03 % of all trails were 
eliminated because of these criteria.  
  
Vocabulary Recall Accuracy  
 
All participants in the control condition got all 20 items on the 
vocabulary recall test. This is unsurprising as all items for the control 
group consisted of everyday objects and their English labels. The 
familiar-object/familiar-label group scored an average 89.6 percent 
accuracy, the novel-object/familiar-label scored an average of 98.5 
percent accuracy, the familiar-object/novel-label scored an average of  
86.9  percent and the novel-object/novel-label scored an average of 86.2 
percent.  
A 2 (label familiarity) by 2 (object familiarity) ANOVA was 
performed on the vocabulary test scores. There was a significant main 
effect for object familiarity (F(1,228)= 6.469, p=0.0116), as well as a 
significant main effect of label familiarity (F(1,228) = 11.377, p<0.001). 
In addition, there was a marginally significant interaction of label and 
object familiarity (F(1,228) = 3.417, p =0.0658).  
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Analysis of Reaction Times 
 
This primary goal of the analysis was to examine how 
performance on the ANT task changed after participants completed the 
object-label association task. Many previous studies – especially in the 
bilingual literature – have used calculations of inhibitory cost (i.e. the 
difference in means between the congruent and incongruent trials for 
each participant). However, Costa and colleagues (Albert Costa et al., 
2009) have suggested that overall RT should be considered. In addition, 
the design of this experiment makes it difficult to use methods such as 
performing analyses on singular data per individual because they fail to 
fully consider within individual variance. Thus, a mixed effects linear 
model was selected for data analyses.  
A total of six fixed effects were included in the model. A dummy 
coding scheme was used for these factors. The first two fixed effects were 
(1) if a trail had congruent or incongruent flankers (congruency) and (2) 
if a trial took place in a block after the association task (block). Both of 
these two factors and their interactions were also included as random 
factors. The next two fixed effects accounted for the familiarity of objects 
(object familiarity) and labels (label familiarity). For image familiarity, 
only trials after an association task with novel images were coded as 1. 
Trials that took place before the association task were dummy coded as 
0, even if they were performed by participants who would later perform 
an association task with novel images. This was done because there is 
no theoretical reason to suspect group-level differences in participants 
before the association task beyond those captured by individual random 
effects.  The same coding scheme was done for trials after association 
tasks with novel words.  
A fixed effect was created to separate the control group form the 
familiar-word familiar-image group. The baseline is the only group 
where participants were asked to pair images and words for which they 
already knew the paring (i.e. the word ‘puppy’ with the image of a 
puppy). As with image and word familiarity, this effect – henceforth 
called alignment – was dummy coded as a 1 only for trials after 
completing the aligned association task.   
Finally, score on the vocabulary task was included as the final 
factor. All scores for trials before the association task were coded as 0, 
while all the scores for trials after the association were mean centered. 
Again, there is no theoretical reason to suspect that performance on an 
association task will affect trails that preceded it. The interactions of all 
factors were included in the model.  
As participants must inhibit irrelevant information in 
incongruent trials, participants are expected to have slower RTs in these 
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incongruent trials. Indeed, there is significant main effect of congruency, 
with participants performing an estimated 68.7 ms slower for 
incongruent trials (F(1,543.16)=48.1979, p < .0001)6. In addition, trials 
taking place in the second block, after the image-word association task 
are an estimated 26.2 ms faster than trials before the association task 
(F(1,288.16)=5.2463, p = 0.0227). This is also expected, as practice 
effects from the first block will help participants to perform the second 
block with familiarity and efficiency. However, there is no interaction 
between congruency and block, meaning that inhibitory cost is not 
significantly different in the second block. This suggests that practice 
had a general effect on task performance, but the specific mechanisms 
underlying inhibitory control have not benefited from this practice.  
A baseline group (the ‘aligned’ group) was included in this 
experiment in order to understand if the effects of the vocabulary tasks 
were simply due to practice. There were no significant effects of 
alignment, meaning that the baseline did not differ significantly differ 
from the unaligned familiar words and familiar images group. However, 
this does not rule out the possibility that other groups differed from the 
baseline. Due to the dummy coding of the model, these differences will 
appear as effects of the association tasks via the factors of word 
familiarity or image familiarity.  
The model showed several effects related to the specific 
association task assigned to each participant. Trials that took place after 
completing the association task with familiar-labels are an estimated 
10.2 ms faster than those after novel-labels association tasks 
(F(1,309.55) =  17.2988, p < 0.0001). There is also a significant effect of 
object familiarity, with trials after novel-object tasks being an estimated 
182 ms faster than trials after familiar-object task (F(1,288.54 )=6.1012, 
p=0.0140). However, there is also an interaction, with RTs being an 
estimated 183 ms slower for trials after the novel-object/novel-label 
association task (F(1 288.54) =11.010, p=0.001).  Together, these effects 
show that participants who learn to pair familiar labels with novel 
objects had faster RTs in the second block.   
The difference between congruent and incongruent trials was also 
affected by the special association task that the participant was given. 
After being given a novel-object association task, incongruent trials were 
an estimated 11.8 ms slower than other trials (F(1,522.88) = 11.3520, p 
= 0.0008). After being given a novel-label association task, incongruent 
trials were an estimated 13.1 ms faster than other trials (F(1 522.88 
13.8065 0.0002245). However, incongruent trials after the novel-
object/novel-label task were an additional 9.5 ms slower than other 
                                                      
6 P-values have been estimated with type III sum of squares, using the lmerTest 
package.  
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trials (F(1,522.89) = 7.3490, p = 0.0069). Together, these results show 
that inhibitory costs are lower for incongruent trials taking place after 
the novel-object/familiar-label association task. These affects are shown 
in Figure 2.2. Overall, the decreased inhibitory and better overall 
efficiency seen after the novel-object/familiar-label suggests that 
inhibitory control my be slightly strengthened when learning new words 
that are phonologically similar but conceptually different form words 
and concepts known by individuals.  
There are also several effects of score. These include a main effect 
of score (F(1,311.13) = 10.9032, p = 0.0010), a congruency and score 
interaction (F(1,540.49 = 4.0271, p = 0.0452), a score and label-
familiarity interaction (F(1,311.13) = 24.6141, p < 0.00001), a score 
object-familiarity interaction (F(1,311.13) = 18.8132, p < 0.0001), a 
score, congruency, and  label-familiarity interaction  (F(1,540.47) = 
8.5657, p = 0.0035), a score, congruency, and object-familiarity 
interaction (F(1,540.47) = 7.8610, p = 0.0052), a score, label-familiarity, 
and object-familiarity interaction (F(1,311.13) = 20.755, p < 0.0001), and 
a score, congruency, object-familiarity, and label-familiarity interaction 
(F(1,540.48) = 4.5333, p = 0.0336). As interactions within a complex 
dummy coded mixed-effects model, these interactions are difficult to 
interpret.  
Overall, the model estimated that for the familiar-label/novel-
object condition, overall RTs correlate with score on the vocabulary test. 
Figure 2.2 Model estimates for the congruent and incongruent trials 
after the four experimental group association tasks. Error bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals for the model estimates.  
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In other words, those who performed lower on the vocabulary test had 
faster RTs. Because this condition has the overall highest vocabulary 
scores, it is possible that correlation between score and performance is 
highly influenced by a few individuals who scored low on the vocabulary 
test. As such, this effect should be interpreted cautiously.  However, if 
the effect is treated seriously, it appears to run counter to the previous 
results. As other effects show a link between the familiar-label/novel-
object group and higher efficiency, it might be expected that those with 
higher scores would have higher efficiency. In addition, it might be the 
case that those with higher scores were able to complete the tasks with 
such efficiency that they did not need to utilize inhibitory control beyond 
their capacities in order to complete the task. However, for those who 
were not able to complete the vocabulary task with full competence, it is 
likely that they struggled to exercise inhibitive control beyond their 
normal capabilities. Thus, those with lower vocabulary scores would 
show higher transfer effects of inhibitory control.  
2.3.3 Discussion 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the mechanisms 
under which bilinguals will increase specific cognitive abilities know as 
inhibitory control. In process that involve inhibitory control, individuals 
must suppress irrelevant information in order to meet the demands of a 
particular task (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). For example, in the case of 
ANT task given in this study, participants had to suppress information 
from distractor arrows in order to report the direction of a centrally 
fixated arrow. Several studies have reported increased inhibitory control 
abilities in bilinguals (Bialystok et al., 2004, 2008, 2008; Calvo & 
Bialystok, 2014; Albert Costa et al., 2009). 
A common explanation for these bilingual advantages is that 
bilinguals must habitually inhibit one language in order to utilize the 
other (e.g. Kroll et al. 2015), While this explanation is warranted given 
the immense control involved in bilingual language production and 
perception, it fails to recognize the complexities of the bilingual mind. 
The languages of a bilingual likely influence each other and overlap in 
many ways. This can be seen in the literature examining bilingual 
processing and production, as well as in neural network models of 
second language learning.  
With such a complex overlap between languages, the need for 
inhibitory control likely varies in degree, depending on the exact nature 
of this overlap. Psycholinguistic studies examining language perception 
in monolinguals and bilinguals show various effects of phonological and 
semantic density (Abdel Rahman & Melinger, 2019; Siew & Vitevitch, 
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2019). In some cases, the presence of phonologically or semantically 
similar words help to facilitate processing (Blumenfeld & Marian, 2011; 
Gordon, 2002; Vitevitch, 1997). In other cases, the presence these lexical 
neighbors slow processing (Ziegler, Grainger, & Brysbaert, 2010; Cluff 
& Luce, 1990; Dell & Gordon, 2003; Gordon, 2014; Munson & Solomon, 
2004; Scarborough, 2010, 2013; Vitevitch & Luce, 1998). It is likely that 
bilinguals must use inhibitory control when language overlap leads to 
competition, rather than facilitation. However, with ambiguities in the 
literature, it is difficult to suggest how the specific overlap between 
languages necessitates the use of inhibitory control.  
This chapter aimed to broadly examine how potential overlaps 
with one’s current linguistic knowledge affect inhibitory control. This 
was achieved by giving participants a task measuring inhibitory control 
(i.e. the ANT) before and after learning a set of image-word pairings. If 
a participant’s ability to use inhibitory control changed in the time 
between the first and second ANT, then much of this change may be 
attributed to the use of inhibitory control during the image-word 
association task. Specific kinds of overlap between the language learned 
during the association task and the learner’s linguistic knowledge will 
cause more changes in the second ANT. Thus, the task may help to 
identify which aspects of linguistic overlap are potentially relevant to 
understanding the bilingual advantages.  
As a first attempt to understand the mechanisms that underlie 
the bilingual advantage, the experiment conducted in this chapter 
tested extreme cases of language learning. In the object-label association 
task, participants were asked to learn labels that were either novel 
words or words that were identical to English words. They were also 
asked to pair these labels with either familiar or completely novel 
objects. Pairing objects with known English words is an exaggerated 
case of learning false cognates, while paring words with novel objects is 
an exaggerated case of learning vocabulary words for novel concepts. 
While both cases are exaggerated, the effects of learning these parings 
on inhibitory control are useful for the understanding of bilingual 
advantages, as they help to further understand the relationship between 
lexical overlap and inhibitory control.  
A total of five object-label association conditions were used. One 
of these acted as a baseline control in which participants ‘learned’ to pair 
objects with their everyday English labels. The other four consisted of a 
2 by 2 design, with a familiar-object familiar-label group, a familiar-
object novel-label group, a novel-object familiar-label group, and a novel-
object novel-label group. Of these groups, the novel-object familiar-label 
group showed a decrease in overall RT in the second block of ANT trials. 
In addition, this group also showed a decrease in the inhibitory cost for 
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incongruent trials. This result suggests that the use of inhibitory control 
was transferred form processes utilized in the novel-object familiar-label 
task to the second block of ANT trials. Therefore, the process of pairing 
a familiar label with a new object utilizes inhibitory control. This is 
interesting, given that none of the other trials showed any differences 
relative to the aligned group.  
It is important to note that, of the four experimental groups, 
participants scored the highest on the novel-object familiar-label 
vocabulary test. In the novel-label condition, participants would have 
had to memorize a set of words. This memorization might have added to 
the particular difficulty of the novel-label condition. However, the 
familiar-label familiar-object also had lower vocabulary scores than the 
novel-object familiar-label group. In the familiar-label familiar-object 
task, participants would have had to simultaneously suppress the label 
for the familiar object while suppressing the object that usually pairs 
with the familiar label. Perhaps this dual suppression made the task 
particularly difficult. Regardless, the ease of the novel-object familiar-
label group supports the fact that this condition was particularly 
different form the others.  
Taking the results of this study into consideration, there must be 
something about pairing novel objects with familiar labels that utilizes 
inhibitory control. The language networks of bilinguals – and 
monolinguals alike – may overlap in many ways. Moreover, overlap can 
pertain to different levels of linguistic information, such as phonological 
or semantic. These familiar-label novel-object pairings perhaps are most 
akin to learning alternative meanings to previously known words or to 
learning words for novel concepts in a second language (or first!) that 
have considerable phonological overlap with previously known words. 
As such, the results of this study suggest that the bilingual advantages 
are related to similarities in the phonological patterns of words and 
differences in the semantics categories of the two languages.  
Overall, this study supports the notion that bilingualism should 
not be treated as a monolithic category. The internal systems of 
linguistic knowledge that individuals possess are part of the larger 
culture-cognition system. Just like all cognitive tools, the spread and 
organization of linguistic information is highly interactive, fluid, and 
difficult to measure in its entirety. However, in order to understand 
these systems, a certain level of research must be done in understanding 
the organization of information (i.e. the content) within the system. In 
the case of language, the culture-cognition system consists of a rich 
network of sounds, words, syntactic patters, and social contexts. 
As the necessity of inhibitory control appears to be necessary for 
only specific types of linguistic overlap, the mechanisms underlying 
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bilingual advantages do not stem from the general existence of a second 
language. In other words, bilingual advantages do not arise because of 
the habitual suppression of a full language. Rather, it is the specific 
organization of the linguistic system determines the degree of inhibitory 
control necessary for language processing or language learning.   
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Chapter 3 
A Cross-National Study Examining 
the Effects of Culture on Attention 
Attention is a fundamental aspect of human cognition. It is an 
integral component of visual processing and is used in a variety of tasks 
such as communication and decision making. Yet, visual attention 
varies significantly between individuals and cultures. A particular body 
of work has shown that individuals from East-Asian (i.e. Japan, Korea, 
and China) and Anglo-American (i.e. Canada and the USA) countries 
vary in their attentional styles (e.g. Nisbett et al. 2001, Kuwabara & 
Smith 2012, Masuda & Nisbett 2001). These differences have most 
abundantly been shown between individuals in the United States and 
Japan.  
East-Asians tend to rely more on context and a broader set of 
details than Anglo-American7 nationals while attending to information. 
For example, while all individuals attend to objects in the foreground 
more than the background of a visual scene, Japanese attend to the 
elements of a visual scene that surround a foregrounded object more 
than Americans. Americans attend more to a foregrounded object itself, 
while largely ignoring the context that surrounds the object (Masuda & 
Nisbett, 2001; Senzaki et al., 2014b).  
These stylistic differences extend to a variety of cognitive 
behaviors, such as eye-movement patterns while viewing natural scenes 
(Masuda & Nisbett 2001), the recognition of basic geometric shapes 
(Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003), categorization 
(Gutchess, Hedden, Ketay, Aron, & Gabrieli, 2010), reasoning 
(Norenzayan et al., 2002) and social cognition (Markus & Kitayama 
1991). For example, given the choice to categorize an object into one of 
two sets of objects, Anglo-Americans will identify a singular feature that 
is true for all objects in each set (i.e. a particular petal shape for a group 
of flowers), and then categorize the object with the group with which it 
shares this singular feature (Norenzayan et al., 2002). However, East-
                                                      
7 Throughout this chapter, participants born in the United States are referred to as 
Americans.  
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Asians will categorize the object with the group that overall has the most 
features in common with the object.  
One particular cultural variable has been proposed throughout 
the literature as the underlying reason for these differences in cognitive 
style. This variable is self-construal, the degree to which members of a 
culture will hold the needs of an individual above the needs of a group 
(Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002; LeFebvre & Franke, 2013; Takahiko 
Masuda & Nisbett, 2006b; Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; Oyserman & Lee, 
2008). While East-Asian and American cultures do indeed possess 
different modal self-construal patterns, it is not clear how self-construal 
causes such differences in cognitive style. Because cultures are complex 
and vary in many ways, there exist other cultural variables that differ 
between East Asia and the United States. Among these are differences 
in the languages and structural environments of these cultures.  
Moreover, if a cultural variable is truly responsible for the cognitive 
styles of individuals within culture-cognition system, then the degree to 
which individuals are exposed or adhere to that cultural variable will 
correlate with that specific aspect of cognitive style.  
In this chapter, I assess the cognitive styles of individuals in the 
United States and Japan. For this work, I give participants a series of 
survey instruments which measured individual differences with respect 
to several cultural variables: self-construal, language background, 
syntactic preferences, and exposer to physical layouts typical of 
Japanese and American cities. In addition, I have participants complete 
two experiments that measured their attentional styles. Finally, I 
examine the relations between the attentional styles and self-reported 
cultural experiences.  
3.1.1 The Scope of Cognitive Style Differences 
Throughout the literature, the American attentional style has 
been labeled ‘analytic’ while the East-Asian attentional style has been 
labeled ‘holistic.’  The analytic/holistic distinction appears to relate to 
the classic cognitive style of field-independence. For example, in the rod 
and frame task (Witkin, Lewis, Hertzman, & Machover, 1954), 
participants are asked to rotate the position of a rod until it is vertical. 
This rod is placed within a frame that has itself been rotated. 
Participants are scored as more field-independent if they are able to 
ignore the orientation of the frame and position the rod with respect to 
absolute position. Americans perform better at the rod-and-frame task 
than Chinese nationals (Ji, Peng, & Nisbett 2000). In contrast to the 
traditional rod-and-frame task, where ignoring context improves 
performance, Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, and Larsen (2003) gave 
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participants a variant of the rod-and-frame task in which participants 
were shown a line embedded in a square and then asked to reproduce 
the line in a second square. As the second square was a different size 
than the first square, ignoring context in this task will hinder 
performance. When participants were asked to draw the line such that 
the length was proportional to the size of the new square, the Japanese 
participants performed better than the American participants. In a 
similar task where participants had to identify if line lengths were the 
same as the line in the previous square, East-Asian born individuals 
showed greater activation in frontal and parietal regions when asked to 
make judgments based on absolute line lengths (Hedden, Ketay, Aron, 
Markus, & Gabrieli, 2008). Those born in the United States had similar 
activations when judging based on relative line lengths. Given the role 
of these brain areas in cognitive control, their activation likely 
represented the detection and suppression of culturally-prefered 
information and actions.  
 
Attention  
 
Eye-tracking studies have shown a general tendency for 
Americans to focus their attention more on the salient features of their 
visual scene. For example, Chua, Boland, and Nisbett (2005) had 
Chinese and American participants rate a series of images consisting of 
a central focal object against an appropriately matched background. 
Chinese participants had more fixations towards the background than 
American participants. In addition, American participants had an 
earlier initial fixation on the object than the Chinese participants. 
Similar results have been repeated in moving scenes (Masuda & Nisbett, 
2001; Senzaki, Masuda, & Ishii, 2014).  
There is also evidence from change blindness studies. When two 
similar images are presented sequentially one after another, separated 
by a small gap in time, participants find it difficult to detect subtle 
differences between the images. Masuda and Nisbett (2006) gave 
American and East-Asian participants image pairs that changed either 
in the foregrounded object or the background. While the groups were 
equally good at detecting changes in objects, the East-Asian participants 
were better at detecting changes in the background.   
Several studies have shown that the attentional differences 
between East-Asia and Anglo-America also affect covert attention. 
Boduroglu, Shah, and Nisbett (2010) used a change detection task to 
show differences in the spatial degree to which East-Asian and 
American participants allocate their attention. Participants had to look 
at a central fixation and identify a color change in one of four stimuli 
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presented to them. The East-Asian participants were better than the 
Americans at identifying changes farther from the fixation, while the 
American participants were better than the East-Asian participants at 
identifying changes closer to the fixation. These results would suggest 
that East-Asians naturally allocate their attention more widely than the 
Americans.  
 Takao, Yamani, and Ariga (2018) gave Japanese and 
American participants a variant of the Posner cueing task (Posner, 
Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). In such cuing tasks, participants must 
detect and respond to stimuli on the left or right side of the screen. 
Before the stimuli, a location cue is given. This cue is not predictive of 
the actual location of the stimuli. When stimuli are presented quickly 
(100 ms) after a cue, RTs are significantly faster for trials where the cue 
is in the location of the stimulus. However, the effect does not hold for 
longer durations (300 ms), suggesting that attention is directed towards 
the direction of the cue, but reallocates back to the fixation after 300 ms. 
When stimuli were presented 700 ms after a cue, American participants 
continued to benefit from the location of the cue, while the Japanese 
participants showed the traditional decrease in the effect of the cue. 
Takao and colleagues suggest that their results indicate that the 
Japanese rely more on the cue to orient their attention.   
 
Memory 
 
East-Asians also appear to remember aspects of context better 
than Anglo-Americans. When East-Asian participants are asked to 
describe images after memorizing their content, they will report more 
details about the background of the image than Anglo-American 
nationals (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Senzaki, Wiebe, Masuda, & 
Shimizu, 2018). Similar effects have been shown in studies in which 
participants are asked to identify if a portion of a picture belongs to a 
previously seen larger image. East-Asians are more likely to recognize 
portions from the background of the larger image than Anglo-Americans 
(Kveraga, Ghuman, & Bar, 2007).  
In addition to having a higher tendency to remember more details 
about the backgrounds of scenes, East-Asian participants rely more on 
background context when recalling information about foregrounded 
objects. Masuda and Nisbett (2001) asked participants to remember a 
set of objects set on a series of backgrounds. They were then shown these 
objects again and asked if they were seen already. Half of the objects 
were set on the same background as seen previously, while the other 
half were not. The East-Asian participants were more likely remember 
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images if they were set against the background they were previously 
paired with.  
 
Categorization  
 
 Ji and Nisbett (2001) gave participants a word and asked 
them to group it with one of two other words (e.g. squirrel with dog or 
acorn). In all cases, the first word was related to both of the other words. 
However, the first relation was one due to the first word being in the 
same category as the second (i.e. a squirrel and a dog are both animals), 
while the first word was related to the third word because they are 
associated in a real-world context (i.e. a squirrel eats an acorn). East-
Asian participants were more likely to pair words based on real-world 
relations. Gutchess, Hedden, Ketay, Aron, & Gabrieli (2010) gave 
participants a similar categorization task. However, they gave 
participants explicit instructions to sort words based on category or real-
world relationships.  For both instruction sets, East-Asian 
participants showed frontal-parietal activation, while Americans 
showed temporal and cingulate activation. Both of these regions are 
associated with conflict. Such a difference is consistent with the 
arguments outlined in Chapter 1. While two individuals may possess 
cognitive tools that perform similar operations, the scaffolding upon 
which these cognitive tools may differ greatly based on other aspects of 
their cognitive style and an individual’s cultural experience.  
 
Global/Local Processing 
  
 McKone et al. (2010) showed East-Asian and Australian 
participants Navon figures (letters made of smaller letter), and asked 
them to respond if a target letter was present either on the global or 
local level. Relative to the Australian participants, the East-Asian 
participants showed a significant advantage detecting target letters at 
the global level. These results were replicated by Hakim, Simons, Zhao, 
and Wan (2017).  
 Oishi et al. (2014) gave participants a Navon figures 
(shapes comprised of shapes) and asked American and Japanese 
participants to indicate which of two other Navon figures it was most 
similar to. Unlike McKone et. al (2010), Oishi and collogues found that 
the American participants preferred to use global processing strategies. 
They replicated this finding among children, college age youth, and older 
adults.  
 Lao, Vizioli, & Caldara (2013) showed East-Asian and 
generically western participants two Navon figures (shapes made of 
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shapes) consecutively. Participants were asked to report if the two 
shapes were completely incongruent, congruent at the local level, 
congruent at the global level, or congruent at both local and global levels.  
While East-Asian participants showed no differences when responding 
to locally or globally congruent trials, western participants showed 
quicker responses for globally congruent trials.  
The local/global studies show mixed results. It is possible that 
global and local processing do not share the same exact underlying 
mechanisms as the differences in holistic/analytic cognitive styles. 
However, given that large cultural differences were found by each of 
these studies, it still remains plausible that global/local difference in 
attention relate to the differences outlined previously in this section.  
3.1.3 Mechanisms for the Cognitive Differences 
With the abovementioned review, it is clear that the cognitive 
differences between East-Asian and American individuals are robust, 
affect a range of cognitive processes, and consistently align with a 
cognitive style preference for different degrees of context sensitivity. 
With these cognitive styles extending to such a wide range of cognitive 
phenomena, it is difficult to pinpoint the mechanisms for such stylistic 
difference without in-depth investigation. However, several candidates 
have been proposed as sources for the difference. I outline each of these 
candidates in the following subsections.  
 
Self-Construal  
 
The predominant explanation in the literature suggests that 
differences in cognitive style arise because of differences in self-
construal. This social dimension – known prevalently as the 
individualism-collectivism continuum – describes the degree to which 
individuals construe the self as an independent agent or as belonging to 
a larger collective unit (Triandis, 2001). Collectivist self-construal, the 
adherence to interindividual harmony is an extremely common cultural 
theme in East-Asia. In contrast, Anglo-American countries, such as the 
United States, stress individualist self-construal in which self-agency is 
valued above the societal collective (Chiao & Blizinsky, 2010). Several 
have suggested that collectivist self-construal requires individuals to 
incorporate greater context from their environment in order to attend to 
the rules and patterns of their social world. Collectivist oriented cultures 
often have customs that require individuals to attend to in-group and 
out-group membership. For example, in both Korean and Japanese, 
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speakers must adhere to particular grammatical forms that reflect the 
relationship between the speaker and the listener.  
There is some evidence to suggest that measures of 
individualism-collectivism correlate with the cross-national differences 
in cognitive style. In a study by Hedden and colleagues (2008), frontal-
parietal activations of American participants performing a context 
incorporating response task (i.e. judging line lengths relative to the size 
of a square) correlated with their scores on a measure of individualism-
collectivism. In contrast, East-Asian participants living in the United 
States showed frontal-parietal activations during a context-free task 
(i.e. judging line lengths irrespective of the size of a square) correlated 
with their scores on acculturation to the United States.  
In addition, there have been several studies that attempt to prime 
individualism or collectivism before a task measuring cognitive style. 
For example, Kühnen and Oyserman (2002) primed participants with 
passages consisting of first person or third person pronouns. They then 
had participants complete both a global and local Navon task. 
Participants primed with third person pronouns performed between at 
the global task than those primed with third person pronouns. It is 
important to note that this study attempted to prime individualism and 
collectivism with linguistic cues. Thus, it is difficult to separate the 
influence of self-construal from language.  
Japan has been the primary East-Asian country represented in 
studies measuring the cross-cultural differences in cognitive style. It is 
unclear, however, the degree to which Japan represents a true 
collectivist culture. In multi-national studies of self-construal, Japan 
scores in the middle of most countries, with countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia towards the most 
individualistic. However, the East-Asian countries of China and Korea 
score among the highest collectivist nations (Hofstede, 2001). 
Furthermore, some have argued that Japan has increasingly adopted 
individualistic tenancies in the past two decades. Individualistic values 
have risen in Japan through globalization and the spread of Euro-
American culture (Elliot, Katagiri, & Sawai, 2012). For example, divorce 
rates have steadily increased in the past two decades. Collectivist 
cultures value marriage commitment over the individual and thus tend 
to see lower rates than individualistic cultures. Moreover, individualism 
itself will manifest differently in Japan and the United States  
(D’Andrade, 2008; Heine et al., 2010). For example, people with 
individualistic values in Japan are likely to isolate themselves from 
friends and develop lower senses of well-being, while individualistically 
minded people in the United States are as likely as collectively minded 
people to form interpersonal relationships (Ogihara & Uchida, 2014). 
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Thus, it is unlikely that individuals with similar self-construal will 
behave the same across cultures. A parallel to draw upon is emotional 
disposition. There is an interaction between emotional style and culture 
because individuals with culturally dis-preferred emotional dispositions 
are more likely to change their affect than those with culturally 
preferred dispositions (Tsai, 2017).  
Even if Japan represents a primarily collectivist culture, it is 
necessary to measure individual differences in order to assess how 
particular aspects of a culture affect cognition because each individual 
has a unique set of experiences. Individual scores on an individualism-
collectivism questionnaire have significantly predicted performance on 
an attentional task for people within the United States (Hedden et al. 
2008). However, it is unknown how scores on an individualism-
collectivism questionnaire relate to the differences in attentional styles 
between individuals in Japan and the United States. 
A second criticism is related to the nature of self-construal itself. 
While the dimension has been re-proposed by a number of authors 
(Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 2001), Singelis (1994) argues that self-
construal can be described by a 2-dimensions space, rather than a single 
continuum. He divides individualism-collectivism into a measure of 
independence and interdependence. As such, individual can 
simultaneously maintain values related to self-independence and group 
harmony. If such, then it is unclear if cross-cultural differences in 
cognitive style relate to differences in independence or interdependence.  
 
Language 
 
Recent studies have suggested that language could also explain 
Japanese and American cognitive differences. Going beyond the 
holistic/analytic cognitive styles literature, there is a robust tradition 
identifying cognitive variation that arises form differences in language 
structure (e.g. Whorf 1956; Lucy 1996; Boroditsky 2001; Lupyan & 
Spivey 2010; Matlock 2004; Bowerman & Choi 2001). As with the 
holistic/analytic distinction, language differences may cause speakers of 
the language to attend to particular elements over others. For example, 
speakers of languages with classifiers8 such as Yukatec Maya and 
Japanese are more likely to categorize objects based on material, while 
those without robust classifier systems such as English are more likely 
to classify based on shape.  
                                                      
8 Such systems require special classifier words to identify the shape of an object being 
referenced by a verb. Thus, nouns in these language naturally refer to material 
without specifying shape. Mass nouns in English share this property. For example, a 
quantity of want cannot be referred to without specifying a container.  
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Duffield and Tajima (2012) suggest that the cognitive style 
differences between those in Japan and the United States arise because 
of syntactic differences between English and Japanese. The difference 
they cite centers around how the language refers to objects (i.e. figures) 
and their backgrounds (i.e. ground). The order in which figure and 
ground information is canonically given is different in English and 
Japanese. In English, figure information typically comes first, while 
ground information typically comes first in Japanese. Examples of figure 
and ground sentences for English and Japanese are given in the 
following example. 
 
(A) The bicycle is in front of the house. 
 
(B) house-POS9 front-LOC bike-SUB is.  
  
In example (A), the English sentence, the figure ‘bicycle’ is 
mentioned before the ground ‘house.’ However, in (B), ‘house’ comes 
before the word ‘bicycle’ in the Japanese sentence. Because figure 
information comes first in English, speakers must be quick to focus on 
foregrounded objects and concepts and hold them in working memory 
until the end of the sentence (or longer). In Japanese, the same is true 
instead for ground information in the case of Japanese.  
However, the tendency to put ground information first is 
inconsistent across the languages of East Asia. In Mandarin, for 
example, the order of figure and ground information is more evenly 
distributed among canonical sentences. Thus, speakers of Mandarin 
should fall between the cognitive styles of English and Japanese 
speakers if these perceptual differences are due to language. Indeed, in 
a task asking participants to recall elements of visual scenes, Japanese 
speakers remembered more elements of the background than the 
Mandarin speakers (Duffield & Tajima, 2012).  
Additional evidence of the involvement of language comes from a 
study by Senzaki, Masuda, and Ishii (2014). They performed a 
replication of the eye-tracking experiments in which background 
elements are fixated more by Japanese participants than American 
participants. However, for their study, participants were either told to 
describe the videos they saw after viewing or simply instructed to 
passively view the images. Japanese and American participants 
exhibited differing attentional patterns when watching videos that they 
expected to describe later. However, the Japanese and American 
participants did not differ when they were passively viewing the images. 
                                                      
9 POS = possessive particle, LOC = location particle, SUB = subject particle 
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This would suggest that eye-fixation differences arise because 
participants are actively planning how to describe the images with 
language. 
In addition to specific language effects, there may be a relation 
between cognitive style and overall language background. A growing 
body of evidence has indicated that bilinguals have certain advantages 
when performing tasks that require participants to suppress task-
irrelevant information. While such advantages do not necessarily align 
with an analytic/holistic style distinction, many of the tasks that 
investigate the distinction require participants to suppress either 
analytic or holistic information in order to meet the demands of their 
current task. Moreover, some studies have shown bilingual advantages 
for some analytic/holistic style measurements, such as the embedded 
figures task (Bialystok & Shapero, 2005). Thus, language experience 
presents a confound that should be considered carefully when 
measuring cross-national differences in cognitive style.  
 
Physical Environment 
 
 Miyamoto, Nisbett, and Masuda (2006) had Japanese and 
American participants examine scenes of Japanese and American 
cityscapes. Participants rated the scenes on the number of objects, the 
ambiguity of object boundaries, the organization of the objects in the 
scene, and the occlusion of objects in the scene. When controlling for city 
size, the Japanese scenes had a greater number of objects and these 
objects were more ambiguous to interpret. Differences in visual scenes 
between the United States and Japan extend beyond cityscapes. 
Japanese comic books, for example, are more likely to divide larger 
scenes into individual panels (Cohn, Taylor-Weiner, & Grossman, 2012). 
As such, each comic panel is more likely to have detailed attention to 
background elements.  
In a second experiment by Miyamoto, Nisbett, and Masuda 
(2006), participants were shown images from either Japan or the United 
States then given change blindness tasks. When primed with Japanese 
cityscape scenes, both Japanese and American participants  were better 
able to identify changes in contextual information. Takahiko Masuda 
and Nisbett (2006) examined change blindness for images of Japanese 
and American scenes. Both American and Japanese participants 
detected changes in focal information better than contextual 
information. Ueda and Komiya (2012) showed Japanese participants 
cityscape images from Japanese and the United States and then had the 
participants look at culturally neutral images. The eye-fixations of the 
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participants focused on context more if they had been shown Japanese 
cityscapes, rather than American cityscapes.  
 Ueda et al. (2018) suggest that the attentional differences 
are a result of bottom-up tuning to different environmental stimuli, 
rather than a holistic-analytic distinction. They examined Japanese and 
American performance on several asymmetrical visual search tasks. In 
such tasks, the search for an item with feature A (e.g. a Q) in a group of 
items with feature B (e.g. an O) is more difficult than a search for an 
item with feature B among items with feature A. Ueda and colleagues 
found differences in the degree and directions for various asymmetrical 
search tasks between American and Japanese participants. They argued 
that because these searches relied on low-level attentional processes, 
that the differences arise because early visual processes are tuned to 
different physical environments.  
3.2.1 Goals of the Study 
Given the current literature, it is difficult to suggest that self-
construal collectivism is the sole underlying reason for the differences 
in cognitive style seen between East-Asians and Anglo-Americans. In 
addition to individualism-collectivism, cultures can differ in many other 
ways such as language and physical environment. While there is some 
evidence to support the relation between self-construal and cognitive 
style, there are equivalent volumes of research indicating that language 
and physical environment play a role. Furthermore, language structure 
and physical environment are highly integrated with sociocultural 
values such as self-construal. As such, attributing attentional variation 
to one particular factor is difficult and perhaps misguided. 
Furthermore, general statements about the differences between 
cultures ignore the high levels of individual variation within a culture. 
Very few studies have examined individual differences in the studies 
addressing cross-cultural cognitive style. However, exploring individual 
differences allows for a comparison of several cultural factors 
simultaneously.  
This project examines how self-construal, language, and physical 
environment modulate differences in cognitive style. Participants 
performed two perceptual tasks that measure their cognitive style. Then 
they completed four survey instruments which measures their self-
construal, physical environment, figure-ground language judgments, 
and language backgrounds.  
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3.2 Experiment 1 
The goals of the first study are two-fold. First, the study attempts 
to replicate the eye-tracking findings that show that the backgrounds of 
visual scenes are attended to more by East-Asians than Anglo-
Americans (Chua et al., 2005; Rayner, Li, Williams, Cave, & Well, 2007; 
Senzaki et al., 2014a). The second goal of this project is to show how 
performance on this task is predicted by individual differences in self-
construal, figure-ground preferences, language background, and/or 
familiarity with certain physical environments (i.e. everyday scenes 
from Japan and the United States). 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants 
 
Fifty Japanese participants were recruited from undergraduate 
classes at Kyoto University. These participants received a voucher to 
buy items at their school bookstore as compensation. Fifty American 
participants were recruited from undergraduate classes at the 
University of California, Merced. All American participants received 
extra credit for their participation. Unfortunately, some of the datafiles 
Figure 3.1. Examples of images used for the eye-tracking study. Images on 
the left have animals as focal objects while images on the right have non-
living entities as focal objects.  
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from each group were corrupted, leaving a remaining forty-three 
Japanese data files and forty-four American datafiles available for 
analysis.   
 
Materials 
 
Twenty visual scene stimuli were constructed such that they 
contained a single foregrounded object set against an appropriately 
matched background. Ten of these scenes used inanimate objects, while 
the other ten used animals. Examples of these are shown in Figure 3.1. 
These were presented on a computer display using MatLab 
Psychophysics Toolbox. As the Japanese and American participants 
participated in separate locations, two slightly different eye-trackers 
were used. American participants were measured using a head mounted 
Eyelink II, while the Japanese participants were measured using a 
desktop mounted Eyelink 1000. Both pieces of equipment used combined 
pupil/corneal reflection tracking and a 9-point calibration. The screen 
resolution and relative size of the images were set such that participants 
in both groups saw the same sized images.  
Four survey instruments were included in the experiment: (1) An 
individualism-collectivism questionnaire, (2) a measure of familiarity 
with physical layouts of cityscapes in Japan/America, (3) a measure of 
the degree to which participants rate non-canonical sentences, and (4) a 
measure of bilingualism.  
Self-Construal. Self-construal traditional looks at a dimension of 
independence and interdependence, or individualism and collectivism, 
respectively. While some view these as two ends of the same dimensions, 
there is evidence to treat them as orthogonal (Singelis, 1994). As such, I 
chose to use a self-construal instrument that separates these two 
dimensions. The self-construal questionnaire used was the Singelis 
scale (Singelis, 1994). The measure consists of 30 items. Each item is 
ranked by the participant in order to indicate the degree to which they 
believe the item describes themselves along a 7-point scale. The items 
are divided into two subsets used to score participants along two 
dimensions, independence and interdependence.  Example C shows an 
item that measures independence, while Example D shows an item that 
assesses interdependence. 
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(C) I enjoy being unique and different from others in many 
respects. 
 
(D) Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I 
avoid an argument. 
 
Physical Familiarity. The physical familiarity index was 
constructed using images from both the United States and Japan. These 
images belonged to a larger set used in in several studies (Miyamoto et 
al., 2006; Ueda & Komiya, 2012). The pictures were taken at culturally 
neutral sites, showing cityscapes at varying levels of urbanization. A 
total of 20 images were taken from the set. 10 were from each country. 
Photos were selected in pairs (from the US and Japan), such that they 
shared the same level of urbanization. Any signs or language present in 
the photos were blurred, so that participants could not directly infer the 
country that the photo was taken in. Participants were asked to rate 
their familiarity with the physical features of the photo. In particular, 
they were asked to ignore the presence or absence of specific objects or 
areas in the photos (e.g. a brand of car or mountain range they know 
form childhood) and make their judgment purely on the physical layout 
(e.g. the relative size of roads and buildings). Ratings were given on a 
Figure 3.2. Four examples of images given for the physical familiarity 
survey. (A) An urban photo taken in Japan. (B) An urban photo taken in 
the USA. (C) A suburban photo taken in the USA. (D) A suburban photo 
taken in Japan 
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scale form 1 through 9, with 1 being very similar and 9 being very 
unfamiliar. Example Images are shown in Figure 3.2.  
Figure-Ground Sentence Ratings. The Figure-Ground sentence 
questionnaire consisted of ten paired sentences. Each of the pairs 
consisted of two sentences with identical meaning. However, one 
sentence was constructed with figure information first, while the other 
had ground information first. All sentences pairs were constructed such 
that they contained identical words, except in different orders. For each 
pair, participants were asked to select the sentence they believed they 
would be more likely to say. Then they were asked to indicate the degree 
to which they believed that sentence was better than the alternative. 
Ratings were given on a scale form 1 through 9. Examples E and F show 
canonical and non-canonical examples from the English version of the 
survey. 
 
(E) There are lots of little red fish swimming around a big 
rock. 
 
(F) Around a big rock there are lots of little red fish 
swimming. 
  
Language Background. The Leap-Q questionnaire, commonly 
used in bilingual studies, was used to measure linguistic background 
(Marian et al 2007). The questionnaire contains questions asking the 
languages they know and their relative proficiency in each of their 
languages.  
Both English and Japanese versions of the survey instruments 
and experimental instructions were necessary for the study. The Leap-
Q and Singelis individualism-collectivism scale have versions translated 
into Japanese. For experiment, the physical familiarity index, and the 
figure-ground sentences, items and instructions were first written in 
English and translated into Japanese by a native speaker of Japanese. 
To check for consistency, the Japanese versions were translated back 
into English by a native speaker of English who was fluent in Japanese.  
Procedure 
  
Before the start of the experiment, American participants gave 
signed consent and Japanese participants indicated their consent with 
a hanko stamp10. This experiment was carried out in the same session 
                                                      
10 Signatures are not common in Japan. Rather, individuals use a stamp engraved 
with their name. This stamp is called a hanko.  
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as a second experiment, described later in this chapter. Thus, each 
participant completed two computerized experiments and four survey 
instruments. So that participants could remain naïve to the survey 
questions, these were always given to participants after completing the 
computerized perceptual tasks. Additionally, the two experiments were 
given to participants in a random, counterbalanced order.  
For the experiment, participants were first calibrated with a 9-
point calibration. Participants were given each of the 16 images in a 
random order. Before each image, a drift correction was performed in 
order to ensure the equipment maintained an accurate log of fixations 
from trial to trail. In each trial, the participant was given 20 seconds to 
study the image. They were then given 40 seconds to describe the image.  
3.2.2 Results 
Survey Measures 
 
LEAP-Q. While the LEAP-Q measures many different aspects of 
language background, the percentage of time an individual decides to 
speak their primary language was chosen to represent an individual’s 
language background. The Japanese participants scored an average of 
90.76 percent, while the Americans scored an average of 78.13 percent. 
The difference is significant (t(78.43) = 3.46, p <0.001), suggesting that 
this population of American participants had a more diverse language 
background than the Japanese participants. The most frequently listed 
second language of the Japanese participants was English, while the 
most frequently listed second language of the American participants 
was Spanish. 
Self-Construal. For the individualism-collectivism survey, items 
were divided into independent and interdependent items. Items in each 
category were averaged together for each participant. A regression was 
performed to assess the correlation between the two dimensions. As with 
previous reports by Singelis (1994), there was no significant correlation 
between the two dimensions (f(1,85)= 0.1298, p=0.720). Thus, the 
interdependent and independent dimensions were kept as separate 
dimensions for further analysis. 
For each dimension of self-construal, a t-test was performed in 
order to see how the American and Japanese participants differed. For 
the independent dimension, Japanese participants (M = 4.25) scored an 
average of 0.6 lower than American participants (M = 5.03; t(84.97) = -
4.95, p = < 0.001). The direction of this difference is expected, as Japan 
has been seen as traditionally less individualistic than the United 
States. However, the 0.6 difference is small relative to the scale of the 
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self-construal instrument, which is on a 7-point scale. This smaller 
difference could be because many of the American participants are 
Hispanic and influenced by more aspects of collectivist culture than 
prototypical Americans. In other studies, individuals in Mexico have 
been found to be more collectivist than individuals in Japan (Chiao & 
Blizinsky, 2010). However, as these measures conflate independence 
and interdependence, it is difficult to suggest how such would 
specifically affect the independence dimension. To investigate this, a 
regression was performed looking at monolingualism scores and 
independence. No significant effect was found (F(1,42)= 0.0227,  p= 0. 
0.881). In addition, a t-test was used to look at independence differences 
between individuals who listed Spanish as a language they spoke (n=22) 
and those who did not (n=29). Again, no significant differences were 
found (t(42) = -1.5434 = 0.1302).  
For the interdependent dimension, Japanese participants (M = 
4.33) scored an average of 0.66 lower than American participants (M = 
5.10; t(78.40) = 5.63, p = < 0.001). This result is particularly surprising, 
as American are expected to be less interdependent than Japanese. 
Again, this could be because of the particular demographics of the 
American participants. Because of this result, however, it might be 
expected that the Americans also have greater likelihood of looking at 
visual context, assuming that interdependent self-construal does affect 
attentional style. Again, these differences could be because of Hispanic 
influence on self-construal. A regression was performed with level of 
monolingualism predicting interdependence. No significant effect was 
found (F(1,42) = 2.479,  p = 0.1229). As with independence, a t-test was 
performed looking at individuals who listed Spanish as a language they 
spoke (n=22) and those who did not (n=29). Again, no significant effect 
was found (t(42)= -1.5434, p= 0.1302).  
Given that there is no significant correlation between self-
construal and language background, it is difficult to attribute the 
American patterns of self-construal specifically to the Hispanic 
backgrounds of many of the participants. However, previous studies 
have found specific student populations in rural areas to be unusually 
collectivist for American culture (Tweed & Sokol, 2001). Regardless of 
the reason for these findings, they are important to consider when 
interpreting correlations between self-construal and the attentional 
measures. 
Figure-Ground Preferences. Due to an error in the digital form for 
the English version of the survey, scores for one of the items failed to 
log. Analysis was performed on the remaining 9 items. For each item, if 
participants selected the sentence with figure information first, the item 
was scored the same as the rating. However, if the ground-first sentence 
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was selected, then the item was scored as 1 minus the rating. Thus, all 
items had a score from -8 to 9.  
Japanese participants had a slight preference for ground 
information first (m = -0.65), while the American participants had a 
preference for figure information first (M = 5.09). This difference was 
significant (t(81.61) = 12.54, p < 0.001). It is expected, as Japanese 
sentences canonically have ground information first, while English 
sentences canonically have figure information first.   
Physical Familiarity. As images were divided into those in Japan 
and those in the USA, a separate score was calculating for Japan images 
and USA images.  These scores were calculated by adding image ratings 
for each participant. A regression was performed to assess the 
correlation between the two dimensions. Surprisingly, there is a 
significant correlation between the two dimensions (f(1,83) = 174.18, p 
< 0.001 ). This would suggest that a single factor could be extracted from 
these two dimensions. However, such a factor would give scores for 
participants that closely resembles the average degree for which they 
were familiar with the physical layout of any image. Such a dimension 
does not carry theoretical significance in this experiment. Thus, a single 
dimension was created by subtracting a participant’s ratings of Japan 
images form their ratings of USA images, with higher scores indicating 
more familiarity with Japan images. 
The two groups were compared with a t-test. The Japanese 
participants (M = 14.80) scored higher than the American participants 
(M = -10.36; t(80.86) = 7.25, p <0.001), meaning that each group 
preferred images from their respective nations.  
Eye-tracking Analysis 
 
This study hypothesizes that the eye-fixations of Japanese and 
American participants will differ in the degree to which they look at 
foregrounded objects in a photograph versus their surrounding 
elements. Both groups will look at objects in the scene. However, 
Japanese participants are more likely to look at aspects of the scene 
surrounding the objects. As the scenes from this study comprise complex 
scenes, focal objects occupy multiple parts of the images. Thus, 
differences in fixations towards objects and context will appear in the 
overall spatial distributions of fixations. In order to assess attention in 
this study, a measure of spatial distribution was calculated by averaging 
the standard deviations of fixation in the X and Y dimension (see also, 
Huette, Winter, Matlock, Ardell, & Spivey, 2014). These calculations 
were used as the dependent variable for analysis.  
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A linear mixed-effects model was used to analyze the data. For 
the model, country, independent self-construal, interdependent self-
construal, figure-ground preference, physical familiarity, percent 
monolingual, and image type (animal vs non-living object) were included 
as fixed effects. The interactions of country with each of the other five 
factors were also included as fixed effects. Participant and image type 
were included as random effects. The model revealed a significant effect 
of country, with American participants having a spatial spread that is 
an estimated 1.9 percent larger than the Japanese participants 
(F(1,75.28) = 23.094, p < .001). This effect goes in the opposite direction 
of previous studies. However, the result is consistent with the fact that 
the American participants scored higher on interdependence. There is 
no main effect for any of the survey measures. However, there is an 
interaction between interdependence and country (F(1,76.030) = 4.1078, 
p=0.04619). The model estimate for this effect can be seen in Figure 3.3. 
With this interaction, the spatial distributions of eye-fixations positively 
correlate with the interdependence scores of Japanese participants, 
while they negatively correlate with the interdependence scores of 
American participants.   
Figure 3.3. Model Estimates for the correlation between Interdependence 
and spatial distributions of eye fixations. Model estimates for Japanese and 
American participants are shown in separate colors.  
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While these findings do support claims that there is a relation 
between visual attention patterns and self-construal, the patterns found 
here are more complex than as suggested by previous accounts. These 
patterns appear to indicate that the more they have a self-construal that 
is culturally dis-preferred, the less likely they are to look at contextual 
information. Differences in attentional style, then, may result from 
habitually balancing between an individual’s preferred self-construal 
and their culture’s preferred self-construal.  
3.2.3 Discussion 
This experiment served to (1) replicate the findings showing 
differing eye-fixation patters in American and Japanese participants 
and (2) to show which – if any – specific cultural factors are able to 
predict variation in the spatial distributions of the eye-fixations of 
individuals. While the Japanese and American participants did indeed 
perform differently, the direction of this difference is contrary to the 
direction in previous studies. The American participants had larger 
spatial distributions in their fixations than the Japanese participants. 
In all previous studies, Japanese participants were more likely to look 
at the context that surrounds objects.  
There are several possible reasons for the overall difference. First, 
many have claimed that self-construal affects attentional styles. While 
the attentional patterns in this study were opposite of what is found in 
the literature, the participants also showed self-construal patterns that 
were opposite of the literature. Specifically, American participants 
showed higher levels of interdependence and were more likely to look at 
visual context than their Japanese peers. These results are consistent 
with the claim that self-construal affects attentional style.  
The interdependence scores of the American participants were 
quite unexpected. It is important to note that the undergraduate 
population at UC Merced is not necessarily representative of other 
undergraduate bodies in the United States. Much of the university’s 
student population consists of first-generation college students and 
there is a high Hispanic population. However, there were no significant 
correlations between the self-construal scores of participants and their 
language backgrounds. It is still possible that Hispanic culture has had 
some influence on the UC Merced population in general. In this case, all 
participants at the university would have been affected, regardless of 
their languages. Moreover, cross-national surveys of self-construal have 
shown that Japanese individuals tend to be among the most 
homogenous culture, while the United States is significantly more 
heterogeneous (Neuliep, Chaudoir, & McCroskey, 2011). Groups within 
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the United States will vary considerably. Previous studies have found 
that even among college student populations, high levels of collectivism 
can occur. Such high levels of collectivism have been shown especially in 
rural communities (Tweed & Sokol, 2001).  
The second objective of the experiment was to see if individual 
difference measures will predict the attentional styles of individuals. A 
total of four survey instruments, with a total of five factors were given 
used to assess individual differences. Of these, interdependent self-
construal was the only factor found to be predictive of eye-fixation 
spread. The most prominent views in the literature would suggest that 
interdependent self-construal styles would be predictive in this 
experiment. However, interdependent scores had differing effects for 
Japanese and American participants. While Japanese who had higher 
interdependent scores had higher spatial distributions, Americans who 
had lower interdependent scores had higher spatial distributions. In 
both cases, individuals who possessed culturally dis-preferred 
interdependence scores were less likely to focus on context. Several 
studies have shown that the behavior of individuals is an interaction 
between cultural norms and individual dispositions. When there is a 
mismatch cultural norms and individual dispositions, individuals will 
find it difficult to adhere to cultural norms or develop particular habits 
that place them within cultural norms. For example, in East-Asian 
culture, low arousal states (e.g. serenity) are preferred to high arousal 
states (e.g. excitement). East-Asian individuals who have particular 
dispositions towards high arousal states are more likely to pick low 
arousal activities such as yoga or meditation than individuals who are 
already have a predisposition towards low arousal states (Tsai, 2017). 
The behaviors that individuals with culturally mis-matched self-
construal patterns may result in a need to attend to contextual 
information.  
Another alternative is that individuals with mis-matching self-
construal patterns must consistently ignore salient cultural cues in 
order to behave within the framework of their preferred self-construal. 
Thus, they will have habitualised to ignore contextual information. This 
argument is similar to the claims of bilingual research, which suggest 
that individuals exercise executive control from the continual 
suppression of one language in order to utilize another (Bialystok et al. 
2004; Costa, Hernandez, & Sebastian-Galles 2008). In this study, there 
was no effect of bilingualism on attentional style. However, the 
attentional mechanisms affected by the suppression of cultural 
information are likely different than the cognitive control responsible 
for bilingual language control.  
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3.3 Study 2 
The first experiment attempted to replicate the findings of several 
eye-tracking studies investigating cross-cultural differences between 
individuals in East-Asia and Anglo-America (Chua et al., 2005; Nisbett 
& Miyamoto, 2005; Senzaki et al., 2014b). These studies, and others 
examining the processing of visual objects and their context show robust 
differences between East-Asian and Anglo-American participants, with 
contextual elements being attended to more by East-Asian participants. 
However, experiments looking at global and local processing – rather 
than analytic/holistic style – are fewer in number and have inconsistent 
results. Thus, the partial purpose of the second experiment is to add to 
the few studies examining global/local processing among Japanese and 
American individuals.  
In this experiment, two tasks were created with Navon shapes. In 
the first, participants are asked to focus on the global properties of the 
Navon figure (e.g. a circle made of small triangles). Then, the 
participants are asked to select the shape that matched the global shape 
of the Navon figure (e.g. a circle). In the second task, participants were 
asked to attend to the local features of the Navon figure and select the 
shape that matched the local features (e.g. a triangle). Both tasks had 
two trial types. In the first, the competing choice matched the non-target 
features of the Navon figure. In the second trial type, the alternative 
choice did not overlap with either the global or local features of the figure 
(e.g. a square).  
Both tasks were constructed such that choices would be made 
with a computer mouse rather than the button presses of traditional RT 
experiments. Thus, mouse trajectories could be measured. A number of 
studies have shown that mouse movements may reveal dynamic 
information about the processes that underlie decision tasks (Freeman 
& Dale, 2013; Freeman, Dale, & Farmer, 2011). For example, a 
participant may have an equally long RT in two different trials. 
However, the reason for these long RTs may differ. One may be long 
because the stimuli itself takes time to process. The other might be long 
because of the time it takes to decide between the two possible 
responses. In the first case, a participant might simply have a slower 
velocity when moving towards their choice or a late onset of movement. 
For the second, the actual trajectory of the mouse movement might 
gravitate to the competitor before the participant ultimately clicks on 
their response. Thus, mouse movement trajectories will give insight into 
the processes responsible for response selection. As there have been 
ambiguous results regarding differences in local/global processing of 
East-Asian and Anglo-American participants, mouse-tracking may be 
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particularly useful in identifying specific differences in cognitive 
processes that do not appear in RT differences. 
3.3.1 Methods 
Participants 
 
The same participants for the previous experiment were used for 
this experiment. They performed the tasks in the same session as the 
previous experiment.  
Materials  
 
Twenty Navon figures were created. All figures consisted of one 
shape type constructed from many of a single different type of shape (e.g. 
a square made of several small triangles). The shapes used for 
construction included circles, squares, triangles, diamonds, and 
hexagons. Target shapes were constructed as whole shapes, rather than 
Navon figures. The tasks were programmed with the MatLab 
PsychToolBox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Pelli and Zhang, 1991).  
Procedure 
 
As reported earlier in this chapter, the tasks in this experiment 
were given in the same session as the eye-tracking experiment. The 
order in which the eye-tracking experiment and the Navon figure 
experiment were given were counterbalanced. In addition, the order of 
the global and local tasks were further counterbalanced.  
For the local task, participants were instructed to attend to the 
smaller shapes that made of the large Navon figures. To begin each trial, 
participants clicked on a button located at the bottom of the screen. 100 
ms after the button was pressed, the Navon figure was displayed for 300 
ms. The Navon shape then disappeared and two shapes were displayed 
in the upper left and upper right sides of the screen. One of these shapes 
matched the Navon figure on the local level. In half of the trials 
(competition trials), the other shape matched the Navon figure on the 
global level, while in the other half of trials (no competition trials) it was 
a shape that matched neither level of the Navon figure. These shapes 
remained onscreen until the participant clicked on either of them. 
Feedback was provided to the participant with either a checkmark for a 
correct response, or an X for a wrong response.  
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The global task was identical to the local except that participants 
were told to attend to the global level of the Navon figure. Additionally, 
the response images always contained a shape that matched the global 
level of the Navon figure. The other shape matched the local level in half 
of the trials.  
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Four mouse trajectory features were investigated. These included 
RTs, maximum deviation, initiation time, and maximum velocity. All 
mouse trajectories were calculated with the mousetrap package in R 
(Kieslich & Henninger, 2017). A linear mixed effects model was run for 
each of the trajectory features. These models included country, task (i.e. 
global/local), and competitor type as fixed effects, as well as their 
interactions. The interaction of task and competitor was included as a 
random effect. In order for the model to properly treat overall means and 
group means as intercepts, all continuous factors were mean centered 
within each group of participants (see Winter 2013). Because the 
analysis examines a number of outcome variables, this section groups 
the reporting of significant effects by predictor variables. All effects were 
calculated with the lmerTest toolbox (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & 
Christensen, 2017), which calculates the significance of each factor – 
including interaction effects – by individual dropping them from the 
model. 
 
Overall Task Effects  
 
This study examined differences in the global and local processing 
abilities of participants in Japan and the United states. In order to do 
so, participants were given two tasks. In the global task, participants 
were presented with a Navon figure and asked to attend to the global 
features of the image. They were to then select between two shapes that 
matched the global features of the presented figure. In congruent trials, 
the distractor shape had features that were not consistent with any 
features of the Navon figure. In competition trials, the distractor shape 
matched the local features of the Navon figure. Local task was identical 
to the global task, except that target shapes matched the local features 
of the Navon figures. As some studies have suggested a general 
preference for global processing over local processing (Navon, 1977), it 
would be expected that participants might show a difference in 
performance in these two tasks. Indeed, there is a main effects of 
condition on maximum deviation, with trials in the global task deviating 
towards the competitor more than trials in the local task (F(1,75.57)   = 
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4.389, p = 0.0395). In addition, there is an interaction of effect of 
condition and competition on maximum deviation. The difference 
between competition and no-competition trials is larger in the global 
task, with competition trials having larger maximum deviations 
(F(1,74.53)  = 6.3033, p =0.01422). This same pattern can be seen in a 
marginally significant interaction effect of condition and competition on 
RT (F(1,1122.82)= 2.793, 0.0949). As maximum deviations measure the 
degree to which the competitor competes with the target response, it is 
expected that larger deviations would occur in competition trials 
compared with no-competition trials. These results also suggest that the 
degree of this competition is less in the local condition. This would 
suggest that participants are biased towards attending to the local 
features of the Navon figures.   
 
Country of Origin Difference 
 
Global processing styles presumably align with attentional 
patterns that focus highly on context. In contrast, local processing styles 
presumably align with attentional patterns that are context 
independent. Thus, Japanese participants should greater performance 
on the global task, while American participants should show greater 
performance on the local task. However, this study revealed no overall 
differences of country. There are several possible reasons for this. First, 
the American participants do not adhere to certain cultural norms, 
relative to American in other cross-cultural studies. Thus, the same 
differences between Japanese and American participants found in other 
studies would not be likely to replicate here, assuming that adherence 
to these cultural norms is related to attentional style. Indeed, the 
previous study revealed a pattern opposite of literature. If non-
adherence to American cultural norms did explain an absence of overall 
differences, then both groups would be expected to have better 
performance in the global task. However, both groups showed greater 
maximum deviations in the global task competition effects were greater 
in the global task.  This suggests that both groups had a preference 
towards local information. A second possible explanation for no main 
effect of country is the nature of the task itself. In some of the other 
global/local paradigms, stimuli were presented sequentially and 
participants were to indicate if the second stimuli was similar to the 
first. Thus, participants had to attend to both local and global 
information and then compare both sets of information. However, in this 
study, participants were instructed to attend only to kind of information 
at a time and compare three images based on that information. 
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Interdependence 
 
Overall, this work hypothesized that individual differences in 
either independence, interdependence, physical familiarity, or figure-
ground ratings would correlate with a preference for local or global 
processing. If the processes that underlie global/local processing are 
subject to the same cross-cultural affects as overt visual attention 
towards objects and their context, then interdependence will also predict 
performance for this experiment. As with the first study, 
interdependence is expected to interact with country. Indeed, there are 
several significant effects related to interdependence. There is a 
significant interaction of interdependence and county on RT. For 
Figure 3.4. Relationship between interdependence and response time.  
 
Figure 3.5. Relationship between interdependence and maximum velocity.  
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Japanese participants, higher interdependence correlates with higher 
RTs. For American participants, higher interdependence correlates with 
lower RTs (F(1,74.59) = 4.0463, p = 0.04788). There is also a significant 
interaction of interdependence and country on maximum velocity. These 
interactions are shown in Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5. Japanese 
participants have higher maximum velocities when they have lower 
interdependence, while American participants have higher maximum 
velocities when then have higher interdependence (F(1,75.0) = 7.7182, 
p= 0.0069). In some cases, maximum velocity can indicate a tradeoff 
between movement earlier in the trajectory and movement later in the 
trajectory. However, as higher velocities coincide with low RT, these 
high velocities may simply reflect higher overall efficiency. These 
interactions also mirror the country and interdependence interactions 
seen in the previous study. Those with culturally dis-preferred self-
construal styles had showed more efficient performance on this task 
than those with culturally preferred self-construal styles. In addition to 
these significant effects, a marginal interaction of condition, country, 
and interdependence on maximum velocity suggests that the correlation 
is steeper (more positive Americans and more negative for Japanese) for 
the local task (F(1,75.0) =  3.3514, p=0.0711).    
Such effects were not found. However, each of these factors did 
show effects on the mouse trajectories of participants in unexpected 
ways. Two of these – interdependence and figure-ground ratings – 
interacted with country. Individuals with interdependence that differed 
further from their cultural norms had faster RTs and higher maximum 
velocities. These effects were exaggerated in the local task. As 
participants were overall more efficient at the local task, this suggests 
that distance from interdependence norms is associated with abilities 
both to efficiently attend towards information different special scales 
and to inhibit attentional biases (towards local information). 
 
Independence 
 
There was also no significant main effect of independence. This 
would have been expected if independence drives the attentional 
differences between the U.S. and Japan. However, there is a significant 
interaction between independence and the presence of competition. 
Trials with competition had a more negative correlation with maximum 
velocity than trials without competition (F(1,355.3) = 5.0730, 
p=0.024911).  This suggests that participants who are more independent 
have slightly higher abilities to process trials that have competition 
than those who are less independent. However, visual inspection shows 
that the effect is small. The independence measure focuses primarily on 
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maintaining a sense of unique individuality.  It is possible that an 
increased ability to process the competition of local and global 
information is related to one’s ability to self-reflect or introspect. Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that attention overlaps with self-directed 
attention (see Humphreys & Sui, 2016 for review).  
 
Figure-Ground Ratings  
 
Ground information canonically is given early in Japanese 
sentences, while figure information is canonically given later sentences. 
As such, individuals who speak Japanese will be required to keep 
ground information in working memory longer than figure information. 
The order of figure and ground information is reversed in English. 
Therefore, English speakers will likely keep figure information longer 
in working memory. With this, it is predicted that figure-ground ratings 
would correlate with a preference for relative performance on the global 
or local tasks. There was no significant effect of figure-ground ratings 
on any of the mouse-tracking outcomes. Given the previous study, these 
results are unsurprising.  
As with interdependence, there was a significant interaction of 
figure-ground ratings and country on maximum deviation, with 
Japanese who preferred canonical Japanese syntactic orders having 
lower maximum deviations and Americans who preferred canonical 
English syntactic orders having lower maximum deviations 
(F(1,74.79)=4.3384, p = 0.04068). This effect is shown in Figure 3.6. 
There is also a marginal interaction of figure-ground ratings and 
Figure 3.6. Relationship between group-first syntactic preferences and maximum deviation.  
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country on maximum velocity, with those who prefer canonical 
sentences in their language having lower maximum velocities 
(F(1,75.0)=3.1898, p=0.078144). Together, these suggest that those who 
prefer non-canonical figure-ground orders are more likely to deviate 
towards the competitor and then quickly correct towards the target 
response. There is an additional marginal effect of condition, 
competition, country, and figure-ground ratings (F(1,74.28) =3.3284, 
p=0.07211). However, as a weak 4-way interaction, it is difficult to 
interpret.  
Unlike interdependence, figure-ground ratings affected 
maximum deviation; participants who prefer non-canonical figure-
ground orders were more likely to deviate towards the distractor. This 
suggests that the aspects of the task affected by figure-ground ratings 
related to the selection of the two competing responses. The differences 
in how these two factors affected the mouse trajectories suggests that 
these factors affect the processing in slightly different ways. 
Interdependence relates to the modulation the difficulty of these specific 
tasks, while figure-ground ratings relate to the degree to which 
participants entertain competing information.  
 
Monolingualism  
 
Many studies have suggested that individuals who know more 
than one language are more efficient at inhibiting irrelevant 
information (e.g. Bialystok & Craik, 2010). As such, those who are highly 
monolingual would be expected to perform competition trials with less 
efficiency than those who speak multiple languages. There is also 
evidence suggesting that bilinguals have overall better performance on 
tasks that involve competition between responses (Albert Costa et al., 
2009). Indeed, monolingualism did have an effect on RT. However, this 
affect showed that for Japanese participants, monolingualism was 
correlated with faster RTs. There is an interaction of monolingualism 
and country. For Japanese participants, monolingualism is negatively 
correlated with RT, while the correlation is slightly positive for 
American participants (F(1,74.53)=3.970, p=0.0499). This would suggest 
that Japanese participants who are bilingual are less efficient at the 
task.  This seems to go against the bilingual literature. In close 
examination of the data, however, the affect appears to be driven by a 
single outlier. The effect is no longer significant when the outlier is 
removed. This aligns with the significance of the effect, which barely fell 
below the .05 threshold.  
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Physical Familiarity 
 
Physical familiarity was also hypothesized to interact with task. 
However, there are no significant effects of physical familiarity. 
However, there is a marginally significant interaction of condition, 
competition, country, and physical familiarity on maximum velocity 
(F(1,5935.4)=2.7434,0.0977). However, as a weak interaction, it is 
difficult to interpret.  
3.4 General Discussion 
Together, the results of these two studies show a complex 
interaction between cultural variables and cognitive processes. For both 
studies, I hypothesized that several cultural variables (independence, 
interdependence, figure-ground order, and physical environment) would 
correlate with the attentional differences between participants in Japan 
and the United States. Each one of these factors presents an alternative 
explanation for why individuals in Japan prefer to attend to contextual 
information more than individuals in the United States. If any if these 
factors were responsible for these differences, then individual 
differences among these factors would explain attentional variation for 
participants from both countries. In the case of study one, a factor would 
correlate with the spatial distributions of eye fixations. In the case of 
study two, a factor would interact with the task type (local vs global), 
indicating that the factor correlates with a preference for one type of 
processing.  
Rather than straightforward correlations between any of the 
cultural variables and task performance, several similar interactions 
were observed in which two of these cultural variables had opposite 
effects on participants in Japan and the United States. These cultural 
variables were interdependence and figure-ground preferences. Japan 
and the United States have cultural norms that are opposite with 
respect to both of these cultural variables. Japanese tend to be high in 
interdependence and prefer ground information first. Americans tend to 
be low in interdependence and prefer figure information first. Therefore, 
the interactions found here can be reinterpreted. Deviation from 
cultural norms within the dimensions of interdependence and figure-
ground preferences correlate with task performance. Such an effect may 
easily stem from reasoning found within the bilingual literature. In a 
sense, these individuals are bicultural. They live in cultures that have 
particular standards of behavior. Yet, they had individual preferences 
for behaving in non-normative ways. As members of their culture, they 
will likely acquire cognitive tools that will help them adhere towards 
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these norms. However, as these individuals come with predispositions 
that oppose their culture norms, they must habitually negotiate between 
their individual and cultural preferences. This habitual negotiation 
results in the strengthening of certain cognitive tools.  
The exact cognitive tools that have been strengthen because of 
habitual negotiation between individual and cultural preferences 
appear to be related to (1) the ability to focus attention away from 
context and (2) general abilities to perform tasks that require 
participants to deciding between competing responses. Assuming that 
these two effects are related, then then it is possible that more effortful 
to make eye-movements towards objects then to make them to objects 
and their context. Contextual information will aid in the processing of 
objects. However, attending to this information may be costly for certain 
aspects of describing the details of a scene. In the Navon task, 
participants generally had a preference for attending towards global 
information. This corroborates the idea that these participants 
generally preferred contextual or global attentional strategies.  
For the original hypothesis each cultural variable had an 
independent mechanism through which they affected attentional 
strategies. In contrast, the results of these studies suggest that more 
general mechanisms are responsible for the effects of culture on 
attention. These mechanisms might be akin to the effects of bilingualism 
on cognition. Moreover, these effects can be seen in multiple cultural 
variables. This suggests either that these factors can independently 
have similar effects on attention or that these factors interact within a 
complex ecosystem of cognitive tools, with an individual’s placement 
within this dynamic as the true factor that necessitates the modulation 
of attentional style.  
  
  
 
78 
Chapter 4 
Personality Describes Behavior 
The cognition of individuals varies. This individual variation may 
actually be more important than group level differences when 
examining cross-cultural variation. This becomes apparent when 
culture and cognition are as seen as a single culture-cognition system. 
The very cognitive tools with which individuals understand and interact 
with their environment are shared and disseminated among the 
individual agents within the culture-cognition system. As this 
dissemination process relies on the interconnections and locations of 
individuals, cognitive tools will naturally be non-uniformly distributed 
across members of a culture. Identifying these individual differences 
help to identify the particular cultural variable responsible for cognitive 
variation. For example, if self-construal is responsible for the cross-
cultural differences in visual attention, then individual differences in 
self-construal should also correlate with individual differences in 
attention. Otherwise, a different cultural variable is likely the origin of 
this cognitive variation.  
In some cases, however, cognitive tools are gained/strengthened 
because individuals must do so in order to competently function in their 
environment. In other words, individuals will rely on previously 
acquired (cultural or biological) tools as scaffolding for the target tool. 
As agents come with unique biological predispositions and previous 
environmental experience, each individual will differ in the specific 
scaffolding that they use when gaining a new tool or strengthening a 
previously acquired one. For example, if an individual learns a second 
language, much of their second language knowledge will be heavily 
influenced by their first language knowledge. 
The cognitive styles of individuals develop over time in order for 
them to be competent members of their culture. Individuals will be 
unaware of many aspects of their cognitive style. In some cases, this is 
because specific tools themselves are not under normal privy of the 
conscious mind. In some cases, the use of these cognitive tool will be so 
commonplace, that there is little awareness that use of the tool could 
vary. However, in many cases, variation in cognitive style is socially 
salient. Such cases are likely to motivate individuals towards certain 
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cognitive styles. Moreover, these differences are likely captured by 
personality instruments. 
According to the American Psychological Association, 
“[p]ersonality refers to individual differences in characteristic patterns 
of thinking, feeling and behaving” (“Personality” n.d.). In other words, 
measures of personality should theoretically capture individual 
differences in cognition. In line with the definitions of cognitive style 
outlined earlier in this chapter, individuals with different personalities 
have different cognitive styles. However, much of the psychological 
literature utilizes definitions of personality that differ from the APA 
definition. These definitions suggest that one’s personality consists of 
the socially relevant traits that differentiate them from others (e.g. 
McCrae & Costa, 1997) 
While the personality overlaps with cognitive style, they refer to 
slightly different concepts. Cognitive style refers to the entire set of 
cognitive tools that an individual possesses. Some of these cognitive 
tools may be more or less socially relevant. For example, a person’s 
verbose communicative style might be quite noticeable to others and 
cause them to be labeled with an ‘extroverted’ personality. However, if 
a person has a particular eye-movement strategy while reading, this 
strategy may go unnoticed by their peers. Thus, the strategy affects 
their cognitive style, without necessarily affecting their personality. 
Moreover, personality might categorize particular cognitive tools 
together. For example, a person who likes to make jokes and a person 
who likes to talk constantly about art may both be labeled as ‘extroverts,’ 
but the underlying reasons for why they talk frequently are different.  
The most popular approaches to personality stem from what is 
known as the lexical hypothesis, which assumes that any and all socially 
relevant aspects of individual human variation will emerge in language 
(Galton, 1884). In other words, if people do not talk about a particular 
aspect of cognitive variation, then that aspect of variation is probably 
not a robust dimension of personality. This runs contrary to cognitive 
style, which captures all aspects of cognitive variation. 
The most persistent view of personality is the five-factor model, 
which follows the lexical hypothesis. It was derived from an analysis of 
English personality trait terms, words that describe long-term 
behavioral characteristics of individuals (e.g. talkative, caring, shy, 
artistic). The approximately ~3500 English trait terms were 
introspectively grouped into 37 categories. Then, through several 
studies, participants were asked to rank themselves and others on these 
37 categories. Factor analyses on these ratings consistently showed that 
English speakers group these 37 categories into five dimensions. Based 
on the psychology literature, these dimensions were named: 
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Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and 
Openness to Experience.  
Many questionnaires have been created from these five 
dimensions. Factor analyses on these questionnaires, even when 
translated into other languages, consistently show five factors that more 
or less align with the original five derived from English (McCrae & 
Terracciano, 2005). However, when the original analysis is performed 
on trait terms from other languages, novel dimensions arise. For 
example, in Korean, there is a dimension of honesty-humility (Hahn, 
Lee, & Ashton, 1999). Even within other proto-Indo-European 
languages, such as Italian or Hindi, there are stark differences from the 
English analysis. Such inconsistencies suggest two ideas. First, 
personality dimensions are parts of larger folk models through which 
cultures explain human behavior. Thus, each culture will identify only 
the culturally relevant differences in behavior as personality. Moreover, 
the dimensions through which individuals self-introspect about their 
own behavior and thoughts are culturally defined. Second, even when 
personality measures are derived from a particular culture, individuals 
from outside that culture may introspect about themselves within that 
cultural framework.  
There are many personality measures. Some, like the big five 
based measures, have gone through rigorous testing to ensure that 
within-questionnaire measures show internal validity across a large 
number of participants. Such ensures that different questions 
measuring extroversion will reliably correlate with one another. While 
the internal validity of other personality measures – such as the Myers-
Briggs Typology Indicator – have been questioned, all such personality 
questionnaires are based on folk models of human behavior and rely on 
the self-introspection of participants. Interestingly, however, some 
personality measures – like the big five – have been discovered via data-
driven approaches akin to those of cognitive anthropology.  
4.2 Personality Folk Models 
The idea that culture can be discovered through language is 
shared by sociocultural anthropologists and advocates of the 
psycholexical approach to personality. The psycholexical approach, 
following the lexical hypothesis, suggests that the socially relevant 
aspects of individual human variation will emerge in language (Galton, 
1884). Inspired by this idea, Allport and Odbert (1936) were among the 
first to exhaustively identify English words that described individual 
characteristics. From an American-English dictionary, they identified 
words which they labeled personality traits. These described long 
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lasting behavioral  characteristics (e.g. agreeable, imaginative, 
stubborn). They did not include physical traits (e.g. fat, tall, skinny, 
short), temporary states (e.g. happy, sad, mentally exhausted), or 
evaluations (e.g. awesome, good, bad). They identified ~4500 personality 
trait terms in English.  
As there are thousands of personality trait terms in English, 
several attempts have been made in order to reduce these into larger 
category groupings. The first was made by Cattell (1946), who 
discovered 35 categories based on his personal intuitions and 
participant judgments. Following Cattel, Tupes and Christal (1961) 
were the first to discover that English personality trait terms could 
reliably be placed into a five-factor structure (the five-factor model; 
FFM). This was soon verified by Norman (1963), and many thereafter 
(e.g. McCrae & Costa, 1997; McCrae et al., 2005). The contemporary 
names for these factors are: (1) Extraversion, one’s likelihood to be 
associated with attention seeking and social dominance, (2) 
Agreeableness, one’s likelihood to be compassionate, trusting, and 
helpful, (3) Neuroticism,  ones likelihood to have stress of negative 
emotions, (4) Conscientiousness, one’s likelihood to be organized and 
focused, and (5) Openness to Experience, one’s likelihood of being 
intellectually curious and creative.  
The original discovery of the FFM can be considered a cognitive-
anthropology-like discovery. Indeed, the cognitive anthropologist, Roy 
D’Andrade (1965) reconstructing the five-factor model using cognitive-
anthropological techniques. Rather than having individuals judge the 
behavior of individuals using personality traits of individuals, 
D’Andrade (1965) had 10 individuals judge the similarity of personality 
trait words (e.g. How similar is the term silent to the term cautious?). 
Factors extracted from these judgments replicated the original big five 
factors, indicating that the participants did indeed have internal 
conceptualizations of these. A larger scale study by Hakel (1974) also 
replicated the FFM. However, rather than similar judgments between 
words, Hakel ask participants, “Suppose a person is _____ - how likely 
is it that he is also ____?” With 480 respondents ratings of 100 pairs, 
Hakel replicated the Big Five factors. As these tasks did not ask people 
to describe an external person, trait similarity must exist in the minds 
of the participants.  
It is important to note, that as a folk model derived from English, 
the FFM is not necessarily consistent across different languages and 
cultures. Early attempts to rediscover the FFM in Germanic languages 
did succeed quite well. Angleitner, Ostendorf, and John (1990) found 
that German trait adjectives gave five factors that seemed identical to 
English. De Raad (1992) only found minor differences between five 
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factors that emerged in Dutch and the American-English factors. 
Mainly, the fifth Dutch factor contained terms such as progressive or 
rebellious, terms that did not contribute to the American fifth factor 
(Openness). While these do show a rediscovery, Dutch and German are 
quite related to English in a historical sense, compared to other 
languages (Konig & Auwera, 2013).  
Analyses of personality traits have been conducted on a total of 
30 languages with at least 3 millions speakers  (de Raad & Mlacic, 2017) 
Of these, 19 are from the Indo-European language family. Of these, 
Hindi and Farsi are the only ones spoken in areas outside of Europe. 
Many language families, such as the Niger-Congo, Dravidian, or 
Amerindian, have been completely ignored. An analysis of Hindi by 
Singh, Misra, & De Raad (2013) revealed six significant factors quite 
different from the big five. For example, the first factor was highly 
associated with traits such as hypocritical, brutish, and cruel. Singh, 
Misra, & De Raad suggest that the first three factors aligned with the 
ancient Indian concepts of Rajas, Sattva, and Tamas, which correspond 
to egoistic and driven, peaceful and virtuous, and apathetic and 
disordered. Markus & Kitayama (1998) argue that the concept of 
personality itself is quite different in many Asian cultures. Rather than 
a view that society is a collection of independent individuals (i.e., 
individualism), personality is understood by an individual’s behavior 
within a collective (i.e., collectivist).  
Clearly there is deviation from the FFM as one examines 
languages that are historically unrelated to and geographically separate 
from English. However, even within English, it is not clear that the FFM 
is stable. Piedmont and Aycock (2007) examined the historical entry of 
personality trait words into the English language. They found that the 
average trait term for Extraversion and Agreeableness entered English 
in the mid-1500s, the average trait term for Conscientiousness and 
Neuroticism entered English in the 1600s, and the average Openness 
trait terms entered English in the early 1700s. Interestingly, the timing 
of trait term entry resembles the ranking of the big five. Earlier trait 
terms might be more relevant to the English language, and thus 
behaviors centered around these traits might be more relevant. Overall, 
this shows that personality models evolve over time, possibly changing 
as certain individual differences become salient at different times in a 
culture’s history.  
4.2 The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator 
While instruments based on the FFM have been used extensively 
within the field of psychology to measure individual differences, they do 
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not represent the personality measures within the popular culture. 
Perhaps the most popular personality measure in online media is the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (e.g. Human-Metrics, n.d.; 16Personalities, 
n.d.). The MBTI is a personality measure that was created by two 
amateur psychologists, Katherine Briggs and Isabel Myers, who based 
the indicator on an adaptation of Carl Jung’s theory of cognitive 
functions.  
Jung’s original theory suggested that there are four major 
functions that characterize behavior. Two of these, Sensing (S) and 
Intuition (N), Jung classified as functions geared towards attending to 
particular kinds of information (i.e., Perceiving ‘P’ Functions). Sensing 
refers to attention towards sensory information gathered by a 
perceptual modality, while Intuition refers to attention towards abstract 
theoretical information. Jung also classified two functions, Thinking (T) 
and Feeling (F), as functions geared to sorting and classifying 
information in order to make decisions (i.e. Judging ‘J’ Functions). 
Thinking involves the use of conceptual manipulation (e.g. logical 
deduction) in order to make sense of information, while Feeling seeks to 
utilize particular subject experience and values in order to make sense 
of information. Each of these four functions could be oriented in either 
an extraverted or introverted orientation, making a total of eight 
cognitive functions. Jung believed that each individual employed all 
functions, but a particular function was dominant for each individual. 
In this way, Jung’s theory behaves very much as a folk model of cognitive 
style.  
The amateur psychologists, Katherine Briggs and Isabel Myers, 
refined Jung’s theory of cognitive functions and built the MBTI. The 
indicator assigns individuals to one of 16 types. These assignments are 
based on four binary dimensions: (1) Extraversion-Introversion, similar 
to the big-five dimension of Extraversion, (2) Intuition-Sensing, 
measuring if an individual prefers to take in abstract information or 
concrete information, (3) Thinking-Feeling, measuring a preference for 
making decisions based on objective conceptual manipulation or based 
on personal experience and values, (4) Perceiving-Judging, a person’s 
preference for taking organizing information and making decisions. The 
indicator itself went through many refinements, both by Myers and later 
the Educational Testing Service. It is now prominently used in social 
media, career counseling, and industry/organizational psychology.  
Each type – according to the Myers-Briggs Model – stood for a 
specific cognitive function style, with one of the eight functions as 
dominant. For example, the ENFP (Extraverted, intuitive, feeling, and 
perceiving) type has dominant extraverted intuition. The indicator 
independently assesses individuals within the binary dimensions and 
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does not test explicit preferences for the cognitive functions. Thus, there 
is the rather simple indicator that groups individuals into 16 categories, 
and there is a more complex folk model of these types which suggests 
complex interactions between cognitive functions and particular ways in 
which individuals mature through time. This is interesting, because the 
ways in which people might talk about Myers-Briggs types will involve 
the discussions of dynamics that are more complex than the indicator 
itself. Given the origins of Jungian theory, it is difficult to suggest that 
these models give a high-fidelity model of human cognition. However, as 
a folk model ever being redefined by communities of individuals, it is 
likely that the Myers-Brigs model takes on the socially-relevant 
discoveries of these communities. Thus, a personality type might 
represent a corner within a 4-dimensional space, or a personality type 
might take on a representation more completely defined by the 
community. This is, in a sense, ideal for understanding how cultures 
evolve personality theories. If these theories pick up on true behavioral 
differences, then the more complex communicative folk model of the 16 
types should have larger explanatory power than the binary 4-
dimensional space.  
Moreover, the MBTI can be used as a proxy for the Big Five 
model. This is especially useful when looking at large online datasets, 
as people often disclose their Myers-Briggs personality types in social 
media. Several studies have looked at the correlations of Myers-Briggs 
and the Big-Five (Furnham, 1996; McCrae & Costa, 1989). Among all 
three, strong correlations were found between MBTI Extroversion and 
Big Five Extroversion, MBTI Intuition and Big Five Openness, MBTI 
Judging with Conscientiousness, MBTI Feeling and Big Five 
Agreeableness. These studies also report minor, yet significant, 
correlations between Big Five Neuroticism and MBTI Extraversion and 
Feeling, Big five Openness with MBTI Extraversion, Intuition, 
Thinking, and Perceiving, and Big Five Conscientiousness with Sensing. 
Clearly, there do exist relations between the two measures – due in part 
to the pervasive use of a shared language to describe these various 
personality traits. 
4.3 Language Variation 
Language is a cognitive tool. It is used to both interact with the 
world and to understand it. People use language in order to express their 
intentions, needs, beliefs, and desires. In addition, language provides 
ways in which to understand the world. For any give language, that 
language provides categories for identifying both real world entities and 
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abstract concepts. In other words, a language helps to constrain and 
identify information that is relevant to a speaker of that language.  
There are over 6,000 languages (Ethnolouge, n.d.). While there do 
appear to be some universal commonalities among most of them, it is 
quite uncontroversial to say that language varies. Much of the discipline 
of linguistics is dedicated towards understanding how language varies. 
Cross-linguistic analyses show differences in the sound inventories, 
morphological complexities, and word orders among the world’s 
languages. Moreover, each language groups objects in the world and 
abstract concepts into unique categories. For instance, English and 
Japanese group colors differently. While English speakers can label the 
color of the sky and the color of a sapphire as ‘blue,’ Japanese speakers 
must identify these separately as mizuiro ‘water-color’ and aoi ‘green-
blue,’ respectively (Athanasopoulos, Damjanovic, Krajciova, & Sasaki, 
2011). Such linguistic differences – grammatical and categorical – affect 
the ways in which speakers of a language attend to and categorize the 
world even in non-linguistic tasks. This corroborates the notion that 
language acts as a tool to understand and interact with the world, 
particularly because language biases the ways in which we understand 
and interact with the world.   
While stark differences can be seen across languages, there is also 
variation within language11. Sociolinguists and linguistic 
anthropologists have documented widespread variation within 
languages. Such variation can be seen due to geographic location (J. 
Chambers & Trudgill, 1998), social class (Labov, 1986), gender (Tannen, 
1994), and one’s generation (Labov, 1962).  Moreover, individuals will 
use distinct variations of language within different social settings 
(Gregory, 1967). For instance, a person will likely talk differently with 
their friends than with their parents.  
One aspect of linguistic variation that has only recently been 
studied in great detail is the relationship between personality and 
language. A limited number of studies, however, have shown that 
personality – especially openness to experience – affects the language 
use of individuals.  
4.4 Language and Personality 
Most research examining the link between personality and 
language use is quite recent. However, in the past half-decade, these 
studies have begun to show that personality predicts fine-grain 
                                                      
11 Sometimes it is quite difficult to distinguish between two languages and varieties 
of the same language.   
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psycholinguistic processes, language learning, and the use of particular 
language forms in online media.  
Several studies have shown that personality is related to 
variation in language use. These have especially focused on the usage of 
lexical items. These differences are akin to language variants or dialect 
differences, as different personalities are more likely to utilize 
particular words than others. For example, Lee, Kim, Young, and Chung 
(2007) examined the relation between personality and free style writing 
by Korean participants. Participants with higher openness to experience 
scores were likely to have more sentences, more likely to use personal 
pronouns, less likely to use proper nouns, used less adverbs, and were 
less likely to refer to sleep.  Other five factor correlates were found, 
including verb usage with extroversion and emotion words with 
neuroticism. In addition to the five factor dimensions, participants were 
also scored on the MBTI.  For example, the overall number of phrases, 
morphemes, and suffixes coincided with the sensory dimension. The use 
of swear words and words about thinking coincided with the judging 
dimension.  
Kern et al. (2014) examined the text of Facebook users who took 
an online assessment of the big five. They analyzed how unigram 
frequencies (i.e. single word counts) correlated with the five dimensions. 
They were able to successfully find different frequency patterns along 
each dimension. For example, mentions of the word “anime” were 
correlated with introversion, while mentions of the word “party” 
associated with extroversion. In addition, the authors looked at 
frequencies of words within semantic categories as defined by the 
Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) template. For example, openness 
to experience correlated with the frequency of insight words such as 
‘accept,’ ‘believe,’ or ‘know.’ Interestingly, openness to experience was 
also correlated with the use of articles (e.g. ‘the,’ ‘an,’ ‘some’). Unigram 
frequency based scoring of personality is reliable, with correlations 
between vocabulary based predicted scores having up to a r=.46 
correlation with questionnaire scores (Park et al., 2014). Schwartz et al. 
(2013) examined how the big five personality traits correlated with eh 
vocabulary of Facebook users. They found significant correlations for all 
five factors. For example, extraversion was correlated with words for 
group activities such as ‘party’, while introversion was correlated with 
words for solo activities such as ‘anime.’ Neuroticism was associated 
with profanity, or ‘depression.’ This Facebook dataset was also used to 
predict the personality of users. Using word frequencies and meanings, 
Park et al. (2014) were able to predict the big five personalities with 
correlations of at least .35 for each of the big five dimensions. 
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Several studies have shown a particular influence of the big five 
factor, openness to experience, on language. These studies have shown 
that individuals more open to experience have better abilities to learn 
languages and to adapt their language to that of other speakers. 
Openness to experience has often been associated with intelligence and 
tendencies to seek novel experiences, and it has been experimentally 
linked to areas of cognition outside of language such as musical abilities 
(Thomas, Silvia, Nusbaum, Beaty, & Hodges, 2015) and statistical 
learning (Kaufman et al., 2010).  
 Yu, Abrego-Collier, & Sonderegger (2013) gave 
participants a word production task before and after listening to a 
narrative. Participants were also given a questionnaire assessing their 
personality on the five factor dimensions. The authors measured the 
phonetic properties of the speech of participants before and after the 
narrative and compared these properties to those of the narratives. 
Along with other factors, the degree to which participants assimilated 
the phonetic properties of the narrative correlated with openness to 
experience.  
Verhoeven & Vermeer (2016) gave second language speakers of 
Dutch a battery of measurements assessing linguistic competence. 
Openness to experience significantly predicted performance on almost 
all of their measures. These included the ability to define words, and, 
reading comprehension, pragmatic competence. In addition, these 
authors gave native Dutch speakers these same linguistic measures. 
While their performance was overall higher than the second language 
speakers, openness to experience significantly predicted many aspects 
of their linguistic competence. These included abilities to define words 
and pragmatic competence.  
When learning a second language, those with high openness to 
experience are able to more accurately make judgments about multi-
word phrases (Kerz & Wiechmann, 2017). Kerz & Wiechmann gave non-
native speakers of English multiword phrases with high frequency (e.g. 
Don’t have to worry ) and low frequency (e.g. Don’t have to wait). These 
were intermixed with ungrammatical phrases. Typically, native-English 
speakers are sensitive to the frequency of multiword phrases, and are 
quicker to process more frequent phrases. Second language learners who 
had higher openess to experience showed a more native-like effect of 
multiword phrase frequency.  
Jackson (2018) gave participants a task where he had 
participants learn vocabulary items in a pseudo-language. Participants 
were asked to view pictures paired with novel words. They were then 
given a vocabulary test, assessing their ability to remember the word-
image pairings given to them. Participants who scored higher in 
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openness to experience had higher overall accuracy when completing the 
vocabulary test. In addition, the author asked participants to report the 
specific strategies that they used in order to memorize the vocabulary. 
In cases where participants did not use explicit strategies, those who 
were more open to experience performed especially above those who 
were unopen to experience. Of importance, this study closely mirrors the 
association tasks performed by participants in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation.  
 
4.5 Goals and Hypothesis 
The abovementioned studies suggest that there is indeed a 
relation between openness to experience and language. Overall, this 
relation suggests that those who are open to experience have higher 
abilities to adapt to and learn language. Many of these studies 
specifically relate to second language acquisition and ultimate 
attainment, with more open individuals having more native-like 
fluency. Interestingly, even native speakers showed differences in 
linguistic competence based on their personality (Verhoeven & Vermeer, 
2016; Yu et al., 2013). In addition, there are many studies showing that 
personality differences may be readily found in online data. Thus, 
language-related competence should be seen in the language of online 
communities.  
While personality does appear to correlate with language use and 
other aspects of cognition, measures of personality are still constructed 
from folk models of the ways individuals differ. On the one hand, this 
means that personality measures will not capture all aspects of cognitive 
style. On the other, personality is likely to capture individual differences 
that measure the degree to which individuals adhere to certain cultural 
norms. Personality systems have been discovered via social processes 
through years (perhaps decades or millennia). Thus, these folk models 
have been optimized to capture individual variation with respect to 
culture. Therefore, it follows that differences in personality will align 
with the degree to which individuals take on linguistic and cultural 
competency, as suggested by the abovementioned studies.  
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, this study seeks to 
expand the growing evidence suggesting a relation between personality 
– specifically openness to experience – and language. Based on previous 
studies, I hypothesized that the Myers-Briggs personalities of online 
forum users will predict aspects of their language use related to overall 
language knowledge and language accommodation. To test this, I 
examined proxies for the vocabulary sizes of users on an online forum, 
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and assessed the degree to which they conformed their language 
patterns to other users on the forum.   
Moreover, I examined language use specifically on a forum where 
people talk about personality. As such, I performed a secondary analysis 
that captures their folk intuitions about personality. Using a word2vec 
model to quantify this folk model, I re-analyzed the effects of personality 
on the measures of vocabulary size and accommodation. I hypothesized 
that the components derived from the word2vec model more 
significantly predict these measures.  
4.6 The Data  
All data were acquired from an online forum dedicated to the 
discussion of personality. Typical forum topics include: how certain 
Myers-Briggs types behave in specific situations, the Myers-Briggs 
types of celebrities, and alternative personality systems, as well as non-
personality related material such as science, the news, and popular 
culture. Each user has the option of tagging their posts with a self-
identified Myers-Briggs type. At the time of data acquisition, there were 
a total of 1,983,279 posts on the forum with 10443 users.  
4.6.1 Acquisition of the Data 
The entire set of publicly available forum posts were scraped from 
TypologyCentral.com. For each post, the post content was acquired, 
along with username, self-identified Myers-Briggs type, date, time, and 
sub-forum identification number.  
4.6.2 Data Cleaning 
All posts were anonymized, tokenized, stripped of punctuation, 
and changed to lowercase. There are many ways to identify as one of the 
16 Myers-Briggs types. All such ways were converted into canonical 
labels (i.e. ‘ENFP’).   
4.6.3 Basic Descriptive Statistics of the Data 
The data comprise a total of 10443 users. Of these, 7320 users 
self-identified a Myers-Briggs type. The posts by these users comprise 
1,558,901 of the total 1,983,279 posts on the forum. The users are not 
evenly distributed among the 16 Myers-Briggs types. The total number 
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of users for each type have been plotted in Figure 4.1. The INFP type 
consists of the highest number of users (n= 1287), while the ESFJ type 
consists of the lowest number of users (n=44). A clear pattern can be 
seen among the user counts for each type; There are more individuals 
who identify as intuitives on the forum than those who identify as 
sensors. This is surprising given the Myers-Briggs Foundation 
estimates that sensors comprise 73.3% of the population (Myers-Briggs, 
n.d.). This imbalance suggests one of two possibilities: (1) intuitive types 
are more likely to find interest in a forum that discusses personality 
types or (2) given the descriptions of intuitive types, individuals are 
more likely to self-report as an intuitive.  
 
4.6.4 Initial Data Analysis 
Based on previous findings in the literature, personality should 
correlate with overall linguistic knowledge and with accommodation to 
other speakers. While the vocabulary size of users in this study could 
not be assessed directly, two proxies for vocabulary size were used. 
These proxies were number of unique words per post and average word 
character lengths. While participants will not use their entire 
vocabulary on the forum, the relative vocabulary sizes of users can be 
inferred from the number of unique words per post as users with higher 
Figure 4.1. Number of users grouped into each of the 16 Myers-Briggs types.  
Intuitives are plotted in orange and sensors are plotted in blue.  
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vocabularies are able to pull from a large baseline of vocabulary items 
in order to make their posts. As the number of unique words in a text do 
not grow linearly with the size of a text, counts were restricted to the 
first 500 words of a user. Thus, posts with more unique words relative 
to the size of the post will be used by users who have larger vocabularies. 
Moreover, users who have higher vocabularies will be more likely to 
know words that are less frequent. Word length correlates with 
frequency. Thus, individuals who use words that are longer will likely 
have larger vocabularies.  
As users of an online forum, individuals will have opportunities 
to interact with other individuals and change their language such that 
it matches others on the same forums. To operationalize this 
accommodation, each post was compared to the last 5 posts on a forum 
that preceded it utilizing a measure known as Jaccard similarity. For 
each post, two bigram sets were created. The first contained unique 
bigrams in that post and the second contained unique bigrams pooled 
form the 5 preceding posts.  Jaccard similarity scores were calculated by 
dividing the intersection of these two sets by the union of these two sets.   
 
Vocabulary Size 
 
In order to examine the effect of personality on number of unique 
words per user, a linear regression was performed, with each of the 4 
binary MBTI dimensions as predictors. There was a significant effect of 
thinking, with thinkers having an average of 1.75 more unique words 
per 500 words than feelers (F(1,3924) = 52.584, p < 0.00001). This effect 
Figure 4.2. Number of unique word for each 500 word bin. 
Individual plots show differences within each of the four binary Myers-Briggs 
dimensions.  
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is plotted in Figure 4.2. This is particularly surprising as thinking is 
anticorrelated with openness to experience. However, as a dimension of 
Myers-Briggs, thinkers tend to be naturally curious and may be likely 
to explore new topics and ideas more than feelers.  
In order examine the effect of personality type on word length, a 
linear mixed effects model was created with each of the 4 binary MBTI 
dimensions as fixed effects. Two random intercepts were included in the 
model. These were user and forum. Random slopes could not be included 
in the model as most users did not post in most forums. Three of the four 
binary dimensions significantly predicted average word length per post. 
Introverts used words that were an average of 0.018 characters longer 
than introverts (F(1,3114) = 20.90, p <  .00001). Intuitives used words 
that were an average of 0.0148 characters longer than sensors 
(F(1,3027.419) = 9.522185,p=.00204). Finally, thinkers used words that 
were an average of 0.029 characters longer than feelers 
(F(1,3436.7)=68.27, p < 0.00001). This effect is plotted in Figure 4.3. 
As both of these measures are proxies for vocabulary size, they 
should correlate. Indeed, a regression revealed a significant correlation 
of mean word lengths and unique words (F(1, 322) = 321.97, p<0.00001). 
However, the effects of introversion and intuition were only significant 
for the character length model. The number of unique words model 
pooled across the posts of individual users as many posts were too short 
for accurate analysis. As a result, it is likely that these effects only 
showed in the character length model because it was able to account for 
variance due to the random effects of user and forum. With this 
reasoning, three of the four dimensions – introversion, intuition, and 
thinking – have effects on vocabulary size. Only one of these dimensions 
(i.e. intuition) aligns with openness to experience. However, the 
Figure 4.3. Average word length in characters per user. Individual 
plots show differences within each of the four binary Myers-Briggs 
dimensions.  
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dimension of intuition does have the strongest correlation with openness 
to experience. It is possible that introversion and thinking predict 
vocabulary sizes for other reasons. Of note, however, one study has 
looked at the relation specifically between Myers-Briggs and language 
Ehrman (2008). It reports that among a sample of language learners, 
INTJs comprised the biggest proportion of students at the highest level. 
This aligns with the findings here. 
 
Jaccard Similarity 
 
In order to examine Jaccard distances, a linear mixed effects 
model was created with each of the 4 binary MBTI dimensions as fixed 
effects. Two random intercepts were included in the model. These were 
user and forum. Random slopes could not be included in the model as 
most users did not post in most forums. There was a significant effect of 
intuition, with inutitives being more likely to use words that overlapped 
with previous posts (F(1,1774.3) =   5.1161, p = 0.02382). This effect is 
plotted in Figure 4.4. In other words, intuitives are more likely to 
accommodate their language use to that of others. Given that intuition 
is most highly correlated with openness to experience, this effect could 
be driven by the fact that these users are more open.  
4.7 Exploring the Myers-Briggs Folk Model 
The above section explored the effects of each of the binary Myers-
Briggs dimensions on vocabulary size and accommodation to the 
language of other on the forum. It is important to note that models of 
personality – even as systems that are constrain by folk intuitions – are 
Figure 4.3. Average Jaccard distance from previous forum posts per 
user. Individual plots show differences within each of the four binary Myers-
Briggs dimensions.  
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more complex than binary 4-dimensional systems. They stem from 
complex behaviors of individuals within a culture. Individuals observe 
these patterns and ascribe traits or even psychological processes to those 
individuals.  
Even the Myers-Briggs model has complexities that go beyond 
four dimensions. The Myers-Briggs model of personality is explicitly 
outlined in many resources and among members of the forum of 
interest’s community. The original model suggests that each type 
prefers to use a specific set of underlying cognitive tools. Types that are 
similar in 3 out of 4 of the binary dimensions may or may not share the 
same cognitive tools. For example, the model suggests that an ENFP 
and an ENFJ will have similar surface level behaviors, but do not share 
the same cognitive tools. In contrast, the model suggests that an ENFP 
and an ISTJ will show dissimilar outward behaviors but rely on similar 
sets of cognitive tools. While the Myers-Briggs indicator makes no 
attempt to confirm these speculations or to understand the cognitive 
tools of individuals, talk about these unintuitive relations between the 
16 types is ubiquitous among serious users of the Myers-Briggs model. 
It is possible that the definitions of the 16 types, as formed through 
communities of talk, have taken on such complexities.  
Myers-Briggs has a rich history of use and has much popularity 
online. Much of this popularity has led to the existence of unofficial 
Myers-Briggs quizzes (e.g. Human-Metrics, n.d.; 16Personalities, n.d.). 
Thus, these dimensions have been placed within a social context. This 
would suggest that the Myers-Briggs personality types themselves have 
taken on richer meanings than were originally constructed. In addition, 
the forum of interest has specifically dedicated to the discussion of 
personality. Therefore, these users have assigned distinct meanings and 
identities to each of the Myers-Briggs types. These attributes have likely 
captured some socially relevant features of personality. It is possibly 
that – more so than the four dimensions themselves – the ways in which 
people on the forum talk about personality indexes the aspects of 
language use analyzed above. In order to quantitatively capture 
relationships between the 16 personality types as talked about by forum 
users, I utilize a word2vec model.  
4.7.1 The Word2Vec Model 
In a Word2Vec model, a feed-forward neural network is trained 
to predict the context of a word given a word that appears in that 
context. The network contains a single hidden layer. Once the model is 
trained, each word is assigned a vector equal to the hidden layer 
activations when that word is given to the network. Word2Vec works 
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well to capture semantic relationships between words.  For example, in 
well-trained Word2Vec models, the vector for ‘king’ minus the vector for 
‘boy’ plus the vector for ‘girl’ will return a vector that is closest to the 
vector for ‘queen.’ As such, word2vec models can give insights into the 
semantic relationships between words. If given the right dataset, these 
relationships can capture rich distinctions between words. In the 
current dataset, users talk frequently about the Myers-Briggs types. 
They use labels for each type (e.g. ‘ENFP’) in order to compare and 
contrast people or understand the complex dynamics of how people 
behave and interact with others. As such, the labels for each Myers-
Briggs type will be used in a slightly different way. The nuances of these 
linguistic contexts will affect how each Myers-Briggs label is treated by 
the word2vec model. I will then use the results of this model to reanalyze 
the linguistic variables from the previous section (number of unique 
words, word lengths, and Jaccard similarities to previous posts).  
For the current analysis, a Word2Vec model with 50 nodes in the 
hidden layer was trained on the entire set of posts from the forum. A 
vector was obtained from the model for each of the 16 personality types. 
The mode was set to create a vector for the most frequent 20000 words 
that appeared on the form. Among these 20000 vectors were vectors for 
each of the 16 personality type labels. Pairwise comparisons between 
the vectors for each of the types were made using cosine distance. 
Multidimensional scaling followed by a principal components analysis 
was performed the cosine distances. A total of four components were 
extracted. These components are visualized in Figure 4.4.   
The original four dimensions of the Myers-Briggs do appear to be 
captured Examining the first four components, there appears to be 
alignment with the four binary dimensions of Myers-Briggs. Component 
1 appears to primarily capture the dimensions of sensing-intuition, as 
well as some of the introversion-extroversion dimension and to an even 
lesser degree, the feeling-thinking dimension. Component 2 appears to 
capture the dimension of feeling-thinking, and to a lesser degree, 
introversion-extroversion. Component 3 appears to capture the 
interaction of the of judging-perceiving dimension and the intuition-
sensing dimension. The difference in component three between sensors 
and intuitives is reversed, depending on if the types are judgers or 
perceivers. Component 4 appears to capture the dimension of 
introversion-extroversion and the dimension of feeling-thinking. While 
the components do capture the four binary dimensions, there does 
appear to be extra information about each specific type. For example, 
even though the second component appears to capture the thinker-feeler 
distinction, the difference (as measured within component two) between 
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an ISFP and ISTP is much greater than the difference between ESTJ 
and ESFJ.  
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Figure 4.4.  Each of the 16 Myers-Briggs labels plotted within the 
four components derived from the word2vec model. Components 1 and 2 
shown on the left, while components 3 and 4 are shown on the right. Each 
row shows labels paired along each dimension (e.g. INFP and ENFP paired 
for introversion-extroversion).    
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4.8 Second Analysis 
The word2vec components can be used see how the ways in which 
users talk about the Myers-Briggs types are able to better predict 
linguistic differences. Each user has self-identified themselves as one of 
the 16 personality types. For each user, four new scores were given, 
based on how their self-identified Myers-Briggs type was embedded 
within the four word2vec components. Thus, each user was scored 
within each of the four word2vec components.  
 
Vocabulary Size 
 
As before, the effects of personality on number of unique words 
was analyzed with a linear regression. The original four binary 
dimensions were included as predictors. In addition, the four word2vec 
components were included as predictors.  As before, there was a 
significant effect of thinking (F(1,3920) = 52.6558, p < 0.0001). In 
addition, there was a significant effect of the first word2vec component 
(F(1,3920) = 5.1079, p = 0.02387). This effect is plotted in Figure 4.5.  
Figure 4.5.  Number of unique words per 500 word bin plotted 
against Component 1.  
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A second model was also created for word length. As with the 
previous model looking at word length, all four MBTI dimensions were 
included as fixed effects. In addition, the four word2vec components 
were also included as fixed effects.  Two random intercepts were 
included in the model. These were user and forum. In the original model, 
three of the four factors showed significance. These were introversion, 
intuition, and thinking. However, only one of these factors was 
significant in the new model. Intuitives had significantly longer word 
lengths than sensors (F(1,3175.5) = 5.1451, p = 0.0233). In addition, the 
judging-perceiving dimension is now significant, with perceivers having 
longer words than judgers (F(1,3236.7)=5.5863, p=0.0181). The absence 
of significant effects for thinking and introversion may likely be due to 
correlations with the word2vec components. If any of the variance 
previously accounted for by the previous model were better accounted 
for by any of the components, then indeed, one component would show 
significance over the original dimension. Indeed, the fourth component 
significantly predicted word lengths, with higher component scores 
correlating with longer words (F(1,3150.4) = 10.2068, p = 0.0014).This 
effect is plotted in Figure 4.6. The fourth component aligned with the 
introversion-extroversion dimension and mildly with the thinking-
feeling dimension. This coincides with the fact that introversion and 
thinking are no longer significant. However, the fact that component 
Figure 4.6. Average word length in characters plotted against 
component 4. 
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four significantly captures variation in word length suggests that the 
true individual differences underlying word length are more complex 
than the binary Myers-Briggs dimensions. Interestingly, the binary 
dimension of judging-perceiving significantly predicts word length when 
the four components are included in the model, with judgers having 
longer word lengths than perceivers (F(1,3236.7)=5.5863, p = 0.018).  
 
Jaccard Similarities 
 
A second linear mixed effects model was also made predicting 
Jaccard similarities. As with the first model, each of the 4 binary MBTI 
dimensions as fixed effects. In addition, the four word2vec components 
were included as fixed effects. Two random intercepts were included in 
the model. These were user and forum. In the original model, intuitives 
had significantly higher Jaccard similarities than sensors. However, in 
the new model, there were no significant effects for the four binary 
Myers-Briggs dimensions. Moreover, there were no significant effects 
from the four word2vec components. An absence of any significant 
findings is likely due to the explained variance being split between the 
binary dimensions and the components.  
4.9 Conclusion  
This chapter explored the relationship between language and 
personality. While language variation has been studied throughout the 
history of linguistics, the study of how language varies in relation to 
personality is has only recently gained attention. The current literature, 
however, does suggest there are indeed relationships between certain 
personality dimensions and differences in language learning (Verhoeven 
& Vermeer, 2016) and accommodation (Yu, Abrego-Collier, & 
Sonderegger, 2013). These correlations primarily relate to the big five 
dimension, openness to experience. In addition, there also appear to be 
general correlations between the words people use and all dimensions of 
the big five (Kern et al., 2014; Park et al., 2014).  
Given that openness to experiences generally aligns abilities to 
acquire language and to adapt to the language of others, I decided to 
examine the relation between three linguistic variable and Myers-
Briggs personality types. To do the analysis, text data from an online 
forum where individuals self-identify their Myers-Briggs types was 
used. Two of these variables served as proxies for vocabulary size, which 
should be higher for individuals who have general proclivities for 
acquiring language. These were unique word counts and average word 
lengths. The third variable was a calculation of the degree to which the 
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language of a user’s post matched the posts of the most recent posts 
within that post’s sub-forum. These were calculated with a Jaccard 
similarity, which measured the overlap between unique bigrams 
between posts.  
The intuition-sensing dimeson of Myers-Briggs most closely 
aligns to openness, and those who are self—report as intuitive types 
indeed show higher overall character lengths. A similar effect was not 
ound for the unique word model. It is important to note, however, that 
the number of users who reported to be sensors were much fewer than 
the number who reported to be intuitives. Given that the unique word 
model was weaker (i.e. data points were aggregated within users) than 
the word length model, it follows that an effect of intuition-sensing 
would be less likely to be detected in the unique word model. In addition, 
there was also an effect of intuition-sensing on Jaccard similarity, with 
intuitives have higher chance of using the same bigrams as previous 
users in the same sub-forum. As such, the overall results here are in 
support of the relationship between openness to experience, language 
learning, and language accommodation. As effects were seen for both 
word length and Jaccard similarity, it may be the case that intuitive 
individuals gain larger vocabularies because they pick up on new 
vocabulary as they accommodate the words of others.  
Introverted and thinking types also had higher word lengths. 
However, while the Myers-Briggs dimensions of introversion and 
thinking are most correlated with the big five dimensions of introversion 
and dis-agreeableness, these dimensions have mild anticorrelations 
with openness to experience. Given that dimensions that both correlate 
and anticorrelate with openness to experience are predictive to word 
length, it is more likely that multiple dimension of personality drive 
vocabulary size. Indeed, when the word2vec components are added to 
the model, the thinking-feeling dimeson remains significant, while the 
significance of the intuition-sensing dimension is encompassed by 
component one. This suggests that these dimensions represent distinct 
sources of variation. It is unclear why dis-agreeableness would correlate 
with higher vocabulary scores. One possibility is that those who are 
agreeable are more likely to be attentive to prosodic and pragmatic 
features of language, as they may have higher degrees of empathy 
(Claxton-Oldfield & Banzen, 2010). In contrast, those who are less 
agreeable are more likely to attend to the literal meanings of words. 
Thus, they will be more likely to learn specific lexical items. This 
possibility is supported by studies suggesting correlations between 
agreeableness and the use of empathy (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & 
Tobin, 2007), as well as with psychological dispositions such as autism 
  
 
102 
spectrum which can characterized by differences in the ability to read 
social cues (Schriber, Robins, & Solomon, 2014). 
The second purpose of this chapter was to examine the ways in 
which the online community talks about personality. Dimensions of 
personality are the socially relevant differences between individuals. As 
such, personality dimensions are discovered through social interactions. 
While the originally Myers-Briggs dimensions were created by armature 
psychologists, it is possible that users of the Myers-Briggs model 
consistently extend the model in order to incorporate their own 
observations about social behavior. Thus, the talk surrounding Myers-
Briggs may be more informative about individual differences than the 
original Myers-Briggs dimensions themselves. In order to see this, a 
word2vec model was created in order to capture differences in how the 
forum users talk about each of the 16 Myers-Briggs types. Four 
components were extracted from the word2vec embeddings of the 16 
Myers-Briggs labels. While these components aligned in some ways with 
the original four dimensions, they appeared to capture additional 
differences between the 16 types that are not captured by the 4 
dimensions. For example, within component 3, there was a greater 
difference between judgers and perceivers who were sensors than 
between judgers and perceivers who were intuitives. This suggests that 
user conceptions of what it means to be a judger is more important for 
individuals who are sensors than intuitives. The component space shows 
other, more subtle, distinctions between the 16 types. At least from a 
qualitative inspection of these components, it appears that users do 
indeed have more complex model of personality than the 4 binary 
dimensions. 
In addition, the components were added to the original models 
predicting unique words, word lengths, and Jaccard similarities. 
Component 1 was found to be a significant predictor for number of 
unique words, while component 4 was found to be significant for 
character length. Component 1 appeared to primarily align with the 
dimension of intuition-sensing, with some aspects of the introversion-
extroversion and judging-perceiving dimensions. Of note, the original 
unique word model did not show a significant effect of intuition-sensing, 
a dimension which did significantly predict the other vocabulary proxy. 
This likely indicates that nuisances related to intuition-sensing that 
users are aware of explains variation in the number of unique words 
enough that component 1 was significant while the binary sensing-
intuition dimension was not. As intuition-sensing correlates with 
openness to experience, this suggests that number of unique words does 
indeed relate to openness to experience, even though the originally 
binary sensing-intuition dimension did not show significance.  
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Component 4, which significantly correlated with word length, 
appears to relate primarily with the thinking-feeling dimension and the 
introversion-extroversion dimension, with some influence of intuition-
sensing. This aligns to the fact that the thinking-feeling dimension and 
the introversion-extraversion dimension were no longer significant in 
the with-components word length model. It appears likely that these two 
dimensions, together, are influenced by a latent factor responsible for 
an increase in vocabulary size. As with agreeableness, extroversion also 
correlates with empathy (Claxton-Oldfield & Banzen, 2010). This 
corroborates the above hypothesis, suggesting that individuals with 
more empathetic tendencies will attend more towards prosodic or 
pragmatic features, while introverts and those who sore as more 
disagreeable will attend more towards literal word meanings. Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that an individual’s degree of empathy 
modulates the ability to understand pragmatic cues (Li, Jiang, Yu, & 
Zhou, 2014).   
Given that some of the four components explained the variance of 
word length and number of unique words better than some of the binary 
Myers-Briggs dimensions suggests that the users of the forum are 
indeed able to capture real-world differences in the behaviors of 
individuals. This is important because personality measures tend to be 
derived from the intuitions of individuals. As such, these measures may 
only be reliable if socially constructed models can references true 
differences in the world. The big five, which is the most widely used 
personality measure in academic contexts, was constructed from such 
folk models. The embeddings of the 16 types within the word2vec space 
suggest that personality dimensions interact heavily and that these 
interactions are privy to socially constructed personality models. As 
such, it is likely that personality folk models are more complex than five 
dimensional spaces. The big five were derived from similarity ratings of 
personality trait terms. However, given advances in data science and 
understandings of cultural knowledge, it is likely that other techniques 
will be able to extract more sophisticated models of individual 
differences that indeed explain real-world differences in human 
behavior and cognition.  
The fact that the intuition-sensing dimension remained 
significant when adding the components to the word length model 
suggests that the variance explained by intuition-sensing truly comes 
from a different source than the variation explained by introversion and 
thinking. As such, it appears (at least) two separate mechanisms are 
responsible for difference sin vocabulary size. As mentioned above, these 
are likely openness to experience and possibly empathetic abilities. If 
this is indeed the case, then this study exemplifies two different kinds 
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of individual differences. In the case of openness to experience, 
individuals would be more willing to attend to the linguistic styles of 
other individuals. As a consequence, they will be exposed to a wider 
range of word forms to learn. Thus, they will have larger vocabularies. 
This is supported by the fact that Jaccard similarity was also larger for 
intuitives. Those who are more intuitive are more likely to adapt to the 
linguistic styles of others, and thus will gain aspects of those styles. This 
would suggest that intuitives/those open to experience would also have 
a wider repertoire of prosodic patterns, phonological flexibility, and 
syntactic flexibility. In contrast, Jaccard similarities were not predicted 
by introversion and thinking, even though these dimensions did predict 
vocabulary size. The variance in vocabulary size related to introversion 
and thinking likely modulates a trade-off between attention towards 
contextual cues and attention towards the meaning of individual word 
forms. While this variation exists, it is unlikely that the majority of 
these speakers use language in ways that inhibit that abilities to operate 
within social contexts. As such, it appears that language users may gain 
competencies with similar functionalities, but by employing different 
strategies.   
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Throughout this dissertation, I have examined the role of culture 
and individual differences in cognitive variation. Specifically, I have 
presented studies that show how language experience, cultural 
background, and personality affect the behaviors and cognition of 
individuals. Each of these studies have helped to exemplify that it is 
important to understand the nuances of the culture-cognition system. 
This culture-cognitive system is made up of thousands of interconnected 
cognitive tools. Each individual within a culture is privy to many of the 
cognitive tools shared within a culture. Individuals will gain and utilize 
cognitive tools depending on their specific cultural exposure and pre-
existing dispositions. Thus, individuals will vary in how they form 
cognitive styles – biases for using particular cognitive tools – both 
because of cultural exposure and because of their pre-existing cognitive 
tools.  
It is important to understand the complexities of the culture-
cognition system and how individuals vary within it in order to 
understand how culture modulates cognitive variation. In order for 
cultural variables to properly explain cognitive variation, there need to 
be direct correspondences between the cultural variable and the 
cognitive consequences. For example, exposure to a certain cognitive tool 
will result in the acquisition of that cognitive tool. Thus, the cognitive 
consequence of the cultural variable is the variable itself. However, 
cognitive tools are often complex and consist of other cognitive tools. 
Thus, the acquisition of a cognitive tool requires the presence of other 
cognitive tools upon which it is scaffolded. For example, a proper 
acquisition of an English verb requires previous understanding of the 
English lexicon, English grammar, English phonology, and English 
syntactic structure. However, the exact scaffolding for a cognitive tool 
may vary. For example, speakers of two English dialects may acquire 
the same new verb, even though they possess slightly different lexicons, 
grammars, phonologies, and syntactic structures. However, in some 
cases, individuals may only possess cognitive tools which are non-
optimal as scaffolding for the new cognitive tool. In order to competently 
gain the cognitive tool, however, the individual will upregulate the 
utility of the sub-optimal tools which are being used as scaffolding. Thus, 
  
 
106 
changes to the components of the acquired cognitive tools will vary along 
with individual differences.  
While understanding the complexities of culture-cognition 
systems is important for understanding cognitive variation, much of the 
recent literature examining cognitive variation does not focus on 
understanding culture as a dynamic system. Indeed, cognitive science 
itself has a long history that focuses on the cognitive process, divorced 
from the rich interactivity of the context within which those processes 
occur. Nonetheless, there has been renewed interest in examining 
cognitive variation. Such studies have touched on topics such as the 
cognitive advantages of bilingualism, cross-cultural differences in the 
attentional styles of individuals in Japan and the USA, and the 
relationship between personality and language. In this dissertation, I 
examined each of these cases of cognitive variation though a dynamic 
systems perspective. In all cases, I show that cognitive variation arises 
through complex interactions within the culture-cognition system.  
5.1 Contextualizing the Findings  
Here, I review the findings from each of the three studies 
presented in this dissertation. Along with these findings, I suggest how 
each study examines individual differences within the culture-cognition 
system. I also give possible future directions for each of the three 
studies.  
5.1.1 Language Learning and Inhibitory Control  
In chapter 2, I presented a study examining the role of language 
learning on inhibitory control. Throughout the literature, bilinguals 
appear to have certain cognitive advantages relative to their 
monolingual peers. These advantages primarily relate to inhibitory 
control, the ability to suppress information that is task-irrelevant. The 
predominant theoretical explanation for this is that bilinguals possess 
two distinct language representations (e.g. Kroll, 2005). Both language 
representations will become active, regardless of the target language. 
This activation will interfere with processing of the target language. 
Thus, bilingual individuals must constantly inhibit the non-target 
language in order to process the target language. This habitual 
inhibition will eventually necessitate the strengthening of inhibitory 
control.  
Despite this explanation, there is evidence to suggest that the 
linguistic knowledge of a bilingual is heavily interwoven. It is likely that 
these interlanguage connections are the source of competition between 
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word forms, sounds, syntactic patterns, and semantic categories of a 
bilingual’s two languages. This competition, while especially strong for 
bilinguals, exists for monolingual linguistic knowledge networks as well. 
This would suggest that the effects of bilingualism are a matter of 
degree, rather than of type. However, it then follows that specific 
differences in linguistic networks drive these differences in degree. 
Connections within these networks can exist because of overlap on all 
linguistic levels, including phonological, semantic, syntactic similarity 
between words. However, it is not clear what kinds of connections drive 
the types of competition that necessitate inhibitory control.  
In order to investigate the link between certain kinds of linguistic 
knowledge and inhibitory control, I conducted an experiment that 
measured how the use of inhibitory control in a word learning task 
transferred to a task directly measuring inhibitory control. Individuals 
were asked to learn associations between objects and labels. The objects 
were either familiar everyday objects and the labels were either words 
that existed in English or novel words. Participants showed increased 
inhibitory control abilities only in the condition where they learned to 
map existing English words with novel objects. The results of this study 
hint that inhibitory control will be particularly needed in cases where 
there is lots of phonological similarity but semantic dis-similarity.  
As with other aspects of cognition, linguistic knowledge is part of 
the larger culture-cognition system. Individual words, syntactic frame, 
phonemes can all be seen as miniature cognitive tools that can be pieced 
together to a larger communication system. As a complex dynamic 
system, all of these linguistic tools interact with each other. Language 
processing – including the use of inhibitory control – can be seen as 
emerging from the properties of an individual’s entire linguistic 
knowledge. As such, it is important to understand the constituents of 
these systems in order to understand how these complex dynamics arise. 
Each individual will have a unique system of linguistic knowledge, with 
its own dynamic properties. Inferring these dynamics requires detailed 
knowledge of which aspects of linguistic knowledge cause what 
emergent properties. In this case, the necessity of inhibitory control is 
the emergent property.  
In this study, a limited number of properties were tested that 
loosely connect to specific aspects of linguistic knowledge. A clear next 
step is to pinpoint in more detail the exact ways in which these effects 
extend to similar situations. With the same experimental paradigm as 
used here, a variety of object-label parings could be used. These could 
include labels that are selected such that they overlap in very specific 
ways with the linguistic knowledge of participants. For example, words 
of various frequency, phonological density, semantic density, or even 
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syntactic frame density could be used in order to precisely see how these 
linguistic properties affect inhibitory control. The same could be applied 
to novel objects. Objects could be constructed to share or not share 
various degrees of properties with known everyday objects.  
In addition to mapping linguistic knowledge systems to inhibitory 
control, there exist other aspects of cognitive control that may align 
differently with such knowledge systems. These include task switching 
and updating. Together with inhibitory control, these three loosely 
connected processes allow for individuals to meet the demands of their 
current task and goals. However, as these processes likely perform 
different – yet slightly overlapping – roles, they are likely affected by 
the structure of linguistic knowledge networks in slightly different 
ways. Just as the attentional network task was used in the current 
study, other tasks could be used before and after a word learning task 
in order to see how these processes are involved in language learning.  
Going beyond the current experimental paradigm, there are other 
methodological implications of the current research. If particular 
properties of linguistic knowledge networks result in certain levels of 
inhibitory control, then there will be predictable individual differences 
in inhibitory control advantages. Thus, measures of individual linguistic 
background – such as the LEAP-Q – will be invaluable in linking the 
structure of linguistic knowledge to cognitive control or other cognitive 
consequences of language. Moreover, in the case of bilingualism, the 
structure of the linguistic knowledge system will greatly depend on the 
similarities and differences between the languages. Therefore, 
bilinguals of different language pairings will likely rely on different – 
yet predictable – degrees of inhibitory control.  
5.1.2 Cross-Cultural Differences in Attentional Style 
In Chapter 3, I presented a study examining cross-cultural 
differences in the attentional styles of individuals in Japan and the 
USA. A robust set of studies have demonstrated the individuals in East-
Asian cultures tend to rely more on context than Western-American 
individuals (Senzaki et al., 2014a; Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; 
Nisbett & Miyamoto, 2005; Kuwabara & Smith 2012; Masuda & Nisbett 
2001). For example, when looking at a visual scene, individuals in Japan 
are more likely to look at background elements than individuals in the 
USA. These differences extend to other aspects of cognition, such as 
memory (Schwartz, Boduroglu, & Gutchess, 2014), reasoning 
(Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002), and categorization (Ji & 
Nisbett, 2001). The predominant theoretical explanation for these 
differences is that East-Asian countries stress collectivist self-construal, 
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the belief that the needs of the group should outweigh the needs of the 
individual. In contrast, those in the USA are more likely to place the 
individual before the needs of the group. For East-Asians, constant 
attention towards the needs of the group facilities an attentional style 
towards context.  
As I argued in Chapter 1, in order for there to be a cognitive 
consequence of culture, (1) there either needs to be a direct one-to-one 
identity between the element of culture being acquired and the cognitive 
tool gained, or (2) the cognitive consequence arises because certain 
cognitive tools are co-opted in order to acquire new cognitive tools. If 
self-construal was the mechanisms through which these attentional 
differences arise, then there must be something about a habitual 
collectivist mindset that necessitates the use of contextual cues. 
However, the relationship between self-construal preferences and 
attentional style is not clear. Thus, without evidence for parallels 
between self-construal and attention, it is unlikely that self-construal 
represents the mechanism through which variation in cognitive style 
arises.  
While differences in self-construal do quite well in dividing East-
Asian and Western-American cultures, it is important to understand 
that this is only one of many variables that can distinguish these 
cultures. As cultural variables are part of a larger culture-cognition 
system, it is important to understand the entire cultural space of 
possible variables. Given the current literature, there are several other 
aspects of these cultures that serve as alternative candidates for the 
mechanisms though which attentional style differences arise. These 
included differences in how the languages of these cultural groups treat 
contextual information and the physical layouts of man-made 
environments (i.e. buildings, streets). Moreover, a closer look at self-
construal suggests that it may be broken into two separate cultural 
variables. Interdependence measures the degree to which individuals 
attend to the needs of a group, while independence measures the degree 
that an individual will attend to the self. In addition, I also identified 
overall language experience as a potential modulator of attentional 
style, due to its relation with other aspects of cognitive variation. While 
these cultural variables do represent possible sources of cognitive 
variation, it is important to note that they are by no means exhaustive. 
A true set of potential mechanisms would require in depth ethnographic-
level analysis of the cultures in question.  
In order to see if any of the proposed cultural variables do indeed 
relate to attentional style, I carried out a study that examined the 
relationship between individual variation within these cultural 
variables and attentional style. Individual differences are quite 
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important to the study of cognitive variation, as differences in exposure 
to these cultural variables should mediate the degree to which these 
cognitive consequences occur. In line with this, I gave participants two 
tasks measuring attentional style. The first measured the eye-fixations 
of participants towards elements of a visual scene. The second measured 
participant abilities to attend towards the global and local features of 
Navon shapes (i.e. shapes made of smaller shapes).  
I expected that some of the cultural variables would correlate 
with individual differences in attentional style, as measured by eye-
fixations and preferences for global and local information. Two of these 
variables, interdependent self-construal and preference for contextual 
information early in sentences, did indeed predict individual differences 
in attentional style. However, the direction of the correlations between 
these variables and attentional style was reversed for individuals in 
Japan and the USA. Looking at both groups simultaneously, it appears 
that individuals who possess self-construal or linguistic preferences that 
mis-align to cultural norms are less dependent on contextual 
information. This line of reasoning is similar to that of the bilingual 
literature. These individuals essentially have two sets of competing 
desires: (1) to function as competent individuals within social contexts 
and (2) to carry out their own individual preferences. As such, these 
individuals must be able to carry out behaviors within two different 
cultural contexts. This would result in a greater ability to process 
information independent of a strong context.  
This study intended to examine one type of individual difference, 
individual differences in cognitive variation that arise due to differences 
in cultural exposure. However, it appears that this study highlights a 
different type of individual difference; individuals in this study appear 
to differ because they possess different predispositions for acquiring 
cognitive tools. Here, the cognitive tools in question are the cultural 
variables being measured. Individuals in Japan must acquire linguistic 
and social competencies that allow them to produce and understand 
sentences that place contextual information first and to operate within 
a collectivist social context. In contrast, individuals in the United States 
must produce and understand sentences that place focused/figure 
information first and operate within a non-collectivist social context. 
However, certain individuals will have predispositions that are align 
more or less to these socially necessitated behaviors. While individuals 
reported varying preferences for these behaviors – even within cultural 
groups – it is unlikely that any of the participants were socially 
incompetent. Thus, those individuals who were less predisposed to gain 
the competency to use these cognitive tools must have had to utilize a 
slightly different set of underlying processes to support the acquisition 
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of cultural competence. This resulted in slightly different attentional 
patterns for individuals with culturally dis-preferred tendencies.  
While significant patterns were found in this study, it is 
important to note that the study was quasi-experimental. In other 
words, while particular variables were identified, these variables were 
not established via controlled laboratory manipulation. Instead, they 
are the consequence of variation within a complex culture-cognition 
system. Within such a system, many cultural variables interact and 
influence each other in complex non-linear ways. As such, it is difficult 
to suggest that variables measured here are indeed the sources of 
cognitive variation. If they are not, however, they at least align with the 
sources of cognitive variation or perhaps jointly contribute along with 
other unknown variables. In order to know better how specific cultural 
variables affect cognition, the relation between these and cognition need 
to be tested in controlled laboratory settings. For example, paradigms 
similar to the one used in Chapter 2 could be employed here. 
Participants could be given a task where they must utilize a particular 
self-construal style or read sentences with specific syntactic orders. 
They could be given a measure of attentional style before and after this 
task in order to assess the degree to which the particular variable 
influences attentional style.  
5.1.3 The Relation Between Personality and 
Language Use on an Online Forum 
In chapter 4, I examined the relation between individual 
variation in personality traits and the use of language. Previous studies 
have linked dimensions of the big five personality model with language 
acquisition (Verhoeven & Vermeer, 2016; Yu, Abrego-Collier, & 
Sonderegger (2013) and accommodation (Yu, Abrego-Collier, & 
Sonderegger (2013). These studies specifically showed correlations with 
the personality dimension of openness to experience. Those who are 
more open to experience are more likely to engage in novel topics and 
take in new kinds of information. Thus, those who are more open will 
naturally attend to a larger variety of content. This translates into 
better abilities to learn language and to match the language styles of 
other individuals.  
The first purpose of this study was to see if the relation between 
personality and language use extended to lexical diversity. Utilizing 
data from an online forum where users provide self-identified Myers-
Briggs Type personality types, I specifically looked at proxies for the 
vocabulary sizes of users, as well as the likelihood that they use 
language constructions (in the form of bigrams) that match users who 
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posted most recently with the same sub-forum as the user’s current post. 
The second purpose of this study was see how the social construction of 
personality is able to explain real-world variation in behavior. While the 
Myers-Briggs model of personality aligns well with other personality 
measures, like the big five, it does not necessarily capture all aspects of 
personality. However, it is likely that the ways in which individuals talk 
about personality – including the Myers-Briggs system – includes 
additional information about human behavior that is socially 
discovered. As such, a word2vec model was created that was able to 
quantify how users talked about each of the 16 Myers-Briggs types. Four 
new components were extracted from the word2vec model, which were 
later used to predict user language (in addition to the original four 
binary Myers-Briggs dimensions).  
Dimensions related to openness (e.g. the intuition-sensing 
dimensions of Myers-Briggs) significantly predicted both user 
vocabulary size and likely to accommodate the language patterns of 
recent user posts. This result aligns with previous findings suggesting 
that those who are more open to experience are more likely to adapt 
their language production to others and to are more able to gain second 
language proficiency to a native-like fluency. Here, those who are more 
open are likely attending to a wider range of linguistic differences. Thus, 
they are more likely to acquire a larger range of linguistic forms.  
In addition to the intuition-sensing dimension, introverts and 
thinkers also had higher vocabularies. However, neither of these 
dimensions predicted user accommodation to other users. In addition, 
when the four word2vec derived components were added to the model, 
these effects disappeared, with the significance from both of these 
dimensions being pooled into a single component. As these pooled into a 
single component, it is likely that a latent variable – common to both 
introverts and thinkers – drives the effect of introversion and thinking 
on vocabulary size. I suggested that a possible factor could be the degree 
to which individuals attend to extralinguistic context versus literal 
semantic meaning. Extroversion and feeling align with the big five 
dimensions of extroversion and agreeableness, which both are 
associated with empathy (Graziano, Habashi, Tobin, and Sheese, 2007). 
As such, these types would be more likely to attend towards intonational 
and pragmatic cues, while introverts and thinkers would be more likely 
to attend to specific word forms in more detail.  
In addition to findings about the relationship between specific 
dimensions of personality and language, this study also showed that the 
language of users does indeed better explain variation in the behavior of 
individuals than the original Myers-Briggs personality dimensions. One 
implication of this is that personality models themselves, as models 
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derived from the folk models of individuals, are reliable enough to 
contain real-world relevance. Moreover, these folk models likely contain 
relevant information about individual differences in behavior that are 
not captured by dimensionality reductions personality trait terms. Folk 
models of personality, while dimensionality reductions themselves, 
likely pick up on the dynamic relationships between individual 
personality traits. These dynamics are likely much more complex than 
4 or 5 dimensional non-interacting systems (like the big five). With 
modern data science techniques it would be relatively trivial to 
investigate the dynamics of such systems. The original big five 
dimensions were created because early personality researchers felt that 
describing individuals with thousands of traits was impractical. 
Intuitions about these traits clustered into five dimensions. However, 
this clustering does not entail that English speakers only think about 
personality within a five-dimensional space. With modern 
computational power, it is less cumbersome to explore individual 
variation within a much higher dimensional space.  
Personality is a measure of the culture-cognition system. 
Individuals with different personalities have different cognitive styles. 
As personality is a reduction of the culture-cognition system, it is 
simultaneously useful for understanding cognitive variation, whilst 
making it difficult to pinpoint the exact mechanisms through which 
cognitive variation arises. Here, several dimensions of personality were 
linked to differences in language use. However, as these dimensions are 
reductions of the entire culture-cognition space, it is difficult to suggest 
which aspects of the system are responsible for these effects. For 
example, the dimension of openness to experience aligns with general 
intelligence, creativity, and even a wider range life experiences. These 
in return are related to thousands of different aspects of the culture-
cognition system.  
Regardless of the exact variables responsible for the relation 
between personality and language, it is clear that measuring personality 
does help to explain variance in the use of language. Moreover, this 
study appears to exemplify two different types of individual variation. 
First, in the case of openness to experience, users appear to take on 
different cognitive styles because they expose themselves to differing 
diversities of cognitive tools.  Second, in the case of introversion and 
thinking, users appear to have different dispositions for attending 
towards certain kinds of information. Introverts and thinkers attend 
more towards word forms, while extraverts and feelers attend more 
towards extra-linguistic cues. Both strategies will lead to linguistic 
competency. However, the cognitive consequences of these strategies 
result in different vocabulary sizes.  
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5.2 Examining the Culture-Cognition System  
In this dissertation, the culture-cognition system was examined 
from several different angles. The culture-cognitive system itself is a 
complex dynamic system within which cognitive tools spread and 
interact. At the level of the individual, cognitive tools make up the 
innerworkings of cognition. Individual cognitive tools are made up of 
other cognitive tools and are used by the individual in order to interact 
with and understand their environment. They take the form of cognitive 
processes and knowledge such as attentional patterns, individual word 
forms, semantic categories, entire languages, actions, or problem-
solving strategies. At the level of culture, cognitive tools take the form 
of shared knowledge and behaviors. As members of a culture, 
individuals will acquire the cognitive tools disseminated among other 
members whom they interact with.  
When measuring variation in the culture-cognition system, 
measurements can examine cognitive tools as they manifest at a 
cultural level or at a cognitive level. While cognitive tools exist within 
the entire culture-cognition system, the ways in which they interact or 
are talked about by people differ at these levels. For example, people will 
often talk about knowing a specific language, but do not often talk about 
knowing particular syntactic structures. Yet, these syntactic structures 
are critical aspects of linguistic cognitive tools. Moreover, the ways in 
which cognitive tools may pattern will take different forms at these 
levels. This is especially true because the dissemination of cognitive 
tools at a cultural level can result in different cognitive tools 
organizations at the individual level. The existence of a cognitive tool 
within a culture does not inherently depend on a particular scaffolding, 
despite the fact that a particular scaffolding is optimal for that cognitive 
tool. Thus, it only makes sense to measure differences in the 
construction of cognitive tools at an individual level, unless the 
component tools are explicitly disseminated.  
The language-learning task presented in Chapter 2 attempted to 
measure cognitive tools as defined at the cognitive level. Very particular 
cognitive tools were explicitly given to participants to incorporate into 
their existing linguistic knowledge systems. Given the English 
knowledge of these participants, it is reasonable to infer the ways in 
which these new object-word pairings integrated with their existing 
linguistic knowledge. Thus, the study was able to examine how the 
patterning of particular cognitive tools at the cognitive level affect 
inhibitory control, which also might be seen as a cognitive tool at the 
cognitive level. In contrast, the cross-cultural study shown in Chapter 3 
measured variation in the culture-cognition system at the cultural level. 
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The surveys given in the study measured cultural variables without 
much attention to the ways in which the cultural knowledge is embodied 
within individuals. While such measures are indeed important in 
understanding how culture effects cognition, it will be necessary in the 
future to understand the exact cognitive tools that comprise self-
construal patterns. However, broader culturally based categories are 
nonetheless useful in understanding cognitive variation. This claim is 
corroborated by Chapter 4, which further demonstrates that culturally 
established dimensions (personality, in this case) are able to capture 
aspects of individual variation.  
While the degree to which each of the three studies examined the 
content of culture-cognition systems differed, it is clear that more 
detailed knowledge of culture-cognition systems is necessary for the 
study of cognitive variation. The study of the cognitive consequences of 
language bilingualism needs to understand the complex network 
properties of linguistic knowledge systems and how each of these 
properties (e.g. phonological density, semantic overlap) relate to 
inhibitory control and other aspects of cognition. As such, studies that 
examine cognitive differences between bilinguals and monolinguals will 
be unable to discover the true mechanisms through which the bilingual 
advantage arises. Moreover, many studies will likely be unable to find 
differences, as not all monolingual/bilingual distinctions will result in 
different enough linguistic knowledge systems to show distinct 
differences in inhibitory control. The cross-cultural study clearly 
demonstrated that other cultural variables present possible 
mechanisms through which attentional differences arise. In particular, 
both interdependence and figure-ground preferences predicted 
attentional strategies. Given that these cultural variables are 
unexhaustive of the differences between Japan and the USA, it is 
reasonable to expect that other variables may affect attentional style. In 
addition, the ways in which these variables affect attentional style 
suggest that the possession of a behavioral disposition that runs 
contrary to a cultural norm may cause domain general attentional 
strategies to be upregulated. As such, it should be the case that many 
other cultural variables have a similar modulatory effect on attentional 
style.  
Finally, the results of the personality study in Chapter 4 suggest 
that individual differences can be – in part – discoverable by the 
individuals of a culture. Specifically, complex interactions between 
certain cognitive variables may be privy to the folk models of a culture. 
This suggests that personality research can benefit from more complex 
analyses of the folk models of personality. More importantly, however, 
this suggests that any studies of cognitive variation may be able to map 
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the complexities of the culture-cognition system though the language of 
individuals within that system. This aligns with the original 
methodologies of cognitive science, which sought to understand the 
relationships between human behavior and the rich systems of 
knowledge that individuals encode into their languages. With modern 
data science techniques, such as the word2vec model used in Chapter 4, 
complex systems of cultural knowledge may be extracted easily from the 
language of individuals. While mapping entire culture-cognition 
systems may need research methodologies that extend beyond the 
analysis of text, the large majority of cultural variables may be 
discovered through future explorations using these data science 
techniques with little effort.  
5.3 Connecting the Dots 
While the three studies exemplified in this study touched on 
seemingly different topics, they are relevant to each other in interesting 
ways. First and foremost, they each exemplify a fundamental way 
through which different cognitive styles arise; groups of individuals who 
must acquire the same cognitive tools will do so differently, depending 
on other cognitive tools within their repertoire. In the case of language 
learning, the effect that learning a new word has on cognition depends 
on the existence of other words in an individual’s linguistic system. 
Moreover, the necessity of developing inhibitory control in order to 
speak two languages will likely depend on the exact relationship 
between those two languages. Thus, the pre-existing linguistic 
knowledge of an individual affects how they acquire new linguistic 
information. In the case of cross-cultural attentional style, individual 
dispositions for particular linguistic structures or self-construal 
patterns will modulate the degree to which certain attentional 
strategies are preferred when acquiring the language and social values 
of their culture. Finally, in the case of personality, individuals who are 
more open to experience will more likely gain larger vocabularies than 
those who are not, despite belonging to the same language communities. 
The same is true for introverts and thinkers. However, the underlying 
mechanisms for such are likely different.  
In addition to the above commonalities, each of these studies have 
further theoretical implications when considered together. The 
language learning study and the cross-cultural study exemplify how the 
existence of conflicting information may affect domain-general 
processes. In the case of lexical conflict, competing information relates 
to inhibitory control. In the case of self-construal and syntactic order, 
competing information relates to attentional style. In both cases, more 
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overall competition results in ability to or preference to ignore context. 
While these effects are similar, it is interesting that they affect slightly 
different processes. In the case of lexical competition, individual must 
suppress information that inadvertently arises due to the structure of 
their linguistic system. Inhibitory control, in parallel, suppresses 
information that arises inadvertently in order to meet task goals. 
However, in the case of figure and ground information, both kinds of 
information are task relevant. The distinction is which information is 
prioritized. This is perhaps also similar for individuals with self-
construal patterns that deviate from cultural norms. While they might 
always need to display culturally normative behavior in public settings, 
they might also always wish to do so in ways that navigate both desires, 
rather than suppressing one over the other. They might also need to 
reference their own tendency in order to properly compensate for their 
personal dispositions. As such, these differences might result in 
different attentional styles, rather than better inhibitory control 
abilities.  
The study on language learning and the study on personality both 
examined the acquisition of vocabulary. In the case of the language 
learning study, the acquisition of certain kinds of vocabulary resulted in 
increased inhibitory control. In the case of the personality study, higher 
vocabulary correlated with higher openness to experience. Taking the 
two studies together, these results hint at a possible connection between 
inhibitory control and openness to experience. Indeed, openness to 
experience is generally related to executive functioning (Schretlen, van 
der Hulst, Pearlson, & Gordon, 2010; Williams, Suchy, & Kraybill, 
2010). Given this possible connection, it may be quite important to track 
personality when assessing the effects of bilingualism on inhibitory 
control, as these factors will likely interact.  
In the personality study, introversion and thinking correlated 
with increased vocabulary scores. I suggested that this may be the case 
because both extraversion and feeling are linked to empathy. As such, 
these individuals are more likely to attend towards extralinguistic 
features, while introverts and thinkers are more likely to gain 
vocabulary because they attend to individual word forms. However, 
when examining this study within the context of the other two studies 
of this dissertation, an alternative explanation arises. Introverts and 
thinkers are less common in the population (Myers-Briggs, n.d.) and 
agreeable and extroverted behaviors are culturally normative within the 
USA (Schmitt et. al, 2007). As such, these individuals possess culturally 
dis-preferred behaviors and have gained certain cognitive consequences 
(i.e. vocabulary size) as a result of negotiating between their personal 
disposition and culturally appropriate behaviors. However, it is not clear 
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how vocabulary size is a cognitive consequence of such cognitive 
negotiation.  
While the connections between these three studies are merely 
speculative, the results of these studies do indicate that there may be 
relevant connections between different domains of cognitive variation. 
Future research on cognitive variation should be alert to the possible 
links between the mechanisms that underlie different sources of 
variation.  
 
5.4 Final Remarks 
This dissertation presented a novel framework for looking at the 
mechanisms through which cognitive variation arises. This framework 
advocates strongly for (1) detailed descriptions of the culture-cognition 
system in order to understand the complex dynamics through which the 
cognitive tools of culture and cognition may interact and (2) attention 
towards individual differences in cognitive variation, as individual 
differences reveal direct parallels between cultural exposure, the 
cognitive styles of individuals, and the cognitive requirements of 
acquiring new cognitive tools. The studies in this dissertation 
exemplified cases whereby adding nuanced information about culture-
cognition systems enhanced the explanatory value of theories that 
explain how cognitive variation arises. By providing these nuanced 
descriptions, a range of cultural variables were identified as potential 
sources of cognitive variation. Furthermore, each of these studies 
demonstrated how measuring (or experimentally creating in the case of 
the language learning study) individual differences was critical in 
understanding the role that these cultural variables play in modulating 
cognitive variation. Overall, this dissertation paints an optimistic 
picture for the future of research on cognitive variation. By using a 
combination of methods – including data science explorations of culture-
cognition systems, cross-cultural and intercultural documentation of 
cognitive variation, and the experimental testing of the effects of 
cultural variables on cognition – cognitive science will be able to 
fruitfully gain understandings of cognitive variation.  
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